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Shaping the perceptual representation of observed human 
action through prediction. 
 
Katrina Louise McDonough  
 
Abstract 
Understanding the actions of others is crucial for all social interactions. Despite a 
dynamic and complicated social world, humans can derive the goals, attitudes and 
beliefs that drive others’ actions, imbuing them with meaning and understanding. 
While such abilities were traditionally accounted for by a direct matching of observed 
actions to actions within the observer’s motor system, contemporary theories of 
social perception explain them within a predictive processing framework. They argue 
that perception of others’ actions is shaped by prior assumptions about their goals 
and intentions and the behaviours that these mental states predict. This thesis aimed 
to resolve whether people make such predictions, whether they are represented 
perceptually, and on which information they rely. 
 Ten experiments utilized a variant of the classical Representational Momentum 
paradigm. They presented participants with the initial stages of a goal-directed action 
and asked them to make spatial judgments of its last seen position prior to sudden 
offset. As expected, the results revealed the top-down expectations that guide action 
perception. The findings revealed (1) that social predictions follow the principle of 
efficient action, biasing perception towards efficient action expectations, such that 
hands seen to reach straight towards an obstacle were perceptually lifted over it. 
These predictions were (2) derived spontaneously, were (3) perceptually 
represented, and emerged (4) from attributions of intentionality to the observed 
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actor, even (5) when the action was already underway, based on the match between 
action kinematics and available target objects.  
The current findings provide direct evidence for predictive models of social 
perception. They confirm that the perceptual representation of others’ actions is 
biased by the intentions we assign to them and our predictions of how these 
intentions will be fulfilled, therefore providing new avenues to understand how action 
expectations can shape our understanding of other people’s actions. 
 
x 
 
Table of Contents 
Copyright statement ................................................................................................. i 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................. iii 
Author’s Declaration ............................................................................................... iv 
Abstract .................................................................................................................. viii 
Table of Contents ..................................................................................................... x 
List of Figures ........................................................................................................ xii 
1 Chapter One - Understanding the actions of others ....................................... 1 
1.1 The importance of action understanding for social interaction ...................... 1 
1.2 Mechanisms underlying action understanding: a bottom-up approach ......... 3 
1.3 Problems with the mirror system account of action understanding ............... 8 
1.4 An alternative account of action understanding: Top-down prediction. ....... 12 
1.5 Evidence for predictive processing in non-social perception ....................... 17 
1.6 Evidence for predictive processing in social perception .............................. 21 
1.7 Thesis Overview .......................................................................................... 25 
2 Chapter Two – Using Representational Momentum to measure action 
prediction ................................................................................................................ 31 
2.1 Representational Momentum ...................................................................... 31 
2.2 What is the Representational Momentum effect? ........................................ 31 
2.3 Representational Momentum to measure social prediction ......................... 37 
3 Chapter Three - Assumptions of efficient action .......................................... 41 
3.1 Perceptual Teleology: Expectations of Action Efficiency Bias Social 
Perception. ............................................................................................................ 41 
3.2 Experiments 1a - c ...................................................................................... 42 
3.2.1 Method........................................................................................................... 46 
3.2.2 Results........................................................................................................... 49 
3.2.3 Discussion ..................................................................................................... 53 
3.2.4 Conclusions ................................................................................................... 56 
3.2.5 References .................................................................................................... 56 
4 Chapter Four: Perceptual predictions ........................................................... 67 
4.1 Using probe judgements and visual noise masking to reveal perceptual 
predictions............................................................................................................. 68 
4.2 Experiment 2a ............................................................................................. 70 
4.2.1 Method........................................................................................................... 72 
4.2.2 Results........................................................................................................... 74 
4.2.3 Discussion ..................................................................................................... 77 
 
xi 
 
4.3 Experiment 2b ............................................................................................. 78 
4.3.1 Method........................................................................................................... 81 
4.3.2 Results........................................................................................................... 83 
4.3.3 Discussion ..................................................................................................... 85 
4.4 Conclusion .................................................................................................. 86 
4.5 References .................................................................................................. 87 
5 Chapter Five - Cues to intention ..................................................................... 92 
5.1 Cues to intention bias action perception toward the most efficient trajectory.
 93 
5.2 Experiments 3a and 3b ............................................................................... 94 
5.2.1 Method........................................................................................................... 99 
5.2.2 Results......................................................................................................... 104 
5.2.3 Discussion ................................................................................................... 111 
5.2.4 Conclusions ................................................................................................. 117 
5.2.5 References .................................................................................................. 118 
6 Chapter Six - Online action prediction ......................................................... 134 
6.1 Affordance matching predictively shapes the perceptual representation of 
others’ ongoing actions. ...................................................................................... 135 
6.2 Experiments 4a and 4b ............................................................................. 136 
6.2.1 Method......................................................................................................... 142 
6.2.2 Results......................................................................................................... 146 
6.2.3 Discussion ................................................................................................... 154 
6.2.4 Conclusions ................................................................................................. 160 
6.2.5 References .................................................................................................. 161 
7 Chapter Seven - General Discussion ........................................................... 173 
7.1 Summary of results ................................................................................... 174 
7.2 Implications for prior research and theorizing............................................ 178 
7.1.1 Prediction in social perception ..................................................................... 178 
7.1.2 Understanding the actions of others ............................................................. 190 
7.3 Remaining questions and future research ................................................. 191 
7.1.3 Do predictions reflect knowledge of others’ minds?...................................... 191 
7.1.4 Penetrability of perception............................................................................ 193 
7.1.5 When and how is perception distorted? ....................................................... 195 
7.1.6 Do eye-movements play a role in social perception? ................................... 198 
7.1.7 How are perceptual predictions updated? .................................................... 200 
7.4 Summary and conclusion .......................................................................... 203 
7.2 References ................................................................................................ 204 
 
xii 
 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 3-1. Experiments 1a-c. Stimulus conditions and trial sequence. .................. 49 
Figure 3-2. Experiments 1a-c. Results .................................................................... 53 
Figure 4-1. Experiment 2a. Trial sequence, Probe positions and Results. .............. 75 
Figure 4-2. Experiment 2b. Trial sequence and Results. ......................................... 85 
Figure 5-1. Experiments 3a-c. Stimulus conditions and trial sequence. ................ 103 
Figure 5-2. Experiments 3a-c. Results .................................................................. 106 
Figure 6-1. Experiments 4a and 4b. Experimental conditions and trial sequence. 145 
Figure 6-2. Experiments 4a and 4b. Results. ........................................................ 150 
Figure 6-3. Experiments 4a and 4b. Correlational results. ..................................... 154 
 
1 
 
1 Chapter One - Understanding the actions of others 
1.1 The importance of action understanding for social interaction 
Understanding the actions of others is crucial for all social interactions. Through 
action observation, humans can derive the goals, attitudes and beliefs that drive the 
actions of others to gain insight into the meaning of their action, and plan a suitable 
response when required (Bach, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2011; Hamilton, 2009; Sebanz & 
Knoblich, 2009). For example, when approached in the town centre with a clipboard 
we know to immediately change direction, when our child hears the jingle of the ice-
cream van we are already prepared for the chase into the road, and when we see 
our friend walking straight-towards the glass door we know he has not seen it. 
Deciphering the mental states of others is no mean feat, as they are largely hidden 
from view. A window into the minds of others must therefore rely upon not only our 
prior knowledge of the person, the action, or the context (Bach & Schenke, 2017;  
Press, Heyes, & Kilner, 2011), but also our sensitivity to cues that may indicate the 
potential goals and beliefs of others. Such cues include where they might be looking 
(Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007; Hudson, Liu, & Jellema, 2009), which emotional 
expression they have (Hudson & Jellema, 2011), what we already know about their 
particular preferences (Schenke, Wyer, & Bach, 2016), or even what potential goal 
objects are available and our knowledge about these objects (Bach, Knoblich, 
Gunter, Friederici, & Prinz, 2005a; Bach, Nicholson, & Hudson, 2014). In the 
examples above, we know the intention of the clipboard-holder through our previous 
encounters, we realise our child has heard the ice-cream van when her gaze 
suddenly follows it, and we foresee our friends impending misfortune when he does 
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not slow down upon approach of the glass door (and we know that glass doors 
cannot be penetrated - without pain).  
Utilising these, often subtle, cues is therefore essential for not only inferring the 
contents of others’ minds, but may also provide a stepping stone for developing 
more sophisticated mentalizing abilities to reason about others’ mental states and 
coordinate social interactions (Hamilton, 2009; Wellman & Brandone, 2009). 
Understanding the goals, beliefs and attitudes of others can reveal how they may 
differ from our own, and inform expectations about likely forthcoming actions, guiding 
our perception of their action and allowing for the preparation of a response to 
potential action consequences, either cooperatively through joint-action or 
competitively which would have been crucial for our ancestor’s survival (Hamilton & 
Grafton, 2007; Sartori, Becchio, & Castiello, 2011; Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009).  
Action understanding therefore lies at the heart of social interaction. Yet, despite this 
critical importance, the mechanisms underlying such abilities are still largely 
unknown or, at the least, controversially debated. It remains unclear what information 
people use to generate assumptions about other people’s goals and intentions, and 
how this information is translated into an expectation of their upcoming action. 
Furthermore, little is known about how these expectations guide our perception of 
their action and contribute to the meaning that we assign to their behaviour. If social 
perception is influenced by our preconceptions of others, then this leaves open the 
door for misinterpretation to distort action perception. Uncovering these processes 
will not only contribute towards our understanding of how humans so effortlessly find 
meaning in other people’s behaviour, but also where these mechanisms breakdown 
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and are responsible for the marked social deficits in autism spectrum conditions and 
schizophrenia (Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013; Pellicano & Burr, 2012). 
1.2 Mechanisms underlying action understanding: a bottom-up 
approach 
People’s ability to decode the actions of others and assign to them meaning and 
purpose has conventionally been conceptualised as a bottom-up process (di 
Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2010; 
Iacoboni, 2009; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). This process is assumed to rely on 
dedicated neural processes that “directly match” the incoming visual information from 
action observation to prior knowledge we already hold about these actions (Gazzola 
& Keysers, 2008; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). They are assumed to not only rely 
on learned semantic associations from previous experience that link overt 
behaviours to their hidden meaning (e.g., that a smile indicates happiness; Brass & 
Heyes, 2005; Keysers & Perrett, 2004), but to take on a more active role. Simulation 
theories suggest that we internally embody the actions of others, playing-out the 
action in our mind as if it were our own (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Jeannerod, 2001; 
Wilson & Knoblich, 2005). A dominant view is that these simulations are motoric in 
nature, simulating the kinematic features of the action in our own motor systems to 
derive the mental state causes and interoceptive consequences of these actions 
(Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). These simulations are thought to activate the low-
level motor areas that correspond to the observed actions, which can then propagate 
up the observers own motor hierarchy in a bottom-up manner, to reveal the likely 
goals that would have generated them. For example, when watching someone reach 
for a hot oven tray, the action is traced onto our own motor system to help us 
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understand the goals (to move the tray) and beliefs (that the tray is cool enough) 
behind the action, as well as their potential (sensory) consequences (pain).  By 
simulating the actions of others in our own minds, we can therefore gain insight into 
the minds of others, drawing on our own motor experiences. 
This bottom-up motoric view of action understanding is supported by evidence that 
action observation facilitates simultaneous execution of the same action. In a 
seminal study, Brass and colleagues found faster reaction times for executing finger 
movements when simultaneously observing an actor performing the same finger 
movements, and slower reaction times (and more errors) when observing different 
finger movements (Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001). Since then, various other 
studies have confirmed this finding for different hand action features such as hand 
configurations (Stürmer, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2000), reach directions (Bach, 
Bayliss, & Tipper, 2010) and even different body parts (Bach, Peatfield, & Tipper, 
2007; Gillmeister, Catmur, Liepelt, Brass, & Heyes, 2008; Wiggett, Hudson, Tipper, 
& Downing, 2011). Observing an action therefore activates similar processes 
required for the execution of that action, facilitating imitation of congruent actions and 
interfering with performing incongruent actions (Bertenthal, Longo, & Kosobud, 2006; 
Press, Bird, Walsh, & Heyes, 2008). Similar effects resulting from measuring motor 
cortex activations via TMS show that this motor simulation follows a similar time 
course as the observed action (Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995).  
Perhaps more compelling evidence for this motoric matching hypothesis comes from 
the discovery of a group of neurons in monkeys that fire both when the monkey is 
executing an action and also when merely observing this same action. These “mirror 
neurons” were recorded in the ventral premotor cortex (area F5; Di Pellegrino et al., 
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1992), and later in the inferior parietal lobule (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 
2002), of the macaque monkey brain using single cell recordings. Importantly, mirror 
neuron activation was only found for goal-directed actions, such as reaching and 
grasping objects, than for pantomimed (without the object) or intransitive (e.g. tongue 
protrusion) actions (Di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 
1996a). This matching between observation and execution is therefore specific to 
actions from which action meaning can be deduced. These findings revealed, for the 
first time, a neural mechanism that may directly translate the visual information about 
a seen action into the motor command that would produce it. The observer likely 
knows the potential sources of this command, and so allows them to understand 
what the actor is doing, and, perhaps, why they are doing it.  
Evidence that mirror neuron activity represents action understanding comes from 
studies that show firing for actions that grasp an object in full view, as well as for 
actions that grasp an object which is hidden behind an occluder (Umilta et al., 2001). 
Importantly, mirror neuron firing for hidden grasps was only evident when the 
monkey had previous exposure to the hidden object. This firing was almost 
eliminated when the monkey did not know what was behind the occluder. Therefore, 
the observed action triggered the equivalent action in the observer’s own motor 
repertoire only when the observer could make use of prior knowledge to understand 
the action. This finding is supported by further studies, which found mirror neuron 
firing for previously known and distinctive action sounds (e.g. breaking nuts or 
tearing paper), even in the absence of visual information (Keysers et al., 2003; 
Kohler et al., 2002). Therefore, as long as the action can be recognised, by prior 
knowledge of object placement or by knowledge of action sounds for example, mirror 
neurons can generate the motor plan required for their execution. 
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Following this ground-breaking discovery, attempts have been made to identify 
equivalent systems in the human brain, albeit using more indirect neuromodulation 
methods such as transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS; Aziz-Zadeh, Maeda, 
Zaidel, Mazziotta, & Iacoboni, 2002; Fadiga et al., 1995; Gangitano, Mottaghy, & 
Pascual‐ Leone, 2004) and neuroimaging methods such as functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI; Aziz-Zadeh, Koski, Zaidel, Mazziotta, & Iacoboni, 2006; 
Jonas et al., 2007; Shmuelof & Zohary, 2006). Indeed, it has been shown that mirror 
systems do exist in the human brain, in areas homologous to that of the monkey 
mirror system. Activation in ventral premotor cortex (PMv), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) 
and inferior parietal lobule (IPL) has been found for the observation and execution of 
comparable actions (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti & Fabbri-Destro, 2008). 
Furthermore, corresponding activation for action observation and execution has 
been identified at the single voxel level in humans (Mukamel, Ekstrom, Kaplan, 
Iacoboni, 2010). 
Further evidence for a mirror system in humans comes from studies comparing 
mirror activity in response to actions that an individual was an expert at performing, 
with individuals who had less experience (Cross, Hamilton, & Grafton, 2006; 
D’Ausilio, Altenmüller, Olivetti Belardinelli, & Lotze, 2006). Since the mirror system is 
assumed to rely on prior knowledge to simulate the corresponding motor activation, it 
can be predicted that experts would show the greatest mirror activation. Indeed, 
brain imaging studies showed that expert piano players and expert ballet dancers 
produced greater mirror activation for piano key presses and ballet dance moves, 
respectively, than non-experts (Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grèzes, Passingham, & 
Haggard, 2004; Haslinger et al., 2005). The prior knowledge and experience of 
performing these actions therefore elicited a stronger response to their observation 
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compared to those with less experience, activating the motor processes involved in 
their execution that the experts would be all too familiar with. 
Unlike what is known so far about the monkey mirror system, humans also appear to 
mirror non-goal-directed and intransitive actions, such as gestures or meaningless 
arm movements (Grèzes, 1998; Grèzes, Costes, & Decety, 1999; Press et al., 2008). 
Rather than being evidence against the role of the human mirror system in action 
understanding, it instead proposes an important difference between humans and 
primates when watching the actions of others (Press et al., 2008). The human ability 
to attribute meaning to seemingly goal-less arm movements essentially reveals the 
unique ability to identify symbolic communication, as well as allowing for learning 
through imitation. In humans, non-goal directed hand actions are used during 
gesturing and sign language, where the goal is not to act upon an object but to 
communicate. By mirroring these actions, humans can access their symbolic 
meaning and facilitate the understanding of this action (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998; 
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). The mirror system is also argued to support action 
understanding in language not only through the use of gestures or sign, but also by 
using spoken word instead of observed action as the sensory input. Prior knowledge 
of these action words can then map the action information onto the motor programs 
that correspond to the action, facilitating the understanding of the action words (de 
Lafuente & Romo, 2004; Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller, 2004).  
In summary, the literature reviewed here provides evidence for a mirror system in 
humans that plays a central role in simulating the actions of others within the 
observers own motor system. This account explains the neural mechanisms that 
serve the transition of action information from its sensory source into the motor 
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components responsible for its execution. This ability to embody the actions that we 
observe, hear, or even talk about, is thought to enable us to understand the meaning 
behind the actions, from the inside. Simulating the kinematic properties of these 
actions, as if we were performing them ourselves, allows us to draw from our own 
personal experiences to relive not only the performance of the action, but to also 
reactivate their likely causes and/or consequence.  
While the literature provides convincing evidence for action simulation and the 
mechanisms responsible for translating the observation into motor representation, 
they do not provide direct evidence that these mirror activations support the actual 
understanding of the action. Recent findings have come to light that cannot be fully 
explained by motor activation alone, challenging the purely bottom-up account and 
suggesting an involvement of top-down processing. It has been suggested so far that 
the mirror system has some reliance upon prior knowledge and experience when 
assigning meaning to observed actions. The following sections will discuss the 
pitfalls in the bottom-up account of action understanding and suggest an alternative 
account of how we so effortlessly navigate the social world.  
1.3 Problems with the mirror system account of action 
understanding 
The ability to understand the actions of others comes naturally to humans. Despite 
the largely hidden drivers of these actions, we are able to effortlessly deduce the 
likely goals and mental states from which these actions were derived (Hamilton & 
Grafton, 2007; Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009). The bottom-up account of action 
understanding, as outlined in the previous section, describes a mechanism in which 
observed actions are directly translated into the motor components responsible for 
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their execution (Gazzola & Keysers, 2008; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Activation 
of these low-level motor features can propagate to higher motor levels in the 
observer’s own motor system, revealing the goals and beliefs that would have driven 
those same actions in the observer. The meaning of the action is therefore 
understood by relying on the observers own motor experience of the observed action 
(Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010).  
This explanation of action understanding has an intuitive appeal, especially 
considering the supporting evidence from mirror-neurons in monkeys and 
homologous mirror systems in humans as described above (Di Pellegrino et al., 
1992; Gallese et al., 2002). However, this explanation fails to consider that there is 
no one-to-one mapping between actions and their goals. The same action can 
achieve a number of different goals and the same goal can be achieved using 
numerous different actions (Bach et al., 2005a, 2014; Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005). For 
example, a reach towards a cup could have the goal to drink from its contents or to 
move it for cleaning. Indeed, Iacoboni et al. (2005) presented these very actions to 
human participants, with and without the two different contexts. Increased activation 
was found in areas of the human mirror system when the action had context 
(depicted by other objects in the background), compared to when the action was 
presented in isolation. The authors claimed that this is evidence for a motoric basis 
of action understanding since the mirror system was more strongly activated when 
the meaning of the action could be deduced. However, the action kinematics were 
identical in both conditions, and only the context was different. It is therefore more 
likely that this difference reflects action understanding from outside the motor 
system, that encodes the context, and not from the observation of the action alone. 
Consequently, it seems quite impossible that a single action can be understood in a 
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purely bottom-up motoric matching way, without relying on additional sources of 
information from higher regions that need not be motor related (Hickok, 2009; Jacob 
& Jeannerod, 2005).  
Other evidence also suggests that findings previously thought to support a motor 
simulation account of action understanding may actually serve as evidence against 
it. As discussed in the previous section, Umilta and colleagues (2001) suggest that 
the mirror neuron activation for actions with occluded targets aids action 
understanding, or at the very least, action recognition, since this only occurs when 
the observing monkey is aware of the occluded object. However, the monkey has the 
same visual access to motor information both when the occluded target is known 
and when it is unknown. Therefore, prior knowledge of the occluded target is what 
contributes to action understanding, rather than the observed action kinematics. This 
understanding may, in turn, trigger the differences in mirror activation, suggesting 
that mirror neurons may reflect the understanding of an action that was already 
achieved by other means, rather than being causally responsible for it.  
Alternative views of the role of the mirror system may also be required to explain 
recent findings from lesion studies that contradict traditional bottom-up theories of 
action understanding. A motor simulation account would predict parallel disruption to 
action execution and observed action understanding with damage to mirror regions. 
Nevertheless, while some lesion studies do reveal such corresponding impairments, 
others do not, creating inconsistencies in the literature. Buxbaum and colleagues 
(2005) studied 44 patients with left-hemisphere damage and found strong 
correlations between performance on action recognition and execution tasks. These 
findings were replicated by Negri et al. (2007) who found similar correlations with 
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equally large samples of comparable patients, providing evidence consistent with the 
direct-matching hypothesis. However, when patients were analysed at an individual 
level, Negri et al. (2007) uncovered dissociations between the ability to recognise 
actions and the ability to execute them. Moreover, in some studies, action 
comprehension deficits have been associated with damage specifically to the IPL 
(Weiss, Rahbari, Hesse, & Fink, 2008), while others demonstrate this impairment in 
patients with IFG lesions (Pazzaglia, Pizzamiglio, Pes, & Aglioti, 2008). These 
contradictory findings therefore make it difficult to ascertain the specific role of the 
human mirror system and how crucial the motor system is for action understanding.  
Moreover, a reliance upon one’s own motor system for action understanding implies 
that one must possess the motor knowledge and experience required to perform the 
observed action in order to understand it. This would therefore be a problem for 
infants who have not yet mastered the ability to execute certain actions that they see 
others perform, for disabled individuals who may have similar action execution 
deficits, and as well, for novices observing expert performers. When watching the 
skilled footwork of a football player as he tackles another player, we understand that 
his intention is to gain possession of the ball, despite our inability to perform such 
actions ourselves. Moreover, we often have no difficulty in understanding the actions 
of animals that are biologically impossible for humans to perform, such as birds flying 
to their nests. Such examples provide further challenges for the direct-matching 
hypothesis, further emphasising a role for systems outside of the motor system 
(Hickok, 2009).  
Together, these findings suggest that the role of the human mirror system in action 
understanding may not be so clear-cut. While evidence for this bottom-up pathway 
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undeniably exists (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2010; Iacoboni, 
2009; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), the inconsistencies and irregularities of the 
research findings discussed here are enough to cast doubt upon this explanation of 
action understanding. The field of social perception is therefore forced to seek an 
alternative theory of how humans are able to extract the hidden goals and mental 
states that guide the action of others, facilitating all social interaction. One potential 
avenue to explore, as hinted earlier in this section, may point to a role-reversal 
between mirror system activity and action comprehension. Such an idea would turn 
the bottom-up approach to action understanding on its head. Rather than motor 
simulation providing the information needed to comprehend the actions of others, 
this might instead be a consequence of action understanding, signifying when the 
action has already been understood, and is now tested against the perceptual input 
(Csibra, 2008; Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). Evidence for a top-down approach to 
action understanding is discussed in the following section. 
1.4 An alternative account of action understanding: Top-down 
prediction. 
Some of the findings discussed in the previous section move away from a purely 
bottom-up approach to action understanding and allude to a top-down mechanism in 
which mirror neuron activation is secondary to action understanding, as suggested 
by several authors. In such views, mirror activation reflects a consequence of action 
comprehension – that is perhaps acquired in other regions - rather than its cause 
(Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005; Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). Such an approach would 
use alternative mechanisms, rather than purely motor-matching processes, to 
facilitate the recognition of others’ actions and their goals. Once realised, motor 
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circuits could be engaged as a consequence of this understanding, perhaps to 
predict which actions might follow from the inferred goals, or to verify that the action 
was understood correctly (Bach et al., 2014; Csibra, 2008; Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 
2007ab). 
Indeed, recent evidence suggests that mirror activation responds to expected 
actions, rather than observed actions, indicating a predictive process as an 
underlying mechanism for action comprehension. Fogassi et al. (2005) found 
activation in different mirror neurons when a monkey watched an experimenter 
initially grasp an object with the goal to eat it, compared to grasping the object with 
the goal to move it. Importantly, these mirror neuron activations were comparable to 
those elicited when the monkey executed the respective actions. This suggests that, 
even though the observed actions towards the object were the same, the goal of the 
action could be inferred from available goal cues (e.g. the presence of a container), 
and so the mirror neuron activation may well reflect the anticipated action that would 
have continued beyond the initial reach to grasp. Similar findings were reported by 
Maranesi and colleagues (2014), whereby the onset of mirror neuron activation for 
predictable actions preceded action observation by 340ms.  
These findings are mirrored by recent studies in humans. In a behavioral study, 
Liepelt, Von Cramon, and Brass, (2008) found that motor activation during action 
observation reflected the implied goal of an action, rather than the observed action 
itself. When participants observed an actor attempting to raise their finger, despite 
being restrained by a finger clamp, motor responses of the participants reflected 
finger lifting, even though this was not observed. Further evidence from adult and 
from infant studies using EEG to investigate the time course of action mirroring found 
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motor activation prior to observing the action when the action was predictable, 
compared to when goal information was unavailable (Bozzacchi, Spinelli, Pitzalis, 
Giusti, & Di Russo, 2015; Fontana et al., 2012; Kilner, Vargas, Duval, Blakemore, & 
Sirigu, 2004; Southgate, Johnson, Osborne, & Csibra, 2009).  
In these examples, the goal of the action can already be assumed from prior 
knowledge or context, which can inform a prediction of the action required to achieve 
this goal. It is therefore more likely to be the expected action that is simulated, rather 
than the observed action. Such a mechanism indicates a major role for other brain 
systems in action understanding, moving away from a reliance upon motor 
activations, which may instead reflect the consequence of action understanding 
(Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005; Mahon & Caramazza, 2008).  
Indeed, such claims were made by Csibra (2008) who challenged the bottom-up 
motor-matching account, suggesting that this “simulation” of observed actions 
actually reflects “emulation” of expected actions. This action reconstruction account 
argues, first, that potential action goals and intentions are derived outside of the 
motor system by relying on prior knowledge through associative learning and 
teleological reasoning. Instead of mirroring observed actions to reveal their goals, 
goal estimations are made, in a Bayesian manner, based on the statistical probability 
that an action outcome is generated by a specific action and the probability that the 
action is generated to fulfil a specific goal. These probabilities are not only informed 
by previous experience with the action as well as potential target objects, but also by 
reasoning that humans attempt to achieve their goals in the most energy efficient 
way as possible, accounting for potential contextual constraints (e.g., location of goal 
objects, obstacles etc.). Csibra argues that these goal assumptions then generate 
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predictions about the actions that would be required to achieve these goals if they 
are correct. From this view, motor activation does not serve to reveal action goals, 
but instead reveals a search for an action that would achieve the inferred goal and 
compares this with the observed action as it unfolds. A close enough match would 
confirm the inferred goal and a mismatch would generate a revision to the emulated 
action. This account therefore provides a predictive mechanism for social perception, 
with motor activation reflecting emulations of expected actions, and goal 
understanding emerging from systems outside of the motor domain.  
Csibra’s action reconstruction account is very much in line with the predictive motor 
activation literature discussed above. It suggests that, in Liepelt et al.’s (2008) finger 
clamp study for example, the goal of the action (to lift finger) engaged the observer’s 
motor system to emulate the action that would achieve this goal (raising the finger 
up), rather than simulating the observed action (finger failing to raise up). This 
account can also explain findings from similar studies in infants. Motor activation was 
only found for predictable actions with an obvious goal (a grasping hand reaching 
behind an occluder), and not when the same action could not be well understood (a 
mimed grasp; Southgate, Johnson, Karoui, & Csibra, 2010). Moreover, Bach and 
colleagues (2010) reported action mirroring effects only when the observed grip type 
matched the size of a target object. 
This top-down approach was developed further by Kilner, Friston, and Frith, 
(2007ab), by drawing parallels between the predictive nature of social perception 
and perception in general, which is understood within a predictive coding framework 
(Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010). In this view, actions are represented across many 
interconnected levels of an action hierarchy. The highest level describes the 
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intention of an action (e.g. to eat), the next level describes the series of short-term 
action goals that are required to fulfil the intention (e.g. reaching for an apple and 
bringing it to the mouth), and the lower levels describe the action kinematics required 
to achieve these short-term goals (e.g. the path of the reach and the grip formation; 
(Hamilton & Grafton, 2007). Each level of the hierarchy forms a prediction about the 
representation in the level below. This prediction is then compared to the 
representation and any difference is communicated back up to the level above in the 
form of a prediction error. The representation in the higher level is then adjusted to 
better explain the lower-level representation, generating new predictions about these 
lower-level representations, and this process continues until the prediction error is 
minimised at all levels of the hierarchy.  
Generally, therefore, in both Kilner’s and Csibra’s views, social perception, like 
perception in general, can be understood as a process of Bayesian hypothesis 
testing and revision: knowledge of the world and its statistical regularities is 
translated into probabilistic predictions about the perceptual input that would be 
received if assumptions about the world are correct (Bach & Schenke, 2017; Csibra, 
2008; Kilner et al., 2007ab). As incoming sensory evidence is received, hypotheses 
are constantly updated until the “best guess” that explains the evidence is arrived at, 
and perception reflects this current best estimate of the sensory input. Social 
perception is therefore seen as an attempt to bring, via predictions and prediction 
errors, higher- and lower-levels of such action hierarchies into alignment. 
Kilner and Csibra’s proposal align models of social perception with more general 
predictive processing accounts that have been used to explain perception across 
different domains, with evidence from visual, auditory and motion perception to name 
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but a few (as will be discussed in more detail in the following section). These models 
explain not only how we represent the world around us, but also how these 
representations can be biased towards what we believe to be true. The following 
sections will discuss evidence for the predictive processing account of perception 
and how social perception in particular can also be understood as a top-down 
process.  
1.5 Evidence for predictive processing in non-social perception 
Predictive processing models of perception (see above) argue that what we perceive 
results from a series of hypothesis testing and revision, predicting the incoming 
sensory information from their inferred cause and updating the inferred cause as the 
sensory information is received, until the most likely cause of the input is generated. 
These models explain perceptual processing in sensory domains across the brain 
and the resulting distortions to perception that are often evidenced by perceptual 
illusions.  
In vision, these models explain how we perceive the “true” colour of a surface, which 
is not only dependent on the colour information provided by the senses but also on 
our expectations of the light source and surrounding illumination (Bloj, Kersten, & 
Hurlbert, 1999). A popular example is the “blue dress illusion” (see Chetverikov & 
Ivanchei, 2016). In a photograph of a dress, some people report seeing a blue and 
black dress while others report the dress to be white and gold.  Predictive processing 
accounts explained this illusion in terms of differing beliefs about the surrounding 
illumination that generated predictions about the colour information that would be 
received by the senses. Those people that assumed the light source to be from the 
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front, such as the cool light from a camera flash, perceived the dress to be blue and 
black, and those that assumed the light source was from behind, such as warm 
sunlight from a window, perceived the dress to be white and gold.  
Predictive coding similarly explains the mechanism underlying bistable figures that 
seem to spontaneously flip as the brain explores differing hypotheses about the 
sensory input (Hohwy, Roepstorff, & Friston, 2008). When two different images are 
presented to each eye, the resulting percept is not a blend of the two images, as one 
might expect. Instead, each image is perceived separately, one-at-a-time, and the 
constant flipping between experiences of the two images may reflect the testing of 
differing hypothesis about what is being presented, and their subsequent partial 
confirmation from the input of one eye. 
Predictive processing models do not only explain perception within one sensory 
modality, but also the well-documented crosstalk between them. In audiovisual 
speech perception, visual information from the shaping of the mouth during speech 
is used to predict the speech sounds that are heard. The McGurk effect (McGurk and 
MacDonald, 1976) demonstrates that when these two sensory inputs are 
incongruent, i.e. seeing the mouth movements that predict a particular speech sound 
but hearing a different sound, speech perception is distorted as the brain tries out a 
new hypothesis that accounts for both sensory inputs. Moreover, the magnitude of 
the illusion is increased the when illusory speech sound is embedded into a 
semantically congruent sentence, compared to an incongruent sentence (Windmann, 
2004), reinforcing the influence of expectation.  
Important for social perception, top-down influences on perception are also evident 
in motion perception. Apparent motion describes the phenomenon that illusory 
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motion is perceived between two visual stimuli that are flashed in quick succession 
(Kolers, 2013; Wertheimer, 1912). The two stimuli are typically not seen as 
alternating but instead perceived as one object moving between two different 
locations. This apparent motion effect reflects the prior hypothesis of a single moving 
stimulus generating a predicted motion path between the two locations. The 
perceptual system fills in the predicted but missing steps in-between as the input, 
albeit partially, confirms this hypothesis (Muckli, Kohler, Kriegeskorte, & Singer, 
2005; Sterzer, Haynes, & Rees, 2006). Similar processes explain why perceptual 
blurring is minimised during motion perception (Bex, Edgar, & Smith, 1995; 
Hammett, 1997), as top-down inferences sharpen the degraded input.  
Predictions during motion perception not only compensate for degraded or missing 
input during the motion, but also account for future motion, predicting where moving 
stimuli will continue and perceptually inserting the predicted next step. Freyd and 
Finke (1984) found that people generally over-estimate the disappearance point of a 
moving stimulus in the direction of the motion trajectory, an effect known as 
Representational Momentum (Hubbard, 2005). When asked to compare a probe 
stimulus to the last seen image before it disappeared, participants were more likely 
to misperceive probes positioned ahead of the final image (forward probes) as being 
in the same position, compared to backwards probes. This phenomenon is taken to 
reflect that prior movement information is used to make constant predictions about 
where the moving target will continue in following steps. When the input is suddenly 
removed, a reliance upon these top-down predictions creates a match between the 
forward probe and the predicted position, whereas backward probes more readily 
detected and signal a prediction error.  
 
20 
 
Further studies have then shown that these forward biases do not only capture the 
low-level predictions of future kinematic movement but also incorporate higher-level 
expectations from prior knowledge (Hubbard, 2005; Hudson, Bach, & Nicholson, 
2018; Hudson & Jellema, 2011; Hudson, Nicholson, Simpson, Ellis, & Bach, 2016; 
Jordan & Hunsinger, 2008), in line with predictive processing models of perception. 
For example, larger forward biases were found for vertical movement from top to 
bottom, compared to bottom to top. This effect, known as representational gravity, 
therefore provides evidence that the visual system not only uses bottom-up 
movement information to generate predictions of future positions, but also 
incorporates high-level knowledge about physics (i.e. that objects fall down but not 
up, Hubbard, 1997, 2005; Hubbard & Bharucha, 1988). Furthermore, horizontal 
movement is less future-biased when the target moves along a rough surface 
compared to a smooth surface (representational friction; Hubbard, 1995, 2005). 
Together, these Representational Momentum examples therefore provide evidence 
of a predictive mechanism in motion perception that not only utilises low-level 
information from the current target motion, but also makes use of high-level 
information from prior knowledge about how this motion is differentially affected by 
the environmental context. Moreover, they provide further evidence for a hierarchical 
structure of predictive processing, with reciprocal communication between high-level 
and low-level predictions to inform the resulting perceptual representation.  
Predictive processing models of perception have provided a robust explanation of 
the experiences we encounter every day, not only in the visual domain, but across all 
sensory modalities (Clark, 2013; Csibra, 2008; Friston, 2010; Kilner et al., 2007ab). 
By understanding perception as the brain’s “best guess” of what is being 
experienced, informed by prior knowledge and context, we can better understand 
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how we are able to so easily deduce the sensory input we receive despite the 
ambiguity and noise that comes with it, such as during motion perception or during 
conflicting sensory information, or occlusion in the visual field (Bex et al., 1995; 
Hammett, 1997; Kok, Brouwer, van Gerven, & de Lange, 2013; Lages, Boyle, & 
Jenkins, 2017; Muckli et al., 2005; Sterzer et al., 2006). Moreover, this allows us to 
describe how our eyes play tricks on us, and how expectations can lead our 
understanding of sensory information astray, as evidenced by various visual illusions 
(Bloj et al., 1999; Chetverikov & Ivanchei, 2016; Hohwy et al., 2008). Since predictive 
processing models have provided such robust explanations of perception spanning 
several different domains, it would not be ill-considered to assume that similar 
processing indeed underlie social perception.  
1.6 Evidence for predictive processing in social perception 
The above reviewed findings provide evidence that perception in general is 
generated via top-down predictive processing (Clark, 2013; Friston & Kiebel, 2009a). 
Given the generalisability of these predictive processing theories of perception 
across multiple sensory domains, it would be logical to assume that social 
perception, too, relies upon comparable mechanisms. This would suggest that, as for 
perception in general, social perception is guided by top-down predictions about 
others’ actions and reflects our best guess about what has been observed (Bach et 
al., 2014; Bach & Schenke, 2017; Csibra, 2008; Kilner et al., 2007ab). Action 
understanding would then similarly not only depend upon what is observed, but also 
upon what was expected. While such predictive models have only recently been 
developed, there is already some early evidence for them.  
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Early evidence for social prediction emerged from studies measuring predictive eye 
movements during action observation. When watching an actor performing an action, 
such as stacking blocks, the observer’s pattern of eye movements mirrored the 
pattern of eye movements elicited when they performed the action themselves 
(Flanagan & Johansson, 2003). Importantly, these eye movements were not reactive 
to the observed action but were predictive. They were directed towards the goal 
object in anticipation of the actor’s reach towards it, suggesting that eye movements 
are guided by top-down knowledge about the actor’s intentions rather than driven by 
a response to the observed action (Eshuis, Coventry, & Vulchanova, 2009a). 
Evidence for predictive social perception has also been found in studies of apparent 
motion. Originally designed to measure top-down prediction in motion perception 
(see previous section), these studies replaced object stimuli with biological stimuli to 
demonstrate how similar predictive mechanisms are at play (Chatterjee, Freyd, & 
Shiffrar, 1996; Shiffrar & Freyd, 1990,1993). As with object stimuli, flashing an image 
of an arm or leg at two different locations in rapid succession created the perception 
of motion between these two positions. However, motion perception for human 
action was specifically modulated by human kinematic capabilities and action goals, 
with adjustments to perceived motion paths when the shortest distance between the 
two locations was either obstructed or was not humanly possible to perform. This 
demonstrated that social perception relies upon similar mechanisms as motion 
perception in general, and is additionally influenced by prior knowledge about the 
specific stimulus’ properties of human bodies and how they can move and not move.  
These studies not only provide support for a predictive processing account of social 
perception, but also suggest that social perception may be similarly susceptible to 
 
23 
 
confirmation bias, favouring interpretations of the input that provide a close-enough 
match to prior assumptions. This creates the opportunity for distortions in perception, 
akin to the visual illusions described earlier, especially when the incoming sensory 
information is ambiguous (Kok et al., 2013; Lages et al., 2017). For example, a quick 
glimpse of a hand forming a large grip might appear to be closer to a large target 
object (such as an apple), compared to a nearby smaller object (such as a 
strawberry), than it really was, in line with the prediction that the actor wants the 
apple (i.e, affordance matching, Bach et al., 2014). In this example, the quick 
glimpse of the action may only generate limited and ambiguous visual information, 
forming an interpretation in light of the expectation that the apple will be grasped, 
therefore imbuing the observation with meaning. Perception, in such models, would 
therefore not be veridical, but potentially influenced by our prior expectations, 
especially when sensory information is limited or degraded (Kok et al., 2013; Lages 
et al., 2017).  
Evidence for predictive biases in social perception is reported in motion perception 
studies that have been adapted to measure action prediction. Representational 
Momentum studies, as described above, reveal predictive biases towards the future 
position of a moving target. When tested with biological motion such as arm reaches 
and head rotations, perception of these actions were similarly biased towards future 
positions along the motion trajectory (Hudson, Burnett, & Jellema, 2012; Hudson et 
al., 2009; Hudson & Jellema, 2011). As with the apparent motion studies above, 
these perceptual biases were modulated by prior knowledge about the actions’ goal. 
Rotating heads were perceived to have rotated even further when the eyes were 
gazing towards the same direction, than when they gazed towards the opposite 
direction. Here, the direction of the eyes were used as a goal cue to inform 
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predictions about how the rotation of the head would continue, creating a bias to the 
perception representation of the action.  
Similarly, arm reaches were reported to have reached even closer to target objects 
when the actor had announced, “I’ll take it!”, than when they announced, “I’ll leave it” 
and vice versa when the arm withdrew away from the target object (Hudson, 
Nicholson, Ellis, & Bach, 2016; Hudson, Nicholson, Simpson, et al., 2016). The 
degree to which perceptual judgements of arm movements were distorted in the 
direction of motion was not only modulated by the prior knowledge of the actors 
intention, but also by how predictive this intention was of the action (Hudson et al., 
2018). The perceptual bias towards the actor’s intention was larger when the actor 
was more likely to perform the corresponding action, than when they were more 
likely to perform the opposite action (e.g. saying “I’ll take it” and then withdrawing 
from the target object).  
Together, these studies provide tantalizing evidence of the predictive nature of social 
perception, in line with predictive processing models of perception in general. These 
perceptual biases for human action do not only follow similar mechanisms as motion 
perception, but are specifically informed by prior information about how humans 
typically behave (Chatterjee et al., 1996; Shiffrar & Freyd, 1990, 1993). These 
studies demonstrate that prior information is gathered from biological sources, such 
as eye gaze direction and speech, as well as from the environment, such as 
available target objects and obstructions, to cue the potential goals of the action 
(Bach et al., 2014; Bach & Schenke, 2017; Hudson et al., 2018; Hudson & Jellema, 
2011; Hudson, Nicholson, Ellis, et al., 2016; Hudson, Nicholson, Simpson, et al., 
2016). In line with Bayesian integration and predictive coding models of perception, 
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this prior knowledge is translated into a weighted prediction about how the action will 
continue if our goal assumptions are correct. The resulting perceptual biases in line 
with expectations suggest that high-level goal information cascades down to lower 
perceptual levels, guiding the sensory input and therefore biasing the perceptual 
experience of other’s actions. As in perception in general, social perception is 
therefore not veridical but instead reflects a best guess of the actor’s goal and 
represents a prediction of how this goal will be achieved.  
While these studies provide compelling evidence for comparable mechanisms 
between social perception and non-social perception, offering a revolutionary 
perspective on how we understand the actions of others, the findings are limited and 
so many questions about the underlying mechanisms of action understanding remain 
unanswered. It is still unclear how these predictions of others’ upcoming behaviour 
are generated, on what cues they rely, how these cues are weighted and integrated 
to inform these predictions, and how these predictions alter the perceptual 
representation of others’ action, for example.  
1.7 Thesis Overview 
This thesis aims to resolve which information is used to inform action predictions and 
what impact these predictions have on social perception, therefore providing new 
avenues to understand how action expectations can shape our understanding of 
other people’s actions.  The experiments presented in this thesis utilise a modified 
version of the Representational Momentum paradigm (Freyd & Finke, 1984; 
Hubbard, 2005) to capture the predictions made about biological actions and to 
measure their resulting effect on action perception. Participants will be presented 
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with a series of short action clips that contain cues to the actor’s intention, allowing 
for the formation of action predictions prior to or during action observation. The 
action will suddenly disappear and participants will be required to indicate its final 
location. Comparing these responses to the real final position allow for the direct 
measure of perceptual distortion, capturing the subtle influences of action predictions 
on action perception. This novel paradigm goes one step further from original 
Representational Momentum studies in action observation that use probe stimuli to 
measure perceptual biases, by instead employing touch-screen responses to 
pinpoint more specifically that magnitude of perceptual distortion. A detailed outline 
of this methodology is presented in Chapter Two.  
The experiments in Chapters Three, Four and Five utilise this Representational 
Momentum paradigm to probe action understanding and to uncover a potential cue 
that may inform action predictions. As described earlier, Csibra (2008) identified 
three sources of information, derived from outside the motor system, that indicate the 
goals and intentions of others actions. As well as relying on associative learning to 
derive the statistical probability that an action was executed to achieve a particular 
goal, and the probability that such a goal could be achieved with the particular 
action, a main source contribution comes from the understanding that humans 
generally act efficiently to reach their goal. This assumption of efficient action 
proposes that humans take the most direct path to achieve their goals, minimising 
energy expenditure and time, and only exerting additional energy when the 
environment requires this – such as when obstacles in the way need to be overcome 
(Csibra & Gergely, 2013; Dennett, 1987; Gergely & Csibra, 2003).  
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Previous research suggests the assumption of action rationality is a basic building 
block of human social perception skills. It has been previously shown that even 
infants and some primates make assumptions about action efficiency, showing 
surprise when a rational actor does not act efficiently, by not attempting to avoid 
obstacles or by taking an unnecessarily long route to their goal, for example (Gergely 
& Csibra, 2003). Once established, this simple heuristic of efficient action may 
contribute to more sophisticated theory of mind abilities (Wellman & Brandone, 
2009). For example, observing an actor reaching inefficiently towards an obstacle 
may signal that the actor has a different belief to our own (i.e. that there is no 
obstacle). Indeed, viewing such actions has been shown to activate perceptual and 
mentalizing processing in the brain (Desmet & Brass, 2015; Marsh, Mullett, Ropar, & 
Hamilton, 2014). 
The experiments in Chapter Three harness the assumption of action efficiency within 
a Representational Momentum paradigm to test (1) whether action efficiency is used 
to inform predictions, (2) whether these predictions specifically concern the expected 
action kinematics in a perceptual format, (3) how these predictions bias the actions’ 
perceptual representation, and (4) whether these perceptual biases are elicited 
spontaneously. They investigate how perception of efficient action is distorted by 
adding or removing obstructing objects into the path of a reaching arm, rendering the 
action inefficient. If specific action predictions are made based on action efficiency, 
and in a perceptual format, we would expect the perceptual representation of 
inefficient actions to be distorted towards efficient action trajectories. For example, 
perception of an arm reaching straight towards an obstruction should be shifted 
upwards, in line with the prediction that the arm will lift to avoid it. Similarly, 
perception of an arm reaching over an empty space should be shifted downwards, in 
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line with prediction that the hand will take a more efficient, straight path. Importantly, 
these perceptual shifts should be elicited when passively viewing the actions, but 
should increase with increasingly explicit instructions to predict or take account of the 
environmental constraints on the action.  
The experiments in Chapter Four further investigate the perceptual nature of action 
predictions by testing whether the effects found in Chapter Three do indeed reflect 
changes to the perceptual representation of the observed actions, rather than effects 
produced by motor or working-memory components. They investigate whether these 
perceptual biases (1) generalise to probe judgement tasks that do not require 
working memory or touch screen responses and (2) can be disrupted by dynamic 
visual noise masks that disrupt lower-level perceptual processing. If substantiated, 
these findings would provide more support for a perceptual locus of action 
predictions.  
The experiments in Chapter Five investigate how these predictions of action 
efficiency are generated. They test the specific features of the action stimuli that 
predictions of action efficiency rely on. As described earlier, predictions of action 
efficiency rest on the reasoning that humans are intentional agents who generally act 
in the most energy-efficient way as possible. Removing the cues that signal the 
intentionality of the agent should therefore reduce the formation of efficiency 
predictions. In these experiments, intentionality cues were manipulated by replacing 
the actor’s arm with a non-agentive ball that still moved with the same biological 
profile as the arm. A further experiment removed a further cue to intention by 
removing this biological profile so that the ball now moved in a straight line at a 
constant speed. If predictions of action efficiency rely on cues to intention, then the 
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size of the perceptual effect should be reduced when the arm is replaced by a ball, 
and reduced even further when the biological profile is removed.  
All experiments in previous chapters provide enough information in the initial 
stimulus frame to make a prediction before action onset (e.g. by presenting a goal 
object and an obstacle that has to be reached over). The experiments in Chapter six 
test whether action predictions are elicited online, during the unfolding action. Here, 
only presenting cues to inform goal assumptions once the action is already 
underway will reveal whether action predictions are indeed generated in real time, 
during ongoing action observation. To test this, these experiments make use of the 
assumption that the available objects in a scene and our knowledge about them can 
provide cues to others’ goals and intentions (see Bach et al., 2014 for a review). 
Knowledge of an object’s function and how they are typically manipulated can inform 
predictions about how an intentional actor, who wants to interact with the object, 
would achieve this. For example, a small object affords a small grip. To reach and 
grasp a small object, an actor would be expected to form a precision grip – with the 
index finger and the thumb – in order to successfully grasp the small object in the 
most efficient way. Observing the formation of an actor’s grip and identifying the 
match to potential goal objects can therefore signal the intention of a rational actor. 
The experiments in this chapter investigate (1) whether action predictions are made 
when goal information is only available during the ongoing action, (2) based on the 
match between the unfolding grip-formation and affordance of available objects, (3) 
how these predictions bias the actions’ perceptual representation, and (4) if these 
biases are elicited automatically. These experiments test whether predictions are 
made by the unfolding match between grip-formation and object affordance, and 
whether these predictions rely on explicit goal assumptions. If perception of specific 
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grip formations are distorted towards compatible compared to incompatible objects, 
and are present even when goal assumptions are implicit, then we can confirm that 
humans make on-line adjustments of predicted actions based on the match between 
hand grip and object goals, distorting the perceptual representation of the action, and 
that these distortions may not reflect high-level goal assumptions, but emerge from 
relatively low-level processing of kinematic features within the perceptual system. 
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2 Chapter Two – Using Representational Momentum to 
measure action prediction  
2.1 Representational Momentum 
This thesis aims to resolve the processes that govern predictive social perception. 
The current work applies predictive processing theories (e.g., Clark, 2013; Friston, 
2010) to social perception to investigate how we form expectations about other 
people’s behaviour, upon what information these expectations rely, and how they 
ultimately shape our perception of other people’s actions, contributing to action 
understanding. Specifically, the experiments in this thesis measure the influence of 
action predictions on social perception to reveal how our observations of other 
people’s behaviour may not be veridical, but biased by what we expected them to 
do. They utilise the Representational Momentum paradigm (Freyd & Finke, 1984; 
Hubbard, 2005), originally designed to measure motion perception in general, to 
capture the predictions made about biological actions and to measure their resulting 
effect on action perception. This chapter will briefly review the Representational 
Momentum paradigm as a measure of predictive displacement, in line with predictive 
processing theories of perception, and how this method can be applied to social 
prediction, providing a novel tool to reveal how action expectations influence social 
perception.  
2.2 What is the Representational Momentum effect? 
In 1984, Freyd and Finke presented to participants three successive presentations of 
a rectangle in progressively increasing orientations to imply rotation, followed by a 
fourth “probe” rectangle. Participants were asked to compare the orientation of the 
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probe rectangle to the final presentation of the rotating rectangle. They found that 
probes that were rotated slightly further in the direction of motion than the last seen 
image were more likely to be incorrectly judged as “same” than probes rotated not as 
far. The authors named this effect the Representational Momentum effect, which is 
more commonly defined as the over-estimation of the disappearance point of a 
moving stimulus in the direction of the motion trajectory (Freyd & Finke, 1984; 
Hubbard, 2005, 2017; Thornton & Hubbard, 2002). More generally, when asked to 
compare a probe stimulus to the last seen image before it disappeared, observers 
are more likely to misperceive probes positioned ahead of the final image in the 
direction of motion (forward probes) as being in the same position, compared to 
backwards probes. The Representational Momentum effect therefore represents the 
anticipation of the future movement of a target and has been observed for targets 
moving horizontally (Hubbard, 1995; Hubbard & Bharucha, 1988), vertically 
(Hubbard, 2001; Nagai, Kazai, & Yagi, 2002), inwards on a curved trajectory (Freyd 
& Jones, 1994; Hubbard, 1996) and even for implied motion in frozen action 
photographs (Freyd, 1983; Freyd & Pantzer, 1995).  
The term “Representational Momentum” was coined from the original hypothesis that 
the representation of a moving target incorporated the physical principle of 
momentum, following the same rules of physics as the moving target itself (Finke, 
Freyd, & Shyi, 1986). For example, the eyes still continue to move for a time in the 
direction of the target once it has disappeared, in the same way that a moving target 
cannot immediately stop when resisting force is applied (Hubbard, 2017; Thornton & 
Hubbard, 2002). Indeed, a number of studies have identified physical variables that 
influence the magnitude of the representational momentum effect, in line with the 
theory of an internalisation of physics. For example, target objects moving 
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downwards, in the direction of gravity, elicit a larger representational momentum 
effect than objects moving upwards, against the force of gravity (Hubbard, 1995, 
1997; Hubbard & Bharucha, 1988). Similar influences of implied physical factors 
have been shown to affect representational momentum, such as friction acting on 
the target (Hubbard, 1995b, 1998), the weight of the target (Hubbard, 1997b), 
acceleration of motion (Finke et al., 1986) and velocity (Freyd & Finke, 1985).  
More low-level theories of representational momentum suggest that the effect is 
elicited by smooth pursuit eye-movements, and represents ocular overshoot after 
target offset (Kerzel, 2000; Kerzel, Jordan, & Müsseler, 2001). Kerzel (2000) argued 
that the visual persistence of a target on the retina continues for 50-60ms after its 
offset and together with the continuing movement of the eyes, creates a distortion in 
the direction of motion. However, smooth pursuit eye-movements only result from 
observing smooth motion, and so cannot explain forward displacement for apparent 
or implied motion (Hubbard, 2017). 
More recently, a number of variables have been found to modulate the degree of 
displacement and contradict the literal explanation of internalised momentum as well 
as providing further evidence against an influence of eye-movements. For example, 
conceptual knowledge about a target object’s typical movement can influence the 
magnitude of displacement. Reed and Vinson (1996) found differences in the 
Representational Momentum effect for two identical moving targets that only differed 
in the labels they had been assigned. An upwards moving target that was labelled as 
a rocket elicited more forward displacement than when it was labelled as a church. 
When the visual features of these stimuli were manipulated, to reflect a canonical 
rocket or a more ambiguous rocket for example, more forward displacement was 
found for prototypical self-propelled objects (Vinson & Reed, 2002). Moreover, 
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forward displacement is also modulated by expectations of a future change in 
movement direction (Johnston & Jones, 2006; Verfaillie & d’Ydewalle, 1991) and by 
beliefs about the source of the target’s motion (for example, after being contacted by 
a moving object or “launcher”, Hubbard & Favretto, 2003; Hubbard & Ruppel, 2002). 
Together, these findings suggest that the Representational Momentum effect not 
only results from extracting low-level motion information from the target’s movement 
to anticipate its future position, but is also influenced by top-down information from 
prior knowledge or experience, in line with predictive processing theories (Clark, 
2013; Friston, 2010). 
Predictive processing models of perception argue that what we perceive results from 
a series of hypothesis testing and revision, predicting the incoming sensory 
information from their inferred cause and updating the inferred cause as the sensory 
information is received, until the most likely cause of the input is derived (Clark, 
2013; Friston, 2010). These models can explain perceptual processing in sensory 
domains across the brain and the resulting distortions to perception that are often 
evidenced by perceptual illusions. For example, they can account for the illusory 
motion that is perceived between two visual stimuli when they are flashed in quick 
succession at different positions on the screen (apparent motion, Kolers, 2013; 
Wertheimer, 1912). This apparent motion effect is argued to reflect the prior 
hypothesis of a single moving stimulus generating a predicted motion path between 
the two locations. The perceptual system fills in the predicted but missing steps in-
between as the input, albeit partially, confirms this hypothesis (Muckli et al., 2005; 
Sterzer et al., 2006). Consistent with a contribution of prior knowledge, this predicted 
path does not just reflect the shortest distance between two locations, but is 
influenced by prior knowledge about the moving target and its capabilities, such that 
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apparent motion for biological stimuli is perceived to curve around obstacles that are 
in the way (Chatterjee, Freyd, & Shiffrar, 1996; Shiffrar & Freyd, 1990,1993). 
Predictive processing theories can explain the Representational Momentum effect in 
the same way that they can account for the influence of prior knowledge on illusory 
motion perception in apparent motion studies. The Representational Momentum 
effect can be theorised as illusory or apparent motion that continues once the 
moving target has disappeared, and the magnitude and direction of the distortion 
similarly reflects expectations not only from bottom-up information from the 
movement of the target, such as its speed or direction (Finke et al., 1986; Hubbard, 
2005; Hubbard & Bharucha, 1988a), but also top-down knowledge about the typical 
movement of the target object (Reed & Vinson, 1996; Vinson & Reed, 2002), 
assumptions about the source of movement (Hubbard & Favretto, 2003; Hubbard & 
Ruppel, 2002), and even expected changes in movement direction (Johnston & 
Jones, 2006; Verfaillie & d’Ydewalle, 1991). Furthermore, a greater influence from 
top-down information is experienced when visual information from the target is 
ambiguous or degraded (Kok et al., 2013; Lages et al., 2017). Therefore, when 
presented with forward probes that match anticipated future motion, they are more 
readily perceived as being in the same position as the last seen image of the moving 
target before its sudden offset. Backward probes, on the other hand, reflect an 
unexpected position and would elicit salient prediction errors that are more easily 
detected, in line with prediction processing theories.  
Recent evidence for the perceptual nature of the Representational Momentum effect 
has been revealed using neuroimaging methods. Functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) studies have revealed that the areas in the brain responsible for 
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motion perception (V5/MT) are activated by static images with implied motion 
(Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2000) and give rise to the Representational Momentum effect 
(Senior et al., 2000a). Furthermore, when transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) is 
applied to these areas, the Representational Momentum effect is eliminated (Senior, 
Ward, & David, 2002). More direct evidence for a top-down effect on perceptual 
regions comes from studies showing primary visual cortex (V1) activation during 
illusory perception in apparent motion tasks, in the precise retinotopic locations for 
the perceptual “filling-in” of the missing visual information (Muckli et al., 2005; Yantis 
& Nakama, 1998). This is supported by findings that show that after training 
participants with dynamic stimulus sets, only presenting the initial stages of these 
motions triggers V1 activity that resembles the perception of the full trajectory 
(Ekman, Kok, & de Lange, 2017). Prior information and knowledge therefore informs 
perceptual predictions of future motion, as revealed during the sudden offset of 
motion stimuli, as in the Representational Momentum effect, and result in the 
perceptual filling in of the missing input. Other investigations have revealed that 
perceptual expectations do not only act on the sudden absence of visual information, 
but facilitate direct changes to ongoing perception by sharpening the sensory input 
(Hammett, 1997; Kok, Jehee, & de Lange, 2012; Yon, Gilbert, Lange, & Press, 
2018). The anticipation of future motion therefore acts directly on perceptual regions, 
either during the ongoing motion or after its sudden offset, and can influence the 
perceptual experience of observed motion, in line with predictive processing 
theories.   
The findings discussed here therefore show that the Representational Momentum 
paradigm is an appropriate measure of predictive processing,  providing a measure 
of expectation that not only draws upon bottom-up information provided by the 
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incoming visual stimuli, but is also influenced by top-down information from prior 
knowledge, reflected in changes to perception either during the ongoing observation 
or after the sudden offset of stimuli. By replacing the motion stimuli used in these 
paradigms with biological action, Representational Momentum presents as a novel 
tool to reveal the perceptual predictions people make about other people’s actions 
and the consequences that these predictions have on social perception.  
2.3 Representational Momentum to measure social prediction 
In non-social perception, predictions of future states in Representational Momentum 
paradigms can be informed by variables such as properties of the target (Finke et al., 
1986; Hubbard, 2005; Hubbard & Bharucha, 1988; Reed & Vinson, 1996; Vinson & 
Reed, 2002), inferred motion source (Hubbard & Favretto, 2003; Hubbard & Ruppel, 
2002), and physical forces (Freyd & Finke, 1985; Hubbard, 1995b, 1998), for 
example. As described above, expectations for human action must additionally 
consider what is biomechanically possible (Chatterjee, Freyd, & Shiffrar, 1996; 
Shiffrar & Freyd, 1990,1993), to represent an accurate inference about predicted 
action. In addition, human action is less directly determined by physical variables 
such as momentum or friction. Instead, human actions are driven by the mental 
states of the actor, their goals and intentions, given the environmental context (Bach, 
Bayliss, & Tipper, 2011; Hamilton, 2009; Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009). Therefore, in 
order to more accurately predict the upcoming actions of others, one must be 
receptive to cues that signal their intention and integrate them into one’s predictions.  
There is some evidence of the use of Representational Momentum paradigms to 
measure such social prediction processes, but these investigations are not extensive 
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and the findings are questionable as to whether they reveal perceptual predictions 
born out of mental state attribution. Yoshikawa and Sato (2008) were one of the first 
to measure the Representational Momentum effect for dynamic facial expressions. 
When participants were shown images of faces that morphed from a neutral facial 
expression to one of the six basic emotions (Ekman, 1993), they reported seeing a 
more developed facial expression than that shown, providing evidence of a forward 
displacement towards more extreme expression. When the velocity of the morph 
was increased, these exaggerations were intensified. This provides initial evidence 
that the Representational Momentum paradigm can be used to capture predictions 
not only in the non-social domain, but also for human biological action. However, 
these findings are limited to low-level predictions based on the natural development 
of the observed faces and do not require higher-level top-down predictions about the 
actor’s mental state.  
When expressions of approach (joy and anger) and avoidance (fear and disgust) 
were measured against congruent or incongruent behaviours in terms of a rotating 
head towards or away from the observer, the final position of the head was judged to 
have rotated further when the expression matched the behaviour (i.e., further 
towards the participants for approach expressions and further away for avoidance 
expressions, Hudson & Jellema, 2011). These displacements demonstrate a 
Representational Momentum effect that draws not only upon predictions of 
continuing movement, but integrates top-down inferences about the actor’s intention, 
as signalled by the match between their facial expression and the direction of their 
head turn. These findings therefore demonstrate the potential for the 
Representational Momentum paradigm to reveal the underlying goals and intentions 
that we attribute to others, in line with predictive processing theories.  
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Recent research has used the Representational Momentum paradigm to investigate 
whether high-level expectations about other people’s actions do indeed induce 
perceptual changes to action observation. Hudson, Nicholson, Simpson, Ellis, and 
Bach (2016) presented participants with short video clips of an actor reaching 
towards or withdrawing away from an object. Before the onset of the action, 
participants instructed the actor by saying either “Take it!” or “Leave it!”. Participants 
overestimated the last seen position of the hand in the direction of motion, and this 
forward bias was larger when the direction of the action followed the instruction. 
Thus, reaches towards an object appeared more exaggerated after instructing them 
to “Take it!” than to “Leave it!”, and vice versa for observed withdrawals. This 
Representational Momentum effect was replicated when the actor stated their 
intention instead, by saying “I’ll take it!” or “I’ll leave it” before the onset of the action 
(Hudson, Nicholson, Ellis, & Bach, 2016), and was modulated by the likelihood that 
the actor would do as he says (25% or 75% of the time, Hudson, Bach, & Nicholson, 
2018). These findings therefore reveal that high-level information about the goals 
and intentions of other’s actions is used to generate predictions of their upcoming 
behaviour, that these predictions create distortions to the perceptual representation 
of the action, and that these social biases can be captured within a Representational 
Momentum paradigm.  
Together, therefore, the Representational Momentum effect presents a unique 
measure of predictive motion perception and has been used extensively to reveal 
how perceptual predictions about the future path of a moving target can distort the 
perceptual representation of the stimulus (Freyd & Finke, 1984; Hubbard, 2005, 
2017). These predictions are not only informed by low-level motion cues from the 
observed stimulus, but are also influenced by higher-level expectations that consider 
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the features of the target (Finke et al., 1986; Hubbard, 2005; Hubbard & Bharucha, 
1988; Reed & Vinson, 1996; Vinson & Reed, 2002), the environment (Johnston & 
Jones, 2006; Verfaillie & d’Ydewalle, 1991), and the causes of motion (Hubbard & 
Favretto, 2003; Hubbard & Ruppel, 2002), for example. More recently, the 
Representational Momentum effect has been employed as a novel method to 
measure social predictions, showing modulations to the predictive effects based on 
inferences about the mental state of the actor (Hudson et al., 2018; Hudson & 
Jellema, 2011; Hudson, Liu, & Jellema, 2009; Hudson, Nicholson, Ellis, et al., 2016; 
Hudson, Nicholson, Simpson, et al., 2016). These findings have shown the 
capabilities of Representational Momentum paradigms to capture the high-level 
expectations that humans have about other people’s upcoming behaviours, informed 
by inferences about their goals and intentions, and the influence these predictions 
have on social perception. While these prior studies demonstrate initial evidence for 
comparable predictive processing mechanisms between social perception and non-
social perception, offering a revolutionary perspective on how we understand the 
actions of others, the findings are limited and so many questions about the 
underlying mechanisms of action understanding remain unanswered. The 
Representational Momentum paradigm therefore offers novel method to conduct 
deeper investigations into predictive processing theories of social perception. The 
experiments in this thesis will use this paradigm to reveal how these predictions of 
others’ upcoming behaviour are generated, on what cues they rely, and how these 
predictions alter the perceptual representation of others’ action.   
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3 Chapter Three - Assumptions of efficient action 
The initial studies aimed to resolve which information is used to inform action 
predictions and what impact these predictions have on social perception, therefore 
providing new avenues to understand how action expectations can shape our 
understanding of other people’s actions. These studies use the Representational 
Momentum paradigm (Freyd & Finke, 1984; Hubbard, 2005) to test whether 
assumptions of action efficiency (Csibra & Gergely, 2013; Dennett, 1987; Gergely & 
Csibra, 2003) inform expectations of others upcoming actions. They test whether 
these predictions specifically concern the expected action kinematics in a perceptual 
format, how these predictions bias the actions’ perceptual representation, and 
whether these perceptual biases are elicited spontaneously.  
The experiments in this chapter were published in Proceedings of the Royal Society: 
Biological Sciences and are presented in their published format (green copy).  
3.1 Perceptual Teleology: Expectations of Action Efficiency Bias 
Social Perception. 
Matthew Hudson*, Katrina L. McDonough*, Rhys Edwards, Patric Bach* 
*authors contributed equally 
 
Abstract 
Primates interpret conspecific behaviour as goal-directed and expect others to 
achieve goals by the most efficient means possible. While this teleological stance is 
prominent in evolutionary and developmental theories of social cognition, little is 
known about the underlying mechanisms. In predictive models of social cognition, a 
perceptual prediction of an ideal efficient trajectory would be generated from prior 
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knowledge against which the observed action is evaluated, distorting the perception 
of unexpected inefficient actions. To test this, participants observed an actor reach 
for an object with a straight or arched trajectory on a touch screen. The actions were 
made efficient or inefficient by adding or removing an obstructing object. The action 
disappeared mid-trajectory and participants touched the last seen screen position of 
the hand. Judgments of inefficient actions were biased toward the efficient prediction 
(straight trajectories upward to avoid the obstruction, arched trajectories downward 
towards the target). These corrections increased when the obstruction’s 
presence/absence was explicitly acknowledged, and when the efficient trajectory 
was explicitly predicted. The teleological stance is at least partly perceptual, 
providing an ideal reference trajectory against which actual behaviour is evaluated. 
3.2 Experiments 1a - c 
Human and non-human primates take the “intentional stance” when watching 
conspecifics (Dennett, 1987), interpreting their behaviour as purposeful and goal 
directed (Baillargeon, Scott & Bian, 2016; Baker, Saxe & Tenenbaum, 2009; Csibra 
& Gergely, 2007; Gergely & Csibra, 2003). Crucial to this is the understanding that 
others’ actions are, from the outset, optimised to achieve their goals in the most 
efficient and rational way, minimising time and energy expenditure given the 
environmental constraints. Both human infants and macaque monkeys, for example, 
show surprise when intentional agents do not attempt to avoid an obstacle, or take 
an unnecessary long way to reach their goal (Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Rochat, Serra, 
Fadiga & Gallese, 2008). This simple efficient action heuristic provides a foundation 
for the development of sophisticated capacities for mentalizing and theory of mind in 
adult humans (e.g., Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Wellman & Brandone, 2009). For 
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example, seeing a seemingly inefficient action (e.g. a reach straight for an object 
despite an obstacle in the way) can prompt the insight that others act according to 
beliefs that can differ from one’s own (i.e. they may not have seen the obstacle). 
Indeed, seeing such actions captures attention (Vivanti et al., 2011), and alters 
activity in brain areas implicated in action perception and mentalizing (e.g. Desmet & 
Brass, 2015; Marsh, Mullett, Ropar & Hamilton, 2014). 
Yet, despite the crucial role of teleological/intentional reasoning in human and 
animal social cognition, little is known about the underlying processes. The currently 
dominant view sees social perception as a bottom-up “resonance” of one’s own 
motor apparatus with others’ actions, which allows the associated goals and internal 
states (sensations, emotions) to be derived (e.g., Iacoboni, 2009; Rizzolatti & 
Sinigaglia, 2010). Action efficiency would, in such a model, be conceptualised as a 
post-hoc motoric signal of effort or energy expenditure, which can be compared with 
a reference value for this type of action (e.g. Jara-Ettinger, Gwean, Tenenbaum and 
Schulz, 2015). However, such models are challenged by findings that children make 
efficiency judgments for movements of biomechanically impossible actions for which 
motor resonance is unlikely (Southgate, Johnson & Csibra, 2008), that they can 
process efficiency before acquiring competence in the seen actions (e.g., Gredeback 
& Melinder, 2010; Sodian, Schoeppner & Metz, 2004), or that, in adults, eye-
movements indicate expectations of efficient action before action onset, when such 
kinematic information is not yet available (Fischer, Prinz & Lotz, 2008). 
An alternative is that teleological reasoning might not emerge from a “late” 
motoric signal, but from earlier perceptual signals. Recent predictive coding 
frameworks argue that perception in general – and social perception in particular – is 
informed by prior expectations, derived from one’s knowledge about the world and 
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other people, and that these expectations guide processing of the perceptual input 
(Bach, Nicholson & Hudson, 2014; 2015; Bach & Schenke, 2017; Csibra, 2008; 
Kilner, Friston & Frith, 2007ab). Predictive influences have been demonstrated in a 
diverse range of perceptual abilities including the perception of “true” colour from 
surrounding illumination (Bloj, Kersten & Hurlbert, 1999), anticipated effects of 
physical dynamics on motion perception (Sotiropoulos, Seitz & Series, 2011), and 
3D concave/convexity from the presumed location of light sources (Adams, Graf & 
Ernst, 2004). In a similar way, the environment provides all the necessary 
information to generate an ideal reference trajectory that a fully rational, intentional 
actor would take to achieve their goal (i.e. location of goal objects and possible 
obstructions), and which would provide a comparison to immediately flag observed 
actions as being efficient or not, confirming prior attributions of goals and 
intentionality. 
Here, we provide a first test of (1) whether human observers make such 
predictions of how rational actors who are aware of all environmental constraints 
efficiently traverse the given action space, (2) whether these predictions are realised 
in a perceptual format that can serve as a reference image for the observed action 
and (3) which bias its perceptual representation. We rely on the well-established 
phenomenon that when a moving stimulus suddenly disappears, participants’ 
estimations of its last seen position show robust distortions towards the expected 
path (i.e. Representational Momentum, Hubbard, 2005), in line with the notion that 
the considerable uncertainty during motion perception is sharpened by top-down 
information (e.g., Hammett, 1997; Bex, Edgar & Smith, 1995), or that predicted paths 
are perceptually “filled in” after the sudden offset (Ekman, Kok & de Lange, 2017). 
Importantly, these distortions rely on changes to lower-level visual representations 
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(e.g. Senior, 2000; Senior, Ward & David, 2002), occur even when participants are 
warned against them (Courtney & Hubbard, 2008; Ruppel, Fleming & Hubbard, 
2009) and integrate higher level information such as the physical forces acting on the 
objects (e.g., momentum, friction, gravity, for a review, see Hubbard, 2005) or prior 
action expectations (Hudson, Nicholson, Ellis & Bach, 2016; Hudson, Nicholson, 
Simpson, Ellis & Bach, 2016; Hudson, Bach & Nicholson, 2017).  
Here, we use this paradigm to reveal the expectations of efficient action that 
guide the perception of others’ actions. In three studies, participants watched an 
actor reach towards an object. The action disappeared mid-trajectory, and 
participants indicated the perceived disappearance point on a touch screen. In two 
conditions, the actions were efficient, showing a reach either straight towards the 
object or arched over an obstacle placed in between. In two other conditions, the 
actions were made inefficient by either adding an obstacle to the path of the straight 
reaches (such that the actor would knock into the obstacle), or removing the obstacle 
for the arched reaches (such that the actor reached over empty space). If others’ 
behaviour is perceived relative to what would be expected under the implicit 
assumption of efficient action, then the perceived kinematics should be displaced 
along the trajectory that an intentional, rational actor might take. Unexpected 
inefficient actions should be “corrected” toward the predicted efficient action 
trajectory: straight reaches would be perceived upward if approaching an obstacle 
where an avoidance movement would be predicted, whilst an arched reach would be 
displaced downwards if made over empty space as this energy expenditure is 
unnecessary. Moreover, such distortions should be observed spontaneously when 
participants passively observe these actions, but should increase the more the 
environmental constraints and the behaviour of a rational actor is made explicit. As 
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an additional between-subjects task manipulation, we therefore varied whether the 
actions were viewed under no additional instructions (No Task), or whether they 
were asked to report “yes” or “no” in response to the presence of an obstacle prior to 
action onset (Report Obstacle) or to predict whether a rational actor would ideally 
have to reach “straight” or “over” an obstacle before the action started (Predict 
Trajectory).  
3.2.1 Method 
3.2.1.1  Participants 
Eighty-five participants took part (mean age=24 years, SD=7.7, 62 females, 
No Task: n=30, Report Obstacle: n=27, Predict Trajectory: n=28). Seven additional 
participants were excluded due to performance (see Results). All participants were 
right handed, had normal/corrected vision, were recruited from Plymouth University 
and wider community, and received course credit or payment. The study received 
ethical approval from the University of Plymouth’s ethics board, in accordance with 
those of the ESRC and the Declaration of Helsinki. A priori power analyses of 
previous experiments investigating similar effects with the same method (Hudson et 
al., 2017, Experiment 3) revealed that a sample size of 14 is required to achieve 
power of 0.95. 
3.2.1.2  Apparatus 
Stimuli were filmed with a Sony HD video camera at 50fps with a widescreen 
aspect ratio (16:9) and a resolution of 1920 X 1080 (2.1 megapixel), and edited with 
Adobe Photoshop. The experiment was delivered using Presentation (NeuroBS) via 
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a NEC Multisync P221w LCD touch screen monitor (1680 X 1050). Verbal responses 
for the Report Obstacle and Predict Trajectory conditions were recorded using 
Presentation’s sound threshold logic via a Logitech PC120 combined microphone 
and headphone set. 
3.2.1.3  Stimuli 
Example stimuli can be seen in Figure 3-1A. Videos were filmed of an arm 
starting in a rest position at the right of the screen and reaching to grasp a target 
object on the left (either an apple, bottle, crisps, glue stick, or stapler). In the original 
set of videos, the actor´s reach was either (1) unobstructed and the trajectory of the 
arm was straight toward the target object (Straight/Efficient), (2) obstructed by one of 
4 objects (iPad, lamp, pencil holder, or photo-frame), and the trajectory of the arm 
was arched over the obstruction (Arched/Efficient). From each video, 19 frames were 
extracted for the experimental stimuli, beginning with the onset of movement (frame 
1) to mid-way through the action (frame 19). Inefficient action sequences were 
created by digitally removing the obstructing objects in the Arched/Efficient videos 
(Arched/Inefficient). For each of the Straight/Efficient actions, a new set of videos 
were created by adding each of the obstructing objects to show the actor was 
reaching straight for the target despite the obstruction (Straight/Inefficient). This 
created a set of inefficient actions that were identical to the efficient actions in terms 
of movement kinematics, and differed only by the presence/absence of the 
obstructing object. Finally, for each action a single frame was created in which the 
hand was digitally removed. This served as a response stimulus at the end of each 
trial where participants estimated the disappearance point of the action. 
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3.2.1.4  Procedure 
Participants completed two blocks of 80 trials in which each combination of 
action trajectory (straight, arched) and efficiency (efficient, inefficient) was 
represented by 20 trials. Participants were instructed that, on each trial, they would 
see an actor reach from the right of the screen for a target object on the far left, but 
that sometimes there would be a second object in between.  
An example trial sequence can be seen in Figure 3-1B. At the start of each 
trial, participants were instructed to “Hold the spacebar” and to keep it depressed to 
prevent them from tracking the observed action with their finger to improve 
performance. They then saw the first frame of the action sequence as a static image. 
In the No Task condition, the action sequence began after a randomly chosen delay 
of between 1000ms or 3000ms. In the Report Obstacle condition and Predict 
Trajectory conditions, it began 1000ms after the participant’s verbal response had 
been detected. In the Report Obstacle condition, participants said “No” if there was 
no obstruction and “Yes” if there was an obstruction. In the Predict Trajectory 
condition, participants said “Straight” if there was no obstruction, and “Over” if there 
was an obstruction. The action depicted the frame order progressing at 3 frame 
intervals for a total sequence of between 4 and 7 frames for 80ms each (e.g. frames 
1-4-7-10-13-16-19). Starting frames and sequence length were randomly chosen on 
each trial to prevent memorisation of the final position from the starting frame. The 
final frame was immediately replaced by the response stimulus, creating the 
impression that the hand simply disappeared from the scene. Participants released 
the spacebar and, with their right hand, touched the screen where they thought the 
final seen position of the tip of the index finger was. As soon as a response was 
registered, the next trial began. 
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Figure 3-1. Experiments 1a-c. Stimulus conditions and trial sequence.  
The stimulus conditions are depicted in Panel A. The Action Trajectory was either 
straight (top row) or arched over (bottom row). The presence or absence of an 
obstructing object made the action trajectory either efficient (left column) or inefficient 
(right column). In all examples, the hand is in the initial start position, and the white 
markers depict the final four frames of the trajectory of the index finger tip. The 
action sequence disappeared at one of these four points. An example trial sequence 
is depicted in Panel B, depicting an efficient arched trajectory over an obstruction. 
3.2.2 Results 
Participants were excluded if the distance between the real and selected 
positions exceeded 3SD of the sample mean (mean =49.2 pixels, SD=12.4, no 
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exclusions), or if the correlation between the real and selected positions was more 
than 3SD below the median r value (X axis: median =.914, SD = .055; Y axis: 
median =.901, SD = .077, 4 participants excluded). For each participant, individual 
trials were excluded if the response procedure was incorrect (spacebar released 
before action offset, 4.1%), or if response initiation or execution times were less than 
200ms or more than 3SD above the sample mean (5.1%, Initiation: mean =443.5ms, 
SD=84.4; Execution: mean =817.2ms, SD=230.4). Three additional participants were 
excluded for having an excessive number of trial exclusions (> 50%). 
The real final screen coordinate of the tip of the index finger was subtracted 
from participants’ selected screen coordinate on each trial. Analysis was conducted 
on this residual localisation error, which provided a directional measure of how far, in 
pixels, participant’s responses were displaced along the X and Y axis. An accurate 
response would produce a value of 0 on both axes. On the X axis, positive values 
denote a rightward displacement (against the direction of motion) and negative 
values a leftward displacement. On the Y axis positive and negative values denote 
upward and down displacements respectively.  
Overall, there was a significant leftward bias (X axis: mean =-8.4px, SD=19.2, 
t(84)=-4.01, p<.001, d=.61, 95% CI [-4.3,-12.5]), and a significant downward bias (Y 
axis: mean =-15.1px, SD=15.0, t(84)=-9.27, p<.001, d=1.35, 95% CI [-11.9,-18.3]). 
The differences along the X and Y axis for each experimental condition across all 
tasks and for each task individually can be seen in Figure 3-2: A-D. These difference 
values were entered into a 2X2X3 mixed measures ANOVA for the X and Y axis 
separately, with Trajectory (arched, straight) and Efficiency (efficient, inefficient) as 
within-subjects factors, and Task (No Task, Report Obstacle, Predict Trajectory) as a 
between-subjects factor. 
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3.2.2.1  Y Axis 
The main prediction is that perceptual judgments of inefficient actions would 
be displaced towards the expected trajectory, that is, downwards for inefficient 
arched trajectories and upwards for inefficient straight trajectories. Indeed, the 
analysis revealed a main effect of Efficiency (F(1,82)=12.04, p=.001, ηp2=.128) that 
was qualified by an interaction of Efficiency and Trajectory (F(1,82)=136.2, p<.001, 
ηp2=.624). As predicted, inefficient arched trajectories (-19.7px) were displaced 
below efficient arched trajectories (-11.0px, t(84)=-9.33, p<.001, d=.47), and 
inefficient straight actions (-12.0px) were displaced above efficient straight actions (-
17.7px, t(84)=8.51, p<.001, d=.44), despite the actual hand disappearance points 
being identical within each trajectory. Importantly, there was a three-way interaction 
between Trajectory, Efficiency, and Task (F(2,82)=10.6, p<.001, ηp2=.205). The 
interaction effect was re-quantified as a single value for each participant 
([Arched/Efficient – Arched/Inefficient] – [Straight/Efficient – Straight/Inefficient]) to 
reveal the total amount in pixels by which inefficient actions were corrected toward a 
more efficient trajectory for each task (see Figure 3-2: E). Between subjects t-tests 
on this interaction value – mathematically equivalent to the pairwise 3-way 
interactions of Trajectory, Efficiency and Task – show that the interaction was 
marginally larger in the Predict Trajectory condition than the Report Obstacle 
condition (t(53)=-1.95, p=.057, d=.53), which in turn was significantly larger than in 
the No Task condition (t(55)=-2.81, p=.007, d=.73). Demonstrating the robustness of 
the interaction, exploratory analysis showed that the interaction of Trajectory and 
Efficiency was evident in all conditions with a corrected alpha level of p = .017 (No 
Task: F(1,29)=35.3, p<.001, ηp2=.549; Report Obstacle: F(1,26)=44.5, p<.001, 
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ηp2=.631; Predict Trajectory: F(1,27)=57.7, p<.001, ηp2=.681, Figure 2 A-C). There 
were no further main effects or interactions.  
3.2.2.2  X Axis 
We did not have specific predictions about how action rationality would affect 
perceptual displacements on the X Axis and the analysis indeed did not reveal either 
a main effect of Efficiency (F(1,82)=.837, p=.363, ηp2=.01) nor an interaction of 
Efficiency and Trajectory (F(1,82)=1.39, p=.242, ηp2=.017). We report the remaining 
effects of no interest below but due to alpha inflation of unpredicted effects in an 
ANOVA (Cramer et al., 2014) they should be considered exploratory and interpreted 
with caution. A main effect of Task (F(2,82)=8.81, p<.001, ηp2=.177) revealed a 
general leftward displacement in the No Task (-16.8px, t(29)=-5.14, p<.001, d=1.35) 
and Predict Trajectory conditions (-10.0px, t(27)=-3.43, p=.002. d=.86), but not in the 
Report Obstacle condition (9px, t(26)=.720, p=.478, d=.19). A main effect of 
Trajectory (F(1,82)=1231.4, p<.001, ηp2=.938) showed a leftward displacement for 
arched trajectories (-24.4px, t(84)=-11.0, p<.001, d=1.7) and a rightward 
displacement for straight trajectories (7.7px, t(84)=3.74, p<.001, d=.53), most likely 
reflecting the further right displaced centre of gravity of the straight arm 
configurations (Coren & Hoeing, 1972; see also Hudson et al., 2017). Finally, an 
interaction between Trajectory and Task (F(1,82)=9.88, p<.001, ηp2=.194) revealed 
that the Trajectory effect was larger in the No Task than in the Report Obstacle 
condition (t(55)=4.15, p<.001, d=1.1) and Predict Trajectory conditions (t(56)=3.25, 
p=.002, d=.86), which did not differ from each other (t(53)=1.18, p=.243, d=.32). 
There were no further interactions (all p’s>.351).  
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Figure 3-2. Experiments 1a-c. Results 
The Trajectory X Efficiency interactions for each Task condition are depicted on the 
top row (A: No Task; B: Report Obstacle; C: Predict Trajectory). The difference 
between the real final position and the selected final position is plotted for the X axis 
and Y axis. The centre of each plot represents the real final position on any given 
trial (0px difference on each axis). Panel D provides a descriptive representation of 
the data in real screen coordinates (collapsed across task conditions). The sold lines 
represent the mean real final position of the Arched (white) and Straight (black) 
trajectories for the four possible disappearance points. The selected screen 
coordinates for each Trajectory are plotted for the efficient (filled line) and inefficient 
(dashed line) conditions. The data are placed over a spatially aligned backdrop of a 
representative stimulus image of the action start point with an obstructing object to 
provide a reference of how the data relate to the stimuli. Panel E depicts a 
comparison of the size of the Y axis interaction in pixels, equivalent to the total 
amount by which inefficient actions were corrected towards a more efficient 
trajectory. Error bars depict 95% confidence intervals. 
3.2.3 Discussion 
The present study showed for the first time that the teleological interpretation 
humans have of others’ behaviour is perceptually instantiated and provides a visual 
 
54 
 
reference signal for an expected “ideal” trajectory during action observation. 
Participants watched a hand reach for objects with either efficient or inefficient 
kinematics and reported its last position after it had suddenly disappeared. Across 
several samples, perceptual reports were consistently biased towards the ideal 
reference kinematics. Straight reaches were reported higher if there was an obstacle 
in the way, as if lifted to avoid it. Conversely, reaches with a high arched trajectory 
were reported lower if the path was clear. These biases were evident automatically, 
but became more pronounced when observers explicitly processed the potential 
obstacles that could constrain the action and particularly when they predicted the 
most efficient action kinematics through the scene.  
Together, these results reveal that, during social perception, the principle of 
efficient action provides a similar perceptual reference signal as the assumption that 
light comes from above (Adams et al., 2004) or that gravity pulls objects downwards 
(Hubbard & Bharucha, 1988), constantly pushing the perceptual representation of 
inefficient actions towards a more rational path. The resulting biases in perceptual 
judgments cannot be accounted for by an abstract awareness of the action’s goal, 
such as when eye movements jump towards an action’s target (Eshuis, Coventry & 
Vulchanova, 2009) or perceptual judgments are biased towards them (Hudson et al., 
2016ab; 2017). Instead, they reveal concrete expectations of the specific trajectory 
that the action will take through the scene. Moreover, making this awareness explicit 
prior to action observation increased the perceptual bias. Action efficiency is 
therefore not only evaluated after an action has been completed (Gergely & Csibra, 
2003; Rochat et al., 2008; Scott & Baillargeon, 2013; Vivanti et al, 2011), but 
constantly updated, at every step in the trajectory, by predictions that can be derived 
from contextual cues prior to the motor behaviour.  
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Our results support predictive coding frameworks of social perception (Bach 
et al., 2014; 2015; 2017; Csibra, 2008; Kilner et al., 2007ab), which argue that social 
perception, like perception in general, is hypothesis driven and guided by top-down 
expectations. In such models, observers constantly test their inferences about 
others’ goals and beliefs by predicting how they would behave, and matching this 
prediction to – and integrating it with –the actual perceptual input. In such a view, 
predictions of efficient action can contribute to the perceptual sharpening of the 
visual uncertainty during action perception (i.e. motion blurring, Hammett, 1997), or 
after its offset, constantly biasing perception toward the expected avoidance or 
straightening movement, with the amount of bias constrained by the visual 
uncertainty. In addition, they allow humans to rapidly confirm the intentionality of 
other’s behaviour, only requiring a match of the observed actions to the ideal 
kinematics that would follow from these goals. Prediction errors, in contrast, would 
signal inefficient actions, triggering more sophisticated mentalising processes to re-
evaluate the actor's goal or how their beliefs may differ from one’s own (Desmet & 
Brass, 2015; Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Marsh et al., 2014). In this way, the relatively 
simple perceptual process of prediction and prediction error would not only support 
perception, but also provide a foundation for higher level judgments about others’ 
beliefs or intentions, even in cases in which motor experience is unlikely (Gredeback 
& Melinder, 2010; Sodian et al., 2004; Southgate et al., 2008).  
In humans, sensitivity to kinematic efficiency emerges early in development. It 
is present in other primates (Rochat et al., 2008) and is also spared in individuals 
with autism spectrum conditions, for whom only more advanced mental state 
reasoning prove problematic (Marsh, Pearson, Ropar & Hamilton, 2015; Vivanti et al, 
2011). The key leap to the sophisticated socio-cognitive abilities of humans may 
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therefore lie in the abstraction of these content-based representations of goals, 
environment, and action, to higher-order representations of desires, beliefs, and 
intentions, respectively (Gergely & Csibra, 2003). For example, it is clear that human 
infants from the age of four onwards are able to predict what others will do not based 
on the actual environmental constraints (toy is in box A), but in terms of what the 
actor believes the state of the environment to be (they believe it is in box B), 
suggesting that the bottleneck emerges at this later state that requires sophisticated 
coordination of representation, such as others’ beliefs that differ from one’s own 
beliefs or objective reality (Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan & Humphreys, 2005; 
Santiesteban, White, Cook, Gilbert, Heyes & Bird, 2012; Steinbeis, 2016).  
3.2.4 Conclusions 
The principle of efficient action allows observers to perceive others’ actions 
relative to ideal reference actions, thereby confirming prior goal attributions or 
revising them in case of a conflict. Such perceptual mechanisms for rationality 
perception support rapid attribution of intentionality and facilitate the perception of 
others’ behaviour and our interactions with them. The burden of social cognition is 
placed on mechanisms that account for unexpected behaviour through a re-
evaluation of their beliefs, desire, and intentions, so that our model of the social 
world can be refined, and predictions of other’s behaviour can be made more 
accurately.  
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4 Chapter Four: Perceptual predictions 
The experiments in Chapter Three provide the first evidence that, during action 
observation, the principle of efficient action provides a perceptual reference signal for 
the specific trajectory a rational actor would make through a given scene, influencing 
action perception. Despite utilising a Representational Momentum paradigm (Freyd 
& Finke, 1984; Hubbard, 2005) that reliably measures predictive biases in motion 
perception, there still remains the possibility that the effects found could be 
influenced by changes outside of the perceptual system (Kerzel, 2005). For example, 
it is possible that participants merely misremembered the last final position of the 
actor’s hand, or that the touch screen response measure introduced the potential for 
motor-related effects (Firestone & Scholl, 2015; Kerzel, 2005).  
Experiment 2a tested whether the perceptual shifts towards efficient actions can be 
observed in a psychophysical task without motor or working memory components 
(Kerzel, 2005). This experiment replaced touch screen judgements with probe 
judgements directly after action offset (250 ms.) to rule out contributions from the 
action’s representation in later working memory or motor control stages, and to 
instead reveal a contribution to immediate perceptual processing, either during 
ongoing motion perception (Muckli, Kohler, Kriegeskorte, & Singer, 2005; Yantis & 
Nakama, 1998), or during perceptual “filling in” in the brief interval directly after its 
sudden offset (Ekman et al., 2017).  
Experiment 2b tested whether the perceptual shifts towards the efficient trajectories 
recorded in Experiments 1a-c can be disrupted with a short dynamic visual noise 
mask presented directly after action offset. Such masks reliably disrupt lower-level 
perceptual processes (Kinsbourne & Warrington, 1962; Breitmeyer & Ögmen 2006), 
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eliciting similar effects as transcranial magnetic stimulation of occipital cortices 
(Tapia & Beck, 2014). If masking successfully reduces predictive effects, then this 
would further confirm that the perceptual biases in Experiments 1a-c reflect changes 
to early visual stimulus representation, either “on-line” during action observation, or 
in the brief interval after its offset where expected trajectories are spontaneously 
“filled in” (Ekman et al., 2017).  
The experiments in this chapter were published in Proceedings of the Royal Society: 
Biological Sciences, and form part of the supplementary experiments that support 
the main findings from the experiments in Chapter Three. 
4.1 Using probe judgements and visual noise masking to reveal 
perceptual predictions 
Human and non-human primates take the “intentional stance” when watching 
conspecifics (Dennett, 1987). They interpret the behaviour of others as goal directed 
(Baillargeon, Scott & Bian, 2016; Baker, Saxe & Tenenbaum, 2009; Csibra & 
Gergely, 2007; Gergely & Csibra, 2003) and expect them to achieve goals in the 
most efficient and rational way, minimising time and energy expenditure given the 
environmental constraints (Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Rochat, Serra, Fadiga & 
Gallese, 2008). This simple heuristic of action efficiency arises early in development 
and allows children to attribute intentionality to observed behaviours, even when 
carried out by inanimate objects (Gergely, Bekkering, & Király, 2002; Gergely, 
Nádasdy, Csibra, & Bíró, 1995; Liu & Spelke, 2017), forming a stepping-stone for 
more sophisticated abilities for reasoning about others (Gergely & Csibra, 2003; 
Wellman & Brandone, 2009).  
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The experiments in Chapter 3 reveal that the principle of efficient action guides the 
perceptual representation of others actions towards the most efficient trajectory 
towards goals, given the environmental constraints (Hudson, McDonough, Edwards, 
& Bach, 2018). They show that expectations of efficient action are, to some extent, 
perceptually represented, in the form of an ideal “reference” trajectory that a rational 
actor would take through a given environment, against which observed actions can 
be judged (Bach & Schenke, 2017; Hudson et al., 2018). Participants observed short 
video clips of a hand starting to reach for an object with a straight or arched 
trajectory. The actions were either efficient (reaching straight when the path was 
clear or arched over an obstacle) or inefficient (straight towards an obstacle or 
arched over empty space). Immediately after action offset, participants reported the 
hand’s last seen position on a touch screen. The results revealed perceptual biases 
towards efficient action expectations, such that straight reaches were reported to 
have reached higher when an obstacle was blocking its path, and arched reaches 
were reported lower when no obstacle was present. These distortions were elicited 
spontaneously but increased as predictions were made more explicit. Such effects 
are akin to the perceptual “filling in” of missing input by top-down information (Muckli 
et al., 2005; Yantis & Nakama, 1998) and the perceptual sharpening of motion 
perception during uncertainty (Bex, Edgar, & Smith, 1995; Ekman et al., 2017). 
Together, these results indicate that the teleological stance is at least partly 
perceptually represented, providing an ideal reference trajectory that informs the 
action that was indeed perceived.  
In the study described above, perceptual judgments were recorded using touch 
screen localisations. These touch screen responses provide a direct measure of 
perceptual shift in each trial (Hubbard, 2005), but leave open at which processing 
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step they occur. Do they directly affect the perceptual representations of the 
observed actions, or do they emerge from later changes to the action’s perceptual 
representations in working memory or in the sensorimotor maps that guide the motor 
responses to the relevant locations on the screen (Firestone & Scholl, 2015, Kerzel, 
2005)? The experiments in this chapter address this question by replicating the main 
experiments with a probe comparison design that is not influenced by changes in 
memory or motor related processes (Kerzel, 2005), and with a visual noise masking 
paradigm that reliably interrupts perceptual processing (Breitmeyer & Öğmen, 2006). 
If the findings from the main experiments truly reflect changes to perceptual 
representations from expectations of action efficiency, then we would expect to 
replicate the predictive effects within the probe design and eliminate the effects with 
a dynamic visual noise mask.  
4.2 Experiment 2a 
The main experiments measured perceptual shifts by calculating the difference 
between the final location of the action and where participants judged this location to 
be, using a touch screen monitor (Hudson et al., 2018). This measure of response 
has been used in previous studies of predictive displacement (Hudson et al., 2017; 
Kerzel & Gegenfurtner, 2003; Motes, Hubbard, Courtney, & Rypma, 2008) and 
utilises the advances in technology that out-date previous Representational 
Momentum designs that used cursor positioning to capture localisation judgements 
(Hubbard & Bharucha, 1988; Joordens, Spalek, Razmy, & van Duijn, 2004). Both 
cursor positioning and touch screen responses provide a more direct measure of 
displacement than classic probe comparison designs used in original 
Representational Momentum paradigms (Freyd & Finke, 1984, 1985; Hubbard, 
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1997, 2005). They allow for the specific localisation for a given vanishing point in a 
single trial whereas probe designs would require several presentations of the same 
vanishing point with varying probe positions, even then only retrieving an estimate of 
this localisation.  
Probe judgments, in contrast, have the advantage of better controlling for response 
time, minimising the delay incurred by localising the cursor or finger in the intended 
position, and, as they only require a single button press, minimise the spatial and 
motor components of the response (Hubbard, 2005). Replicating the original 
experiments with a Probe comparison design can therefore eliminate the influence of 
working-memory components, by controlling the retention interval between action 
offset and response, and motor related processes by employing the same response 
method (button press) in every trial that do not require access to visuospatial 
information. Since the original touch screen experiments have already identified the 
average position of predictive displacements, replications with a probe design are no 
longer limited by non-specific estimations for probe positions.  
Experiment 2a therefore replicated the Report Object experiment from the original 
study (Hudson et al., 2018) with the well-established probe comparison task that is 
free from such memory or motoric influences, but reliably measures changes to the 
perceived motion in the predicted path (i.e., representational momentum, Freyd & 
Finke, 1984; Hudson et al., 2017; 2016ab, for reviews, see Hubbard, 2005; Kerzel, 
2005). In each trial, participants compared the hand’s last seen position with a probe 
stimulus presented directly after hand offset (250 ms. gap), which was displaced 
vertically either in the predicted direction (e.g. downwards for inefficient arched 
reaches) or in the opposite unpredicted direction, and horizontally leftwards or 
rightwards. They indicated, with the press of a button, whether the probe stimulus 
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position was identical or different from the hand’s last seen position on the screen. 
Importantly, if predictions of efficient action affect the ongoing perceptual 
representation of the observed actions, akin to perceptual processing in non-
biological perception (Muckli et al., 2005; Yantis & Nakama, 1998) or if they lead to 
spontaneous perceptual filling in of the predicted trajectories after the sudden offset 
(Ekman et al., 2017), then participants should be more likely to mistake probe 
displacements in the expected direction with the hand’s last seen position, compared 
to displacements in the opposite, unpredicted direction. Because the probe stimuli 
appear directly after action offset and participants’ responses do not need access to 
visuospatial representations, any such effects will therefore reflect either perceptual 
changes during ongoing action observation or directly after action offset.  
4.2.1 Method 
4.2.1.1  Participants 
Thirty-nine participants took part in the experiment (mean age = 20.0 years, 
SD = 1.7, 28 females). All participants were right-handed, had normal/corrected 
vision, and were recruited from Plymouth University for course credit. The study 
received ethical approval from the University of Plymouth’s ethics board, in 
accordance with those of the ESRC and the Declaration of Helsinki. 
4.2.1.2  Apparatus  
The experiment was presented on a HP EliteDisplay S230tm 23-inch 
widescreen (1920 X 1080) touch screen monitor. Verbal responses were recorded 
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with Microsoft LifeChat LX-3000 Headsets. All other components of the apparatus 
were the same as in the main experiments.  
4.2.1.3  Stimuli 
The stimulus set was identical to the main experiments. The only addition was 
the probe stimulus, a single red circle the same size (30 X 30 pixels) as the tip of the 
index finger of the action stimuli in Experiments 1a-c. 
4.2.1.4  Procedure 
The design of the experiment closely matched that of Experiments 1a-c (see 
Figure 4-1A). As before, participants completed two blocks of 80 randomised trials. 
Each trial began with the first static image of the action sequence, and continued to 
replicate the trial sequence of the Report Obstacle experiment (Experiment 1b) until 
the response stimulus. Thus, participants saw the action commence after they 
reported, verbally into the microphone, whether an obstacle was present in the 
scene. After the action disappeared, participants did not make a touch response. 
Instead, the probe stimulus was presented 250ms after hand offset (preventing 
masking effects, Breitmeyer & Öğmen, 2006). The probe stimulus was overlaid on 
top of the scene (without hand) and was positioned at either the same coordinates 
as the tip of the index finger, or at one of 12 different positions (see Figure 4-1B). 
These positions were derived from the average displacements induced by inefficient 
compared to efficient actions recorded in the Report Obstacle experiment 
(Experiment 1b, X = 24.3 pixels, Y= 19.2 pixels). Four of the different positions were 
calculated as the coordinates of the tip of the index finger, plus or minus 50% of 
these average displacement pixels, 100% of the average displacements, or 150%. 
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Panel B of Figure 4-1 depicts all 13 possible probe positions. Participants were 
required to press the spacebar if they judged the probe to be in a position different to 
the tip of the index finger and do nothing if they judged it to be in the same position.  
Each participant received two practice blocks containing six trials each. In the 
first practice block, the final action frame remained on screen instead of the 
response stimulus, and the probe was overlaid on top of this frame. This made it 
clear to participants when the probe was in the same or different position as the tip of 
the index finger. The second practice block was the same as the experimental trials.   
4.2.2 Results 
Participants were excluded if the correlation between their probe judgements 
and the probe positions was more than 3SD away from the median r value (X axis: 
median .858, SD = .141; Y axis: median =.898, SD = .123, 2 participants excluded). 
Exclusion of these participants does not affect the results. Individual trials were 
excluded if response times were faster than 200ms or slower than 3000ms (.04% of 
trials). 
Analysis was conducted on the proportion of “different” responses, averaged 
across the three probe positions in each of the four directions. Difference scores 
were calculated along the X and Y axis separately to measure the size of the 
perceptual shift. For the X axis, responses for rightward probes were subtracted from 
responses for leftward probes. Therefore, positive difference scores denote the 
proportion of rightward probes judged as “same” and negative difference scores 
denote the proportion of leftward probes judged as “same”. For the Y axis, 
responses for upward probes were subtracted from responses for downward probes. 
Therefore, positive difference scores denote the proportion of upward probes judged 
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as “same” and negative difference scores denote the proportion of downward probes 
judged as “same”. These difference scores were entered into two separate 2 X 2 
ANOVAs with Trajectory (arched, straight) and Efficiency (efficient, inefficient) as 
within-subjects factors.  
 
  
 
Figure 4-1. Experiment 2a. Trial sequence, Probe positions and Results. 
An example of the trial sequence is depicted in Panel A. Panel B depicts all probe 
positions relative to the final position of the hand, where 0,0 depicts a probe in the 
same position as the hand. Filled circles depict average displacement pixels as 
recorded in the Report Obstacle Experiment and empty circles depict plus or minus 
50%. The results for the Y axis are depicted in Panel C and the results for the X axis 
are depicted in Panel D.  
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4.2.2.1  Y Axis 
Overall, there was a main effect of Trajectory (F(1,36)= 13.44, p=.001, 
ηp2=.272), where the likelihood to accept upward compared to downward probes as 
“same” was greater for arched reaches (-.004) than for straight reaches (-.07, 
t(36)=3.67, p=.001, d=0.60), consistent with a extrapolation of the prior motion along 
its path. A main effect of Efficiency (F(1,36)= 5.66, p=.023, ηp2=.136) indicated that 
the likelihood to accept upward compared to downward probes as “same” was 
greater for inefficient reaches (-.01) than for efficient reaches (-.06, t(36)=2.38, 
p=.023, d=0.39). Most importantly, the analysis revealed the predicted interaction 
between Trajectory and Efficiency (F(1,36)= 11.39, p=.002, ηp2=.240). Participants 
were more likely to accept downwards compared to upwards probes as “same” for 
inefficient arched reaches than for efficient arched reaches, and, conversely, were 
more likely to accept upwards probes for inefficient straight reaches than for efficient 
straight reaches. These results therefore fully replicate the perceptual shifts towards 
the efficient trajectories in Experiments 1a-c with a psychophysical judgment task 
without working memory or motor components.  
4.2.2.2  X Axis 
As in Experiments 1a-c, we did not have specific predictions for the X Axis. 
The reported effects should therefore be considered exploratory and interpreted with 
caution. Overall, there was a main effect of Trajectory (F(1,36)= 47.01, p<.001, 
ηp2=.566). The likelihood to accept rightward compared to leftward probes as “same” 
was greater for arched reaches (.08) than for straight reaches (-.05, t(36)=6.86, 
p<.001, d=1.23), most likely reflecting a greater expectation of forward momentum 
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(leftward direction) for straight reaches compared to arched reaches 
(Representational Momentum; Hubbard, 2005). Interestingly, the analysis revealed 
an interaction between Trajectory and Efficiency (F(1,36)= 7.49, p=.010, ηp2=.172), 
showing that the likelihood to accept rightwards compared to leftward probes as 
“same” was greater for efficient arched reaches than for inefficient arched reaches, 
and greater for inefficient straight reaches than for efficient straight reaches. While 
unpredicted, this finding is fully in line with the expected deviation towards the 
predicted “efficient” trajectory. Because straight reaches exert more forward 
displacements than arched reaches (see above), this forward displacement also 
takes place – albeit to a smaller extent – when participants see an arched reach but 
predict a straight reach, or conversely, is reduced when participants see a straight 
reach but predict an arched one. As noted, this effect was not predicted and not 
observed with the touch screen responses. It should therefore be interpreted with 
caution before being replicated.  
4.2.3 Discussion      
The results of Experiment 2a confirm that perceptual distortions of observed actions 
towards an ideal reference trajectory can be measured with probe stimuli, with 
responses that do not rely on perceptual working memory representations or 
visuospatial motor maps (Kerzel, 2005). Participants simply reported – with a press 
of a button – whether the index finger’s seen disappearance was identical to a probe 
stimulus presented directly after action offset, which could be displaced either subtly 
upwards or downwards from the real disappearance point. Mirroring the results of 
the main experiments (Hudson, et al., 2018), participants were more likely to mis-
identify probes displaced towards the predicted “ideal” trajectory with the actually 
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perceived disappearance point. They more readily accepted downwards probes as 
the same as the last seen position of inefficient arched reaches, and upwards probes 
for inefficient straight reaches.  
This replication rules out that the effects emerge from perceptual changes to the 
action’s representation in later working memory or motor control stages, and instead 
reveal a contribution to immediate perceptual processing, either during ongoing 
motion perception (Muckli et al., 2005; Yantis & Nakama, 1998), or in the brief 
interval directly after its sudden offset, when the visual system spontaneously fills in 
the further expected trajectory (Ekman et al., 2017). These effects can be linked 
either to top-down changes that sharpen the considerable perceptual uncertainty 
during motion perception (motion blurring & sharpening, Hammett, 1997), and/or to 
changes in short term iconic memory that are assumed to rely on early visual 
representation. These effects are comparable to such phenomena as integration of 
stimulus features, change blindness and the experience of stable percepts across 
saccades (Becker, Pashler & Anstis, 2000; Jonides, Irwin & Yantis, 1982, see 
Öğmen & Herzog, 2016 for a recent review).   
4.3 Experiment 2b 
Experiment 2a provides strong support for the top-down influence of action efficiency 
expectations on the perceptual representation of others’ actions. Replicating the 
findings from the main experiments (Hudson et al., 2018) with a probe comparison 
task, Experiment 2a discounts that effects could have emerged from perceptual 
changes to the action’s representation in later working memory or motor control 
stages, and instead reveal a contribution to immediate perceptual processing, either 
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during ongoing motion perception (Muckli, et al., 2005; Yantis & Nakama, 1998), or 
in the brief interval directly after its sudden offset, when the visual system 
spontaneously fills in the further expected trajectory (Ekman et al., 2017). If 
predictions of efficient kinematics do indeed act on early perceptual representations, 
then methods that reliably disrupt these lower-level perceptual processes should 
equally disrupt the influence of action efficiency predictions on social perception.  
It is a well-established phenomenon that visual masks, presented directly after 
stimulus offset (backward masking), reliably disrupt lower-level processing in 
perceptual regions (Breitmeyer & Ögmen 2006; Kinsbourne & Warrington, 1962). In 
backward masking paradigms, presenting a second visual stimulus (the mask) 
immediately after an initial visual stimulus (the target) impairs perception of this first 
target stimulus (Lamme 2000; Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000; Lamme, Zipser & 
Spekreijse, 2002). These studies showed that visual masking leaves early 
feedforward signals from primary visual cortex (V1) to higher areas that encode the 
visual stimulus features unaffected, while specifically disrupting the later re-entrant 
feedback signals from higher visual areas to V1, responsible for establishing a stable 
stimulus representation (e.g. “interruption masking”, Kolers, 1968; for more recent 
studies, see Boehler, Schoenfeld, Heinze, & Hopf, 2008; Fahrenfort, Scholte, & 
Lamme, 2007). They are further supported by studies that apply transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS) to early visual cortices at the respective points reflecting 
feedforward and feedback processes, and induce comparable masking-like effects 
(for a review, see Tapia & Beck, 2014).  
Thorough investigations have demonstrated that the disruption of top-down 
influences on visual processing are greatest when masks are presented immediately 
after target offset (SOAs from 30 to 100 ms) and when masks are more visually 
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intrusive (Breitmeyer & Ögmen 2006). Visually intrusive masks consist of high 
contrast random noise patterns (Kinsbourne and Warrington 1962), such as random 
black and white dot patterns that are dynamically presented (e.g. rapid sequential 
presentations of different random noise arrays, Quinn & McConnell, 1996). 
Importantly for the current experiment, such dynamic visual noise masks induce 
apparent motion illusions between the successive presentations of contrasting dots 
in different spatial locations, which specifically interfere with visual processing during 
motion perception (Breitmeyer & Ögmen 2006; MacKay, 1965). 
Visual masking paradigms therefore induce specific interferences to top-down visual 
influences on perception, while retaining bottom-up sensory information from the 
stimulus (Fahrenfort et al., 2007, 2008), with dynamic visual noise masks creating 
unique disruptions to the visual processing of moving targets (Breitmeyer & Ögmen 
2006; MacKay, 1965). They can interfere with visual processing during actual 
perception (e.g., backwards masking, Lamme 2000; Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000; 
Lamme, Zipser & Spekreijse, 2002) or during visual imagery, where masking 
interferes with the “painting” of top-down information into perceptual structures 
(Andrade, Kemps, Werniers, May, & Szmalec, 2002; Borst, Ganis, Thompson & 
Kosslyn, 2012; McConnell & Quinn, 2000; Quinn and McConnell, 1996, 1999).     
To test whether such top-down interactions with early visual processes are 
responsible for the biases towards efficient actions, we again replicated the Report 
Obstacle experiment (Hudson et al., 2018) but inserted, in half of the trials, a short 
(560 ms.) rapidly changing visual noise pattern immediately after the action offset. 
Because such dynamic visual noise causes apparent motion (MacKay, 1965), it 
should interfere with motion based predictions that contribute either to the conscious 
perception of the seen action, or to the perceptual “filling in” of the suddenly missing 
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information directly after action offset. If the perceptual biases emerge from such 
changes to early visual perceptual representations, then these biases should be only 
(or more strongly) observed in the no-mask compared to the masked trials.     
4.3.1 Method 
4.3.1.1  Participants 
Twenty-eight participants took part in the experiment (mean age = 19.6 years, 
SD = 1.1, 26 females). All participants were right-handed, had normal/corrected 
vision, and were recruited from Plymouth University for course credit. The study 
received ethical approval from the University of Plymouth’s ethics board, in 
accordance with those of the ESRC and the Declaration of Helsinki. 
4.3.1.2  Apparatus 
The experiment was presented on a HP EliteDisplay S230tm 23-inch widescreen 
(1920 X 1080) touch screen monitor. Verbal responses were recorded with Microsoft 
LifeChat LX-3000 Headsets. All other components of the apparatus were the same 
as in the main experiments.  
4.3.1.3  Stimuli 
The stimulus set was identical to the main experiments. The additional mask 
stimuli were created in R. The mask covered an area of 200 X 200 pixels and 
contained 50 black and 50 white squares of equal size (12 X 12 pixels) on a 
transparent background. Twenty different mask images were created, each 
containing a randomised arrangement of the squares.  
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4.3.1.4  Procedure 
The design of the experiment closely matched the Report Obstacle version of 
the main experiments. Participants completed two blocks of 80 randomised trials. 
Half of the trials were an exact replication of the Report Obstacle experiment (no-
mask condition), and half the trials had the addition of the mask (mask condition), 
randomly interspersed. Participants again reported whether an obstacle was present 
in the scene or not, by speaking “Yes” or “No” into the microphone. The action 
sequence then started and disappeared before completion. In no-mask trials, 
participants simply indicated on the response stimulus – the scene with the hand 
removed – the index finger’s last seen location. For masked trials, the mask was 
overlaid on top of the response stimulus 560 ms immediately after action offset, on 
which participants reported – with a touch response – the hand’s last seen position. 
The centre of the mask was positioned at the disappearance point of the tip of the 
index finger, plus or minus 20 pixels in the X and Y direction, to ensure that 
participants could not simply use the task to aid their judgment. As soon as the hand 
disappeared, a sequence of seven randomised mask images was presented at the 
same rate as the prior action sequence (80 ms. per frame), creating a mask which 
was on screen for 560 ms. Once the mask ended, the response stimulus remained 
on screen until the touch response was recorded. Any touch responses recorded 
while the mask remained on screen ended the trial. An example trial sequence for 
masked trials can be seen in Figure 4-2A. 
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4.3.2 Results 
Exclusion criteria were identical to the main experiments. No participants were 
excluded on the basis of the distance between the real and selected screen 
coordinate (mean = 36.3px, SD = 21.9), but one was excluded based on the 
correlation between the real and selected positions on the X (median r = .944, SD = 
.039) or Y axis (median r = .888, SD = .038).  A total of 3.2% of trials were excluded 
due to incorrect response procedure and 2.8% of trials were excluded if initiation or 
execution times were less than 200ms or more than 3SD above the sample mean 
(Initiation: mean =350.5ms, SD=158.7; Execution: mean =527.8ms, SD=161.8). In 
2.9% of trials, a response was made while the mask remained on screen. These 
trials were included in the analysis but their exclusion/inclusion does not affect the 
results.   
Data was analysed in the same way as the main experiments. Difference values 
(reported minus actual disappearance points) were entered into a 2X2X2 repeated-
measures ANOVA for the X and Y coordinates separately, with Trajectory (arched, 
straight), Efficiency (efficient, inefficient), and Condition (mask, no-mask) as within-
subjects factors. 
4.3.2.1  Y Axis 
Overall, there was a main effect of Trajectory (F(1,26)= 80.08, p<.001, ηp2=.755) 
where arched reaches (-1.8px) were displaced higher than straight reaches (-9.7px, 
t(26)=8.74, p<.001, d=1.68). Importantly, the analysis replicated the interaction of 
Efficiency and Trajectory (F(1,26)= 22.74, p<.001, ηp2=.467). As before, inefficient 
arched trajectories (-4.5px) were displaced below efficient arched trajectories (0.7px, 
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t(26)=-3.71, p=.001, d=.71), and inefficient straight trajectories (-7.3px) were 
displaced above efficient straight trajectories (-12.1px, , t(26)=4.25, p<.001, d=.82). 
More importantly, the analysis revealed a three-way interaction between Efficiency, 
Trajectory and Mask (F(1,26)=8.89, p=.006, ηp2=.255). As predicted, while the 
displacements towards the more effective trajectory in the no-mask trials closely 
resembled the main experiment (14.4 vs. 14.6 pixels, respectively), they were 
substantially reduced in the masked trials (5.2 pixels, see Figure 4-2D).  
4.3.2.2  X Axis 
 Overall, there was a main effect of Trajectory (F(1,26)= 148.85, p<.001, 
ηp2=.852). As in the main experiments, arched trajectories (-25.3px) were displaced 
more leftward than straight trajectories (-4.5px, t(26)=-11.98, p<.001, d=2.3). An 
interaction between Trajectory and Mask (F(1,26)= 41.41, p<.001, ηp2=.614) showed 
that the Trajectory effect was larger in the no-mask trials than in the masked trials 
(t(26)=6.44, p<.001, d=1.2). There was also a three-way interaction between 
Efficiency, Trajectory and Mask condition (F(1,26)=4.89, p=.036, ηp2=.158) revealing 
that the Trajectory X Mask condition effect was larger for Efficient actions than for 
Inefficient actions. While this effect reveals a similar mask effect as for the Y Axis, it 
should be treated with caution as it was not predicted, no similar interaction of 
Efficiency and Trajectory was found for any of the main experiments, and it was one 
of many possible (unpredicted) effects in the ANOVA, and would therefore be 
subject to adjustments for multiple comparisons (Cramer et al., 2016). 
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Figure 4-2. Experiment 2b. Trial sequence and Results. 
An example of the trial sequence for the Mask condition is depicted in Panel A. The 
results for the no-mask condition are depicted in Panel B and the results for the 
Mask condition are depicted in Panel C. Panel D depicts a comparison of the size of 
the Y axis interaction in pixels, equivalent to the total amount by which inefficient 
actions were corrected towards a more efficient trajectory. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
4.3.3 Discussion 
Experiment 2b replicated the finding that perceptual judgments of observed actions 
are biased towards efficient trajectories. Crucially, it showed that a brief dynamic 
visual noise mask inserted directly after action offset successfully disrupted the 
resulting effects on perceptual judgments, substantially reducing the bias towards 
efficient actions. Dynamic visual noise masks as used here specifically interfere with 
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the re-entrant top-down interactions with early perceptual regions (Boehler et al., 
2008; Fahrenfort, Scholte, & Lamme, 2007) that are crucial for visual awareness of a 
stimulus (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000; Lamme et al., 2002), especially during motion 
perception (Breitmeyer & Ögmen 2006; MacKay, 1965), or the creation of a detailed 
mental image during visual imagery that is akin to actual perception and which can 
be accessed for further processing (Andrade et al., 2002; Borst et al., 2012; 
McConnell & Quinn, 2000). The masking effects therefore further confirm that the 
perceptual bias in the main experiments either reflect on-line changes to the action’s 
perceptual representation during observation, or spontaneous “filling in” of the 
suddenly missing input briefly after its offset, creating an impression of an action 
displaced towards the anticipated ideal reference trajectory. 
4.4 Conclusion 
Experiments 2a and 2b showed that the biases in perceptual judgements 
found in the main experiments (Hudson et al., 2018) could also be observed in a 
probe judgment task without working memory or motor components already at 250 
ms. after action offset. Moreover, they showed that the perceptual biases were 
effectively disrupted by dynamic visual noise masks which interfere with the re-
current (top-down) feedback to early visual cortex (Fahrenfort, Scholte, & Lamme, 
2007), preventing its use in awareness (i.e. backwards masking, Breitmeyer & 
Ögmen 2006; Tapia & Beck, 2014) or visual imagery (e.g., Andrade et al., 2002; 
Borst et al., 2012). The observed biases in perceptual judgments are therefore 
unlikely to stem from unspecific perceptual changes in memory or motor control (e.g. 
Firestone & Scholl, 2016; see Ianì, Mazzoni & Bucciarelli, 2018, for an example for 
perceptual changes in action memory), instead supporting a role in ongoing motion 
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perception (e.g. Muckli et al., 2005) or occurring directly after its offset, when the 
predicted future trajectory is visually “filled in” (e.g. Ekman et al., 2017). Together 
with the findings from Chapter Three, these results reveal that social perception is 
driven by similar predictive mechanisms as non-social perception, such as the 
assumption that light comes from above (Adams et al., 2004) or that gravity pulls 
objects downwards (Hubbard & Bharucha, 1988). Specifically, the principle of 
efficient action provides a perceptual reference signal that guides the perceptual 
representation of inefficient actions towards a more rational path. The resulting 
biases in perceptual judgments reveal concrete expectations of the specific trajectory 
that the action will take through the scene. Action efficiency is therefore constantly 
projected onto other’s behaviour via predictions that can be derived from contextual 
cues prior to the motor behaviour.  
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5 Chapter Five - Cues to intention 
The experiments in Chapter Three and Four have demonstrated how the principle of 
efficient action allows observers to spontaneously predict ideal reference trajectories 
that a rational and intentional actor will follow, given that they are fully aware of all 
relevant environmental constraints. These predictions are at least partially 
perceptually represented and specifically concern the expected action kinematics, 
biasing perception towards these expectations. This mechanism of predictive social 
perception is in line with recent predictive processing theories (Bach et al., 2014; 
Csibra, 2008; Kilner et al., 2007ab) and is comparable to the mechanisms that 
underlie non-social perception (Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010). What remains 
unresolved is how these efficiency predictions emerge and upon what stimulus 
features they depend. If assumptions of efficient action are only assigned to 
intentional agents, then formation of such predictions should only emerge when cues 
to the intentionality of an actor are present.  
The experiments in Chapter Five investigate the cues that trigger attributions of 
intentionality to others and whether the expectation of efficient action is tied to such 
intentionality attribution. The findings are important not only for supporting the 
proposal that these predictions emerge from the attribution of intention to others, but 
also for emphasising how revisions to these attributions, when observing inefficient 
actions, can signal that a behaviour may not have been intentional after all, or that 
the actor is not aware of all relevant environmental constraints. Such findings will 
therefore reinforce the proposed link between teleological perception of others’ 
behaviour and more sophisticated theory of mind and mentalising processes, 
contributing to action understanding. 
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The experiments in this chapter were published in Scientific Reports and are 
presented in their published format (green copy).  
5.1 Cues to intention bias action perception toward the most 
efficient trajectory. 
Katrina L. McDonough, Matthew Hudson, Patric Bach 
Abstract 
Humans interpret others’ behaviour as intentional and expect them to take the most 
energy-efficient path to achieve their goals. Recent studies show that these 
expectations of efficient action take the form of a prediction of an ideal “reference” 
trajectory, against which observed actions are evaluated, distorting their perceptual 
representation towards this expected path. Here we tested whether these predictions 
depend upon the implied intentionality of the stimulus. Participants saw videos of an 
actor reaching either efficiently (straight towards an object or arched over an 
obstacle) or inefficiently (straight towards an obstacle or arched over an empty 
space). The hand disappeared mid-trajectory and participants reported the last seen 
position on a touch-screen. As in prior research, judgments of inefficient actions 
were biased toward efficiency expectations (straight trajectories upwards to avoid 
obstacles, arched trajectories downward towards goals). In two further experimental 
groups, intentionality cues were removed by replacing the hand with a non-agentive 
ball (group 2), and by removing the action’s biological motion profile (group 3). 
Removing these cues substantially reduced perceptual biases. Our results therefore 
confirm that the perception of others’ actions is guided by expectations of efficient 
actions, which are triggered by the perception of semantic and motion cues to 
intentionality. 
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5.2 Experiments 3a and 3b 
Humans see others’ behaviour as purposeful and goal directed (Baillargeon, Scott, & 
Bian, 2016; Baker, Saxe, & Tenenbaum, 2009; Csibra & Gergely, 2007; Gergely & 
Csibra, 2003). A key signature of this “intentional stance” (Dennett, 1987) is the 
assumption that other people generally act rationally: they take the most energy-
efficient path to achieve their goal, and expend additional energy only when an 
obstacle has to be overcome (Csibra & Gergely, 2007; Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014). 
This simple heuristic of action efficiency arises early in development and allows 
children to attribute intentionality to observed behaviours, even when carried out by 
inanimate objects (Gergely, Bekkering, & Király, 2002; Gergely, Nádasdy, Csibra, & 
Bíró, 1995; Liu & Spelke, 2017). Human infants (and some non-human primates) 
show surprise, for example, when actors that are believed to be intentional violate 
these assumptions, such as when they do not adjust their reach despite an obstacle 
or exert additional unnecessary energy to reach their goal (Gergely & Csibra, 2003; 
Rochat, Serra, Fadiga, & Gallese, 2008). Once established, this simple heuristic may 
form a stepping-stone for more sophisticated abilities for reasoning about others 
(Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Wellman & Brandone, 2009). For example, observing an 
inefficient action (e.g. reaching directly towards an object despite an obstacle in the 
way) can help people realize that others act according to beliefs and not objective 
reality (i.e. they may not have sight of the obstacle), forming the basis of a 
prototypical theory of mind.  
We have argued that expectations of efficient action are, to some extent, 
perceptually represented, in the form of an ideal “reference” trajectory that a rational 
actor would take through a given environment, against which observed actions can 
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be judged (Bach & Schenke, 2017; Hudson, McDonough, Edwards, & Bach, 2018). 
This proposal emerges from recent predictive processing models of social perception 
(Bach & Schenke, 2017; Csibra, 2008; Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007a, 2007b; Zaki, 
2013) which argue that perception of others’ actions – like perception in general – is 
hypothesis-driven. Any assumption about the external world (and the people within 
it) is translated into the perceptual input that would result from such a state. These 
expectations of future input can guide perception and be tested against actual 
stimulation (Clark, 2013; Friston & Kiebel, 2009; Hohwy, 2013). In non-social 
perception, such expectations explain several visual illusions (e.g., dress illusion, 
Schlaffke et al., 2015), the switch between different bi-stable percepts (Kondo, 
Farkas, Denham, Asai, & Winkler, 2017), or why the same objects can appear 
convex or concave depending on prior assumptions about light sources (Adams, 
Graf, & Ernst, 2004). In social perception, simply attributing a goal to another person 
could similarly elicit associated predictions about how this individual would realise 
such a goal, specifying which action they may soon carry out (Bach, Bayliss, & 
Tipper, 2011; Bach, Knoblich, Gunter, Friederici, & Prinz, 2005; for theoretical 
arguments, see Bach, Nicholson, & Hudson, 2014; Bach, Nicholson, & Hudson, 
2015; Csibra, 2008; Kilner et al., 2007ab). The principle of efficient action can make 
a direct contribution here, specifying the ideal “reference” trajectory that achieves the 
actor’s goals with minimum energy expenditure, given the current environmental 
constraints, such as potential obstacles in the way (Bach et al., 2014; Bach & 
Schenke, 2017).  
In a recent series of studies, we attempted to reveal these expectations of efficient 
action (Hudson et al., 2018). These studies relied on the well-established 
phenomenon that the uncertainty during motion perception is perceptually sharpened 
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using top-down information (Bex, Edgar, & Smith, 1995; Hammett, 1997), filling in 
missing information (Muckli, Kohler, Kriegeskorte, & Singer, 2005; Shiffrar & Freyd, 
1993; Yantis & Nakama, 1998) in a predictive manner (Avenanti, Annella, Candidi, 
Urgesi, & Aglioti, 2012; Ekman, Kok, & de Lange, 2017). The resulting perceptual 
biases can be reliably measured by suddenly removing the moving object from view, 
and asking participants to report its disappearance point, either on a touch screen 
(Pozzo, Papaxanthis, Petit, Schweighofer, & Stucchi, 2006; Saunier, Papaxanthis, 
Vargas, & Pozzo, 2008, see also, Hudson, Bach, & Nicholson, 2017) or by 
comparing it to probe stimuli presented shortly after (Freyd & Finke, 1984; Hubbard, 
2005, 2015, see also, Hudson, Nicholson, Ellis, & Bach, 2016; Hudson, Nicholson, 
Simpson, Ellis, & Bach, 2016). In such a paradigm, people generally over-estimate 
the movement they have seen, reporting the moving stimulus to have disappeared 
further along its trajectory than it really did (i.e. the Representational Momentum 
effect, Freyd & Finke, 1984; Hubbard, 2005). These displacements have been 
shown not only reflect a sample extrapolation of motion based on the previously 
seen trajectory (Kessler, Gordon, Cessford, & Lages, 2010), but also prior 
knowledge about it’s causes, such as how the motion would be affected by one’s 
own actions (Jordan & Hunsinger, 2008), by physical forces such as friction or 
gravity (Hubbard, 1995), or the most likely behaviours of the other person (Hudson, 
Burnett, & Jellema, 2012; Hudson & Jellema, 2011; Hudson, Liu, & Jellema, 2009; 
Hudson, Nicholson, Ellis, et al., 2016; Hudson, Nicholson, Simpson, et al., 2016).  
In the case of observed actions, the perceptual biases reflect the predictions derived 
from the assumption of efficient action (Hudson et al., 2018). In a recent series of 
experiments, participants observed a hand reaching for an object with a straight or 
arched trajectory. The actions were either efficient (reaching straight when the path 
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was clear or arched over an obstacle) or inefficient (straight towards an obstacle or 
arched over empty space). The movement disappeared at some point on its course 
and participants reported the hand’s last seen position on a touch screen, or by 
comparing it to probe stimuli presented immediately after. Both measures revealed 
that perceptual judgements were reliably biased by expectations of efficient action. 
Straight reaches were reported to have reached higher when an obstacle was 
blocking its path, in line with the expectation that the hand would soon lift to avoid it. 
Conversely, high arched reaches were reported lower when no obstacle was 
present, and corrected towards the straighter, more energy-efficient trajectory. These 
biases were present automatically, but increased when participants explicitly 
predicted – prior to action onset – the most efficient trajectory through the scene, or 
when attention was drawn to the environmental constraints. Moreover, they could be 
disrupted by dynamic visual noise masks presented directly after stimulus offset, 
suggesting that the biases emerge during ongoing perception or directly after the 
sudden offset, when the visual system “fills in” the expected future path (Fahrenfort, 
Scholte, & Lamme, 2007; Lamme, Zipser, & Spekreijse, 2002).  
Together, these results indicate that the teleological stance is at least partly 
perceptually represented, providing an ideal reference trajectory that informs the 
action that was indeed perceived. Here, we test on what stimulus features these 
predictions of efficient action depend. In children, as well as in adults, intention 
attribution – and the resulting surprise when seeing an inefficient action – depends 
on the presence of cues to intention (Johnson, 2000, 2003; Sartori, Becchio, & 
Castiello, 2011), such as seeing an agentive stimulus (such as a hand relative to a 
ball; Falck-Ytter, Gredebäck, & von Hofsten, 2006), or observing movements with 
biological motion trajectories (Baron-Cohen, 1997; Leslie, 1994; Morewedge, 
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Preston, & Wegner, 2007; Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001). If such cues indeed 
trigger attributions of intentionality to others, and the expectation of efficient action is 
tied to such intentionality attribution, then they should also determine to what extent 
perceptual biases towards efficient actions are observed.  
In the first experimental group, we replicated the original experiment by Hudson and 
colleagues (Hudson et al., 2018), in which participants saw efficient and inefficient 
reach trajectories (arched/straight over an obstacle vs. empty space) and indicated 
the hand’s last seen location before it suddenly disappeared on a touch screen. In 
two further experimental groups, we progressively removed intentional cues. First, as 
in prior research on infant intention attribution, we replaced the hand with a non-
agentive stimulus – a ball (Falck-Ytter et al., 2006) –, which however followed the 
same characteristic biological motion trajectories and profiles as the hands in the first 
experimental group, showing the classical bell-shaped velocity profile of reaches 
towards objects (Beggs & Howarth, 1972). Second, humans are sensitive to motion 
cues that distinguish the intentional biological agents from inanimate objects, such 
as self-propulsion and change of direction (Baron-Cohen, 1997; Leslie, 1994), or a 
trajectory and speed of movement that is similar to one’s own movement 
(Morewedge et al., 2007; Rakison & Poulin-Dubois, 2001). In a third group, 
participants therefore saw the same ball, but it did not now follow a biological motion 
profile, removing all kinematic cues to intention. If biases toward efficient action 
emerge from cues that signal intentionality, then they should be substantially 
reduced in group 2, and further reduced in group 3, as cues to intentionality are 
removed.  
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5.2.1 Method 
5.2.1.1  Participants  
Eighty-two participants took part in the experiment: twenty-nine participants in group 
1 (hand stimuli, mean age = 21 years, SD = 4.7, 25 females), twenty-seven in group 
2 (balls with biological motion, mean age = 20 years, SD = 4.1, 21 females), and 
twenty-six in group 3 (balls with non-biological motion, mean age = 21 years, SD = 
4.2, 20 females). Nine additional participants (two from group 1, three from group 2, 
four from group 3) were excluded based on previously established exclusion criteria 
(see Results). All participants in all groups were tested in the same three-week 
period. Both the gender mix and age distribution did not differ between groups 
(ps>.39). All participants were right-handed, had normal/corrected-to-normal vision, 
gave informed consent, and were recruited from the University of Plymouth or the 
wider community for course credit or payment. The study was approved by the 
University of Plymouth’s ethics board, in line with the ESRC and the Declaration of 
Helsinki. A power analysis revealed that a sample size of 26 provides .80 power to 
detect two-sided within-subjects effects in each of the group with Cohen’s d = .57. 
Our prior study investigating the same effect (Hudson, et al., 2018, "report obstacle" 
condition) and pilot data revealed consistently larger effect sizes, d= .76 to d = 1.29. 
For the between-subjects effects, a power analysis revealed that a sample size of 26 
per group provides .80 power to detect effects in either direction with Cohen’s d = 
.79. This should provide enough power to detect reductions of the original effect to 
about 40% of the original size (assuming that standard deviations remain the same). 
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5.2.1.2  Apparatus 
Presentation (NeuroBS) software was used to present the experiment via a HP 
EliteDisplay S230tm 23-inch widescreen (1920 x 1080) Touch Monitor. Verbal 
responses were recorded with Presentation’s sound threshold logic via a Logitech 
PC120 combined microphone and headphone set. 
5.2.1.3  Stimuli 
Example stimuli can be seen in Figure 5-1A-B. To derive a set of stimuli of efficient 
actions, videos were filmed of an arm at rest to the right of the screen, which then 
reached for one of four objects (an apple, a packet of crisps, a glue stick, or a 
stapler) on the left of the screen. The reaches were either directed straight for the 
target object (Straight/Efficient), or arched over one of three obstacles (an iPad, lamp 
or pencil holder; Arched/Efficient). Each video clip was then converted into individual 
frames, and the first 22 from frame 1 (initial rest position) to 22 (mid-way through the 
action) were used as stimuli. For each efficient action, an inefficient action sequence 
was created by digitally removing the obstacles from the Arched/Efficient videos 
(Arched/Inefficient), or by inserting the obstructing objects into the Straight/Efficient 
videos, (Straight/Inefficient). The inefficient actions were therefore identical to the 
efficient actions in terms of movement kinematics, and differed only by the 
presence/absence of the obstacle. Finally, response stimuli were created by taking 
one frame from each action sequence and digitally removing the actor’s arm from the 
scene, so that only the objects and background remained. Presenting this frame 
immediately after the action sequence gave the impression of the hand disappearing 
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from the scene, and participants indicated the last seen location of the tip of the 
index finger on this frame with a touch response on screen. 
For experimental group 2 (balls with biological motion), the forty videos of hand 
movements used in experimental group 1 were digitally manipulated so that the 
actor’s hand was replaced with a ball, coloured using the same tones as the hand. 
The ball was the same size as the tip of the index finger that participants had to 
touch in experimental group 1 (30px. diameter) and was positioned at the same 
coordinates in each frame. An additional frame was created by positioning the ball 
mid-air before the first frame (where the ball contacts the table) creating an illusory 
“bounce” motion, providing a realistic context for the ball movement in order to 
reduce impressions of self-propelled movement that could also cue the observer that 
the motion is intentional (Luo & Baillargeon, 2005).  
For Experimental group 3 (balls with non-biological motion), the forty videos from 
group 2 were digitally manipulated so that the ball now appeared to move in a 
straight line and at a constant speed after the bounce frame, eliminating the 
biological motion profile. To ensure that comparability of disappearance points 
between experimental groups, the line of best fit was calculated through the last four 
frames of each sequence of experimental group 1 (i.e. all possible disappearance 
points). The constant speed of the ball was created by recalculating the Y 
coordinates at equal distances along this line, between the first and last frame. 
5.2.1.4  Procedure 
An example trial sequence can be seen in Figure 5-1C. Participants completed four 
blocks of 48 trials in which each condition was presented an equal amount of times 
 
102 
 
(Straight/Efficient, Straight/Inefficient, Arched/Efficient, Arched/Inefficient). At the 
start of each trial, participants saw an instruction to “Hold the spacebar”, to which 
they pressed the spacebar with their right hand and kept it depressed. This ensured 
that they did not track the observed motion with their finger and could only initiate 
their response once the action sequence had disappeared. Participants then saw the 
first frame of the action sequence as a static image (the hand at rest in experimental 
group 1 and the “bouncing ball” frame in experimental groups 2 and 3) and were 
required to say “yes” into the microphone if there was an obstructing object present, 
and “no” if there was not.   
The action sequence began 1000ms after a verbal response had been detected. 
Every third frame of the action sequence was presented for 80ms each, with a 
randomly selected sequence length of 5, 6, 7 or 8 frames (e.g. trials with a length of 
8 frames showed frames 1-4-7-10-13-16-19-22). The final frame was then 
immediately replaced with the response frame, which showed the same scene 
without the moving object, creating the impression that the hand/ball had simply 
disappeared. Participants released the spacebar and, with their right hand, touched 
the screen where they thought the final position of the tip of the observed index 
finger was in group 1, or the final ball position in group 2 and 3. As soon as a 
response was registered, the next trial began.  
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Figure 5-1. Experiments 3a-c. Stimulus conditions and trial sequence.  
The stimulus conditions used in all three experimental groups are depicted in Panel 
A. The Action Trajectory was either straight or arched over. These Action 
Trajectories were either efficient or inefficient, governed by the presence or absence 
of an obstructing object. Panel B depicts an example of a Straight/Inefficient trial in 
the Biological Ball group (top) and the Non-Biological Ball group (bottom). Examples 
in Panel A depict the start frame and examples in Panel B depict the equivalent 
frame. The white markers depict the disappearance point of the index finger tip/ball 
in each of the four final frames. Panel C shows an example of a trial sequence in the 
Arched/Efficient condition of group 1. This trial sequence is equivalent across all 
experimental groups.  
 
Note that the presentation of every third frame of the videos resulted in illusory 
“apparent” motion between the steps in the trajectory (Wertheimer, 1912). Such non-
smooth motion retains the relevant characteristics of intentional biological motion 
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(e.g. parabolic path, bell-shaped velocity profile) and provides ideal conditions to 
measure predictive influences in motion perception, which are larger with apparent 
motion than smooth motion (Kerzel, 2003). This is in line with the notion that top-
down influences that govern everyday perception become apparent the more the 
bottom-up sensory input becomes ambiguous or uncertain (e.g. through bi-stable 
images, Hohwy, Roepstorff, & Friston, 2008; visual noise, Gordon, Koenig-Robert, 
Tsuchiya, van Boxtel, & Hohwy, 2017). For motion, non-smooth step-wise 
presentation is assumed to disrupt low-level motion detectors, prompting a stronger 
weighting of top-down influences that compensate and “fill in” the intervening steps 
in the trajectory (Kok, Brouwer, van Gerven, & de Lange, 2013; Muckli et al., 2005; 
Yantis & Nakama, 1998). 
5.2.2 Results 
Data filtering was identical to our original experiment (Hudson et al., 2018). In all 
three experimental groups, trials were excluded if the correct response procedure 
was not followed (e.g. lifting the spacebar too early; 3.5%), or if response initiation or 
execution times were shorter than 200ms or more than 3SDs above the sample 
mean (2.2%, Initiation: mean =393.7ms, SD=173.3; Execution: mean =571.9ms, 
SD=203.3). Participants were excluded if too few trials remained after trial exclusions 
(< 50% valid trials, 3 participants), if the distance between the real and selected 
positions exceeded 3SD of the sample mean (mean =39.9 pixels, SD=18.9, 2 
participants excluded), or if the correlation between the real and selected positions 
was more than 3SD below the median r value (X axis: median r =.940, SD = .041; Y 
axis: median r =.908, SD = .063, 4 participants excluded).   
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Analysis was conducted on the predictive perceptual bias by subtracting the real final 
coordinates of the tip of the index finger/ball from the participant’s selected 
coordinates on each trial. This resulted in separate “difference” scores along the X 
and Y axis where positive X and Y scores represented a rightward and upward 
displacement respectively, and negative X and Y scores represented a leftward and 
downward displacement respectively. A score of 0 on both axes indicated that the 
participant selected the real final position exactly. These difference scores were 
entered into a 2x2x3 ANOVA for the X and Y axis separately, with Trajectory 
(straight vs arched) and Efficiency (efficient vs inefficient) as repeated-measures 
factors, and experimental group as a between-subjects factor.  
The data from the original experiments, as well as further pilot studies in our lab, 
have shown that expectations of efficient action primarily induce biases on the Y-
axis, but not the X-axis. This is consistent with the view that rather than viewing the 
current trajectory relative to the trajectory that was initially predicted (e.g. an arched 
trajectory when an obstacle was present), expectations of action efficiency reflect 
expectations about how the current trajectory will further develop. In other words, 
when seeing a straight reach towards an obstacle, one expects the hand to be 
merely lifted upwards to avoid the obstacle (rather than it being also displaced 
backwards to its corresponding location had it followed the arched trajectory from the 
outset). Similarly, when seeing an arched reach over empty space one expects the 
current reach would straighten downwards towards the goal object (rather than also 
being displaced forwards to where the hand would be had it followed the alternative 
straight trajectory). If the current results replicate this established pattern, 
displacement should therefore again primarily affect the Y axis (capturing this lifting 
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or lowering of the hand towards the target or away from the obstacle), but not the X-
axis (indexing a displacement forwards/backwards to the alternative trajectory).    
 
Figure 5-2. Experiments 3a-c. Results 
The Trajectory X Efficiency interactions for the Biological Hand (A), Biological Ball 
(B), and Non-biological Ball (C) groups. The difference between the real final position 
and the selected final position is plotted for the X axis and Y axis. The real final 
position on any given trial is at point 0,0, as indicated on each plot. Panel D depicts a 
comparison of the size of the Y axis interaction in pixels, equivalent to the total 
amount by which inefficient actions were corrected towards a more efficient 
trajectory. Error bars depict 95% confidence intervals. 
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5.2.2.1  Y axis 
If intentionality is perceptually instantiated, we predicted (1) that inefficient actions 
would be perceptually “corrected” towards the more efficient action alternative, and 
(2) that these biases should be strongest in experimental group 1 (hands with 
biological motion) but weaker when cues to intentionality are removed in groups 2 
(balls with biological motion) and 3 (balls with non-biological motion). Indeed, the 
analysis revealed an interaction of Trajectory and Efficiency (F(1,79) = 45.0, p <.001, 
ηp2= .363), replicating our prior study (Hudson et al., 2018). Across groups, the 
disappearance points for straight trajectories were reported higher when the actions 
were inefficient (i.e. reaching towards an obstacle, 2.26px), than when the actions 
were efficient (no obstacle, -.967px; t(81)=5.46, p<.001, d=.60). Conversely, the 
perceived disappearance points for arched reaches were perceived to be lower for 
inefficient actions (7.87px) than for efficient actions (11.6px; t(81)=4.81, p<.001, 
d=.53).  
Importantly, and as predicted, these biases differed between experimental groups, 
as indicated by an interaction of Trajectory, Efficiency and Experimental group 
(F(1,79) = 6.47, p = .002, ηp2 = .141). Pairwise step-down comparisons showed that 
the interaction between Trajectory and Efficiency was smaller in the Non-biological 
Ball group (group 3) than in the Biological Hand group (group 1: F(1,53)=11.7, 
p=.001, ηp2=.181), and the Biological Ball group (F(1,51) =4.00, p=.051, ηp2=.073). 
No difference was found between Biological Hand group and the Biological Ball 
group (group 2: F(1,54) =2.77, p=.102, ηp2=.049), although a Two One-Sided Tests 
(TOST) procedure (Lakens, 2017) indicated that the observed effect size (d=.45) 
was not significantly within the equivalence bounds of ΔL = –.53 and ΔU =.53, 
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t(53.85) = -0.31, p = .38 (equivalence bounds calculated as critical Cohen’s d-values 
from our prior study investigating the same effect, Lakens, 2017). When 
experimental groups were analysed separately, the interaction between Trajectory 
and Efficiency was only present for the groups seeing Hands and Balls on biological 
motion trajectories (Biological Hand: F(1,28) = 41.7, p < .001, ηp2 = .598; Biological 
Ball: F(1,26) = 21.0, p < .001, ηp2 = .447), but not in the group viewing balls a non-
biological motion trajectory (Non-biological Ball: F(1,25) = 1.20, p = .284, ηp2 = .046). 
Indeed, the TOST procedure indicated that the observed effect size in the latter 
group (d=.21) was significantly within the equivalence bounds of ΔL = –.55 and ΔU 
=.55, t(25) = -1.71, p = .05. 
As unpredicted effects are subject to alpha inflation in an ANOVA due to multiple 
testing (Cramer et al., 2015) all additional results in the analysis of Y-Axis and X-Axis 
should be interpreted with caution, and considered relative to a Bonferroni-adjusted 
alpha of .004. The analysis revealed an additional main effect of Trajectory that 
passed this threshold (F(1,79) = 197.5, p < .001, ηp2 = .714), with perceived 
disappearance points of stimuli on arched trajectories being displaced further 
upwards (9.76px, t(81)=9.72, p<.001, d=1.1) than for straight trajectories (.67 px). 
This bias is consistent with the well-known predictive displacement in the direction of 
motion (e.g. further upwards for arched trajectories, but not for straight ones), known 
at the Representational Momentum effect (Hubbard, 2005). Interestingly, this forward 
displacement again differed between experimental groups, as indicated by an 
interaction of Trajectory and Experimental group that passed corrected thresholds 
(F(1,79) = 40.4, p < .001, ηp2 = .506). Direct comparisons showed that the upwards 
displacements for arched trajectories were larger in Non-biological Ball group (group 
3) than the Biological Ball group, (group 2: F(1,51) = 12.9, p = .001, ηp2 = .203), 
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which in turn were larger than in the Biological Hand group, (group 1: F(1,54) = 31.9, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .371). When analysing each experimental group separately, the 
upwards shift of straight trajectories was only present with ball stimuli, both when 
following biological, (F(1,26) = 100.5, p < .001, ηp2 = .794), and non-biological 
trajectories, (F(1,79) = 147.7 p < .001, ηp2 = .855), but not with moving hands, 
(F(1,28) = 2.35, p = .136, ηp2 = .077). While not explicitly predicted, these 
displacements may reflect further changes to motion prediction depending on the 
presence of intentional cues. Balls, especially those that do not follow a biological 
motion trajectory, would be expected to continue on their upwards path, but hands 
would not when the goal of the reach is located towards the bottom, such as here. 
Nevertheless, due to the post-hoc nature of these findings, they should be treated 
with caution.   
5.2.2.2  X axis 
We did not have any prediction for the X axis. All effects are therefore subject to 
alpha inflation in an ANOVA and should be interpreted with caution, relative to a 
Bonferroni-adjusted alpha of .004 (Cramer et al., 2015). A main effect of Trajectory, 
(F(1,79) = 199.0, p < .001, ηp2 = .716), passed this, which threshold was further 
qualified by an interaction of Trajectory and Experimental group (F(1,79) = 112.9, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .741). As can be seen in Figure 5-2, perceptual judgments of hands – but 
not balls – on arched trajectories were generally biased leftwards and rightwards for 
hands on straight trajectories. This difference replicates previous results and simply 
reflects stimulus differences between the hand shapes of the naturally recorded 
reaches on straight and arched trajectories, specifically the further rightwards centre 
of gravity for hands on straight trajectories, which biases location judgments (Coren 
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& Hoenig, 1972). No other effects passed the Bonferroni-adjusted thresholds of .004. 
Specifically, there was no main effect of Efficiency (F(1,79) = .4.66, p = .034, ηp2 = 
.056), no interaction between Efficiency and Experimental group (F(1,79) = 5.42, p = 
.006, ηp2 = .121), no interaction between Trajectory and Efficiency (F(1,79) = 5.15, p 
= .026, ηp2 = .061) and no three-way interaction between Trajectory, Efficiency and 
Experimental group (F(1,79) = 1.25, p = .293, ηp2 = .031).  
5.2.2.3  Testing for general differences in attention between groups 
In an exploratory analysis, we tested whether the observed differences between 
groups can be explained by more general differences in attention towards the 
biological and non-biological stimuli. In particular, it is well-established that agentive 
stimuli with a biological motion profile attract attention (Guerrero & Calvillo, 2016; 
Lindemann, Nuku, Rueschemeyer, & Bekkering, 2011; Pratt, Radulescu, Guo, & 
Abrams, 2010). To ensure that our results cannot be explained simply by more 
attentive perception of the more biological stimuli, we used the across-trial 
correlations between actual disappearance points and participants’ judgments that 
we used to identify participants that did not follow the task (i.e. if the reported x 
coordinates did not bear enough relationship to the actual coordinates). If 
participants attend more strongly to biological stimuli than to non-biological stimuli, 
one would expect their judgements to be more accurate and to more closely follow 
what was observed, resulting in smaller deviations for biological hand stimuli than for 
the other, less intentional stimulus types. We found no evidence for this prediction. 
While these correlations were generally high, they were, if anything, higher in the ball 
conditions in which participants’ judgments are less affected by their expectations 
(Hands, mean x r = .91, mean y r = .88; biological ball, mean x r = .95, mean y r = 
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.93; non-biological ball, mean x r = .92, mean y r = .90). While this runs counter to 
the argument for decreased attention in the non-biological conditions, it is fully in line 
with our proposal of a stronger reliance on prior expectations as soon as intentions 
can be attributed to these stimuli. Indeed, as predicted from this hypothesis, 
participants’ across-trial correlations between actual and selected coordinates 
correlated negatively with how much they are affected by their expectations (r=-.30, 
p=.006), even when gross-between groups differences are factored out via z 
standardization in each group (r=-.31, p=.005). Thus, across all participants in the 
three groups, differences in the ability to track the actual disappearance points show, 
if anything, better accuracy in the non-biological groups, which can be explained by 
an (over-) reliance on prior expectations for stimuli that provide intentional cues.  
5.2.3 Discussion 
Previous studies have shown that perceptual representations of observed actions 
are predictively biased towards the goals attributed to them (Hudson et al., 2017; 
Hudson et al., 2012; Hudson & Jellema, 2011; Hudson et al., 2009; Hudson, 
Nicholson, Ellis, et al., 2016; Hudson, Nicholson, Simpson, et al., 2016) and that 
these predictions are informed by the assumption of efficient action, reflecting the 
specific trajectories that would allow an actor to efficiently reach the inferred goal 
(Hudson et al., 2018). To investigate if these expectations emerge from assumptions 
about action intentionality, we asked participants to watch moving stimuli and to 
accurately report the object’s last seen position after it suddenly disappeared. We 
tested whether perceptual reports would again be predictively biased towards the 
expected trajectory (Hudson et al., 2017; Hudson et al., 2018; Hudson, Nicholson, 
Ellis, et al., 2016; Hudson, Nicholson, Simpson, et al., 2016) but varied whether the 
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stimulus was a hand with biological motion kinematics (i.e. bell-shaped velocity 
profile of reaching, Beggs & Howarth, 1972), a non-agentive ball that travelled the 
same biological motion trajectory as the hand, or a ball travelling a non-biological 
trajectory.  
Replicating our prior studies, perceptual reports of hand disappearance points were 
not veridical, but “corrected” towards the expected action kinematics of a rational, 
efficient actor. The perceived disappearance points of hands reaching straight 
towards an obstacle were reported higher than if the path was clear. Similarly, the 
perceived disappearance point of arched reaches was perceived lower if there was 
no obstacle to reach across, compared to when there was an obstacle. Importantly, 
our new data now show that these biases towards efficient action depend on cues to 
intentionality. The biases were numerically reduced when participants watched a 
non-intentional object – a ball – travel on the same biological motion trajectory, 
starting slowly and speeding up along, as if self-propelled. They were almost 
completely eliminated, when the same ball was now seen travelling with a non-
biological trajectory that nevertheless traversed, on average, the same path of 
motion as the hands, but did not show the characteristic bell-shaped velocity profile 
of goal-directed reaches (Beggs & Howarth, 1972). 
These results confirm first that, as in our prior studies, observers predict the ideal 
action trajectory a rational actor would take that is fully aware of all relevant 
environmental constraints. Second, they show that these predictions influenced the 
perceptual judgments of observed actions, subtly biasing them towards the most 
efficient trajectory. These findings are therefore in line with predictive processing 
models of social perception (Bach et al., 2014; Bach & Schenke, 2017; Hudson, 
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Nicholson, Ellis, et al., 2016; Hudson, Nicholson, Simpson, et al., 2016; Kilner et al., 
2007a, 2007b; Zaki, 2013), which assume that the perceptual experience of others’ 
actions emerges from an integration of bottom-up sensory information and prior 
assumptions about others’ goals and how they would (best) realise them. Our data 
now show, third, that when observing the behaviour of others these predictions of 
efficient action depend on bottom-up cues to intentionality derived from the objects’ 
semantics and its trajectory and motion profile. Both types of cues have been 
previously identified as a basis for attributing intentionality to observed agents in 
children (Baron-Cohen, 1997; Leslie, 1994; Morewedge et al., 2007; Rakison & 
Poulin-Dubois, 2001). The finding that these cues also modulate predictive biases 
towards efficient action in adult action observation directly supports the proposal that 
these predictions emerge from the attribution of intention to the observed actions 
(Hudson et al., 2017; Hudson et al., 2018; Hudson, Nicholson, Ellis, et al., 2016; 
Hudson, Nicholson, Simpson, et al., 2016), which then inform their perceptual 
representation.  
During everyday action observation these top-down influences can fulfil several 
important functions. First, they can disambiguate perception by compensating for the 
perceptual “blurring” during motion perception (i.e. motion sharpening, Bex et al., 
1995; Hammett, 1997), or filling in missing steps of the input (Muckli et al., 2005). 
Second they can support planning of one’s own actions, allowing them to be 
coordinated with the others’ future behaviour or the end-state of their actions 
(Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006). Finally, they can be compared to actual 
behaviour, triggering revisions of prior assumptions if prediction errors become too 
large (Clark, 2013; Hohwy, 2013), signalling, for example, that a behaviour may not 
be intentional after all, or that the actor is not aware of all relevant environmental 
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constraints (e.g., they may not have seen the obstacle). As such, they may underlie 
the proposed link between teleological perception of others’ behaviour and more 
sophisticated theory of mind and mentalizing processes (Csibra & Gergely, 2007). 
Further work now needs to resolve via which mechanisms cues of intentionality 
induce the predictive biases towards efficient action. One possibility is that the 
biases emerge via predictive mechanisms in one’s own motor system (Ansuini, 
Cavallo, Bertone, & Becchio, 2015; Csibra, 2008; Kilner et al., 2007a, 2007b; Otten, 
Seth, & Pinto, 2017). On such views, people make higher-level “cognitive” 
attributions of intentions of others and then feed these goals into their own motor 
system to predict the kinematics they would need to achieve if they were in the 
actor’s place. Indeed, the perceptual effects observed here bear a striking similarity 
to similar motoric effects that can be measured when people watch others’ 
behaviour. Both behavioural and neuroimaging studies suggest that, during action 
observation, one’s own motor system does not only mirror the actually seen 
behaviour (e.g. a finger being depressed) but also the behaviour that is only 
predicted from the goals attributed to the actor, even if it is not actually observed 
(Bach et al., 2011; Bach et al., 2014, e.g., finger held up by a clamp, Liepelt, Von 
Cramon, & Brass, 2008). Even if one watches an inanimate ball that one has 
experience of controlling oneself, one’s motor behaviour subtly captures both the 
ball’s actual trajectory and the trajectory one intended for it to travel on (De Maeght & 
Prinz, 2004; Knuf, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001).These motoric changes might 
therefore index the recruitment of such predictive (forward modelling) mechanisms 
that have evolved for the control of one’s own actions but are applied to the actions 
of others.  
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An alternative possibility is that attributions of intentionality are made within the 
(higher-level) perceptual system. It is well-known that the perceptual system itself 
can make sophisticated “unconscious inferences” about objects, extracting, for 
example, the real colour of a stimulus by subtracting out cues to shading and 
illumination (Bloj, Kersten, & Hurlbert, 1999). In the same way, the perceptual 
system could use object and motion information (e.g., balls vs. hands; biological vs. 
non-biological motion profiles) to make inferences about the intentionality of a 
moving object (Scholl & Gao, 2013). Indeed, several imaging studies suggest that 
such cues to intentionality act on lower-level regions within higher-level visual cortex, 
such as the superior temporal sulcus (Grossman et al., 2000; Saygin, 2007). 
Moreover, it well known that children can attribute intentionality to stimuli which are 
unlikely to engender motor activation, such as abstract geometric shapes or 
biomechanically impossible actions (Heider & Simmel, 1944; Southgate, Johnson, & 
Csibra, 2008) or that they process action efficiency before they have competence in 
the observed action (Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010; Sodian, Schoeppner, & Metz, 
2004). Local interactions within the perceptual system could explain such 
observation. In such views, the motoric activation measured during action 
observation described above therefore does not reflect the origin of the perceptual 
effects, but a mere passive “motor resonance” that captures instead the changes to 
the action’s perceptual representation that has already occurred. 
While we are sympathetic to both explanations (Bach & Schenke, 2017), and we do 
not deem them as mutually exclusive, our prior data seems to be more consistent 
with the latter, perceptual locus of effects. In our original study (Hudson, Nicholson, 
Simpson, et al., 2016), we observed that while attributing goals (e.g. to reach or 
withdraw) to others reliably biased perceptual measures towards these goals, the 
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same was not true for when these action possibilities were motorically activated (i.e. 
by asking participants to make a forward or backwards movement with their own 
hand). While this conclusion is certainly preliminary, and needs to be supported by 
further studies, it makes a strong causal role of motoric processes unlikely. 
Another question is how the present effects on perceptual judgments emerge. 
Several studies, both psychophysical and based on neuroimaging, have shown that 
predictions can exert downstream effects on early perceptual processes, across 
different modalities (e.g., vision, Ekman et al., 2017; Muckli et al., 2005, audition, 
Kondo et al., 2017), providing sensory “templates” of expected stimulation (Ekman et 
al., 2017), or filling in missing information during apparent motion (Avenanti et al., 
2012; Muckli et al., 2005). Others, however, argue that expectations influence 
primarily decision-related processes that integrate bottom-up with top-down 
information on all levels of the hierarchy (Bang & Rahnev, 2017; 
Rungratsameetaweemana, Itthipuripat, Salazar, & Serences, 2018), or that they 
reflect attentional modulations of the response properties of neurons in early sensory 
areas (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Serences & Kastner, 2014). Others argue that 
many of the psychophysical effects of expectation may in fact reflect testing artefacts 
or demand effects, when participants realise what is being tested (Durgin et al., 
2009; Firestone & Scholl, 2016). 
While the precise mechanism has to be confirmed, several aspects of prior studies 
(Hudson et al., 2018) imply a role in the action’s perceptual representation. First, 
when asked during piloting of the original set of studies, participants were unaware 
of the experimental hypotheses, arguing against demand effects. Second, the effects 
were present already very briefly (250 ms) after action offset, in psychophysical 
 
117 
 
probe judgment tasks (Hudson et al., 2017; Hudson et al., 2018; Hudson, Nicholson, 
Ellis, et al., 2016; Hudson, Nicholson, Simpson, et al., 2016, for a review of similar 
findings in non-biological motion perception, see Hubbard, 2015) that has been 
shown to be relatively robust against cognitive control processes (Courtney & 
Hubbard, 2008; Ruppel, Fleming, & Hubbard, 2009). Third, and most importantly, the 
biases towards efficient action were disrupted by brief (560 ms.) dynamic visual 
noise masks that interfere with the re-entrant feedback from higher cortical areas 
with visual cortex that is required for the stabilisation of percepts for conscious 
access, during both perception (Breitmeyer & Öğmen, 2006; Fahrenfort et al., 2007; 
Kinsbourne & Warrington, 1962; Lamme et al., 2002) and imagery (Dijkstra, Mostert, 
de Lange, Bosch, & van Gerven, 2018). The observed biases in perceptual 
judgments are therefore unlikely to stem from unspecific perceptual changes in 
memory or motor control (Firestone & Scholl, 2016; for an example for perceptual 
changes in action memory, see, Ianì, Mazzoni, & Bucciarelli, 2018). Instead, we 
propose that they either play a role in ongoing motion perception emerging from the 
re-current interactions between lower and higher visual regions involved in stabilising 
percepts and compensating for the substantial blurring during motion perception. 
5.2.4 Conclusions 
The principle of efficient action allows observers to predict ideal reference 
trajectories that intentional actions will follow, given that the agent is fully aware of all 
relevant environmental constraints. The data presented here confirm that these 
predictions are at least partially perceptually represented and influence perceptual 
judgments of others actions, biasing them towards these expectations. They show 
that these predictions emerge from attributions of intentionality to the observed actor, 
 
118 
 
triggered by the perception of biological “agentive” objects and kinematics that follow 
biological motion profiles. 
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6 Chapter Six - Online action prediction 
All experiments so far in thesis have revealed a reliance upon expectations of action 
efficiency to guide the perception of others actions. These expectations rest upon 
attributions of intentionality, triggered by semantic and motion cues from the 
observed action. They provide a perceptual reference signal for the specific 
trajectory a rational and intentional actor would make through a given scene to 
achieve their goal, which is constantly tested against the perceptual input, inducing a 
subtle perceptual confirmation bias that distorts observed action kinematics towards 
expectations. In all these experiments, the goals and intentions of the actor (to reach 
the target object) and the environmental constraints (the presence or absence of an 
obstacle) were known prior to action onset. In the real world, the mental states of 
others (i.e. their goals, intentions, knowledge of the world) are not explicitly available 
beforehand, and instead have be derived dynamically from their ongoing behaviour 
from cues embedded in their action kinematics.  
The experiments in Chapter Six investigated whether predictions of others upcoming 
actions are not only derived before action onset, but are dynamically adjusted “on-
line” as more goal and intention information becomes available from the unfolding 
kinematics and then integrated with the action’s perceptual representation. Such 
findings would provide applications of the current findings to real world social 
interactions, revealing how humans so effortlessly attribute meaning to others 
behaviours in such a complex and dynamic social world. 
The experiments in this chapter are currently under review for publication and have 
been uploaded to the preprint server, PsyArX.  They are presented in their submitted 
format (green copy).  
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6.1 Affordance matching predictively shapes the perceptual 
representation of others’ ongoing actions. 
Katrina L. McDonough, Marcello Costantini, Matthew Hudson, Patric Bach. 
Abstract 
Predictive processing accounts of social perception argue that action observation is 
a predictive process, in which inferences about others goals are constantly tested 
against the perceptual input, inducing a subtle perceptual confirmation bias that 
distorts observed action kinematics towards the inferred goals. Here we test whether 
such biases are induced even when goals are not explicitly given but have to be 
derived from the unfolding action kinematics. In two experiments, participants briefly 
saw an actor reach ambiguously towards a large object and a small object, with 
either a whole-hand power grip or a precision grip. During its course, the hand 
suddenly disappeared, and participants reported its last seen position on a touch-
screen. As predicted, judgments were consistently biased towards apparent action 
targets, such that power grips were perceived closer to large objects and precision 
grips closer to small objects, even if the reach kinematics were identical. Strikingly, 
these biases were independent of participants’ explicit goal judgments. They were of 
equal size when action goals had to be explicitly derived in each trial (Experiment 
4a) or not (Experiment 4b) and, across trials and across participants, explicit 
judgments and perceptual biases were uncorrelated. This provides evidence, for the 
first time, that people make on-line adjustments of observed actions based on the 
match between hand grip and object goals, distorting their perceptual representation 
towards implied goals. These distortions may not reflect high-level goal assumptions, 
but emerge from relatively low-level processing of kinematic features within the 
perceptual system.  
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6.2 Experiments 4a and 4b 
The ability to understand and predict other people’s behaviour is a cornerstone of 
human social cognition and makes people’s sophisticated interactions with others 
possible. A parent constantly monitors their child’s goals, and intervenes when it 
reaches for the hot cup of coffee instead of the toy right next to it. In sports, players 
foresee each other’s behaviour, fluently passing a ball to a team mate’s future 
position. In contrast, deficits in the ability to understand others’ behaviour are a 
hallmark of several conditions that bring with them marked impairments in social 
interactions, such as autism (Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013; Pellicano & Burr, 2012; von 
der Lühe et al., 2016). 
These abilities for social perception are conventionally conceptualized as a simple 
bottom-up process, in which incoming visual information about others’ behaviour is 
matched to one’s higher-level motor – or conceptual – knowledge about it, so that 
the action’s meaning and associated mental states can be derived (Gallese & 
Goldman, 1998; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010; Rizzolatti, Cattaneo, Fabbri-Destro & 
Rozzi, 2014). However, there is no one-to-one mapping between stimuli and 
meaning that such a mechanism could rely on (Ansuini, Cavallo, Bertone, & Becchio, 
2015; Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005; Uithol, van Rooij, Bekkering, & Haselager, 2011). 
The same behaviour can mean multiple things in different contexts (e.g. a smile), 
and the same goals can be accomplished by multiple behaviours (e.g., closing a 
drawer with one’s hand vs hip). It has therefore been argued that social perception is 
better understood as a predictive process in which the brain constantly tests 
hypotheses about the observed action against the perceptual input (Bach, Nicholson, 
& Hudson, 2014; Bach & Schenke, 2017; Csibra, 2008; Donnarumma, Costantini, 
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Ambrosini, Friston, & Pezzulo, 2017; Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007ab).  In such 
accounts, any assumption about others’ goals and beliefs – derived perhaps from 
prior knowledge about the individual (Joyce, Schenke, Bayliss, & Bach, 2015; 
Schenke, Wyer, & Bach, 2016) or from contextual information (e.g., objects, Bach, 
Knoblich, Gunter, Friederici, & Prinz, 2005; Jacquet et al, 2012; Kalénine et al., 
2013, Nicholson, Roser, & Bach, 2017; gaze and emotional expressions, Adams, 
Ambady, Macrae, & Kleck, 2006; Frischen & Tipper, 2006) – is translated into 
predictions about which behaviour should be observed if these assumptions were 
correct and is superimposed over the perceptual input. Such an integration would not 
only help to stabilize perception, filling in gaps in the input (e.g. in the case of 
occlusion, Prinz & Rapinett, 2008) or compensate for the considerable noise during 
motion perception (Hammett, 1997), but would also let mismatching behaviour of 
others’ stand out, so that our assumptions about them can be revised until they 
better explain their behaviour. 
We recently developed an experimental paradigm that can make these predictions 
visible (Hudson, Bach, & Nicholson, 2017; Hudson, McDonough, Edwards, & Bach, 
2018; Hudson, Nicholson, Ellis, & Bach, 2016; Hudson, Nicholson, Simpson, Ellis, & 
Bach, 2016; McDonough, Hudson, & Bach, 2019). This paradigm rests on the 
assumption that, if predictions indeed act on perceptual representations (Bar, 2004; 
de Lange, Heilbron, & Kok, 2018; Ekman, Kok, & de Lange, 2017) then every 
prediction one makes about another person may subtly bias the perception of their 
forthcoming actions, especially in case of uncertainty, such as the visual blurring 
during motion perception. Thus, in the same way as prior expectations in the non-
social world cause us to see a colour differently (Bloj, Kersten, & Hurlbert, 1999; see 
for an application to the blue/gold dress illusions, Chetverikov & Ivanchei, 2016) or 
 
138 
 
shapes as either convex or concave based on the surrounding illumination (Adams, 
Graf, & Ernst, 2004), our prior knowledge of other people – their goals and intentions 
– may subtly shape the perceptual experience of their actions.  
This is indeed what we observed. Participants heard an actor make a statement 
about their goal – “I’ll take it” or “I’ll leave it” – before they briefly saw him start to 
reach for an object or withdraw from it. The action disappeared mid-motion and 
participants indicated the perceived vanishing point, either by comparing it to a probe 
stimulus shortly after stimulus offset (Hudson, Nicholson, Ellis, et al., 2016; Hudson, 
Nicholson, Simpson, et al., 2016) or by indicating its disappearance point on a touch 
screen (Hudson et al., 2017; Hudson et al., 2018). The results consistently revealed 
predictive biases on these perceptual judgments. First, hands were generally 
reported to have disappeared further along the trajectory than what was actually 
seen, capturing lower-level predictions based on the action’s prior course (e.g. 
Representational Momentum, Freyd & Finke, 1984; Hubbard, 2005). Second, and 
more importantly, they revealed an influence of goals attributed to the actor: hands 
were reported to have disappeared further towards the object when the actor said 
they would take it and further away from the object when the actor said they wanted 
to leave it. Other studies extended these findings, showing that similar distortions 
can be induced when the participant instructed the observed actor (Hudson, 
Nicholson, Ellis, et al., 2016) and that the observed actor’s long-term reliability to do 
as they said modulates the strength of the prediction effects (Hudson et al., 2017). 
Most recently, we showed that similar effects can be elicited by the prior object 
context, such that hands reaching straight for an object are perceptually judged to 
veer slightly upwards if they would need to reach over an obstacle, and slightly 
downwards when reaching unnecessarily high (Hudson et al., 2018), as long as 
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intentionality is attributed to the moving stimulus (McDonough, Hudson & Bach, 
2019).  
These data show that the goals attributed to others are indeed translated into 
predictions about their upcoming action, which then bias perceptual judgments 
towards these expectations. Yet, in all these studies the goals or environmental 
constraints were explicitly given prior to action onset. In the real world, people 
typically do not always announce their intentions before action. Instead, an action’s 
goal often has to be derived dynamically once the action is underway and its 
kinematics become apparent (Ambrosini, Costantini, & Sinigaglia, 2011; Ambrosini et 
al., 2013; Bach, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2011; Sartori, Becchio, & Castiello, 2011). We 
have argued that the affordances of the goal objects could play a major role in 
deriving a person’s goals once an action is underway (Bach et al., 2014). Viewing an 
action (e.g. a hammering motion) that matches the affordances of an available goal 
object (e.g. a hammer) would immediately signal to an observer what the goal of the 
action would be (Bach et al., 2005; van Elk, van Schie, & Bekkering, 2014). And 
indeed, there is now ample evidence that people spontaneously derive the target of 
a reach, by matching the hand’s grip configuration – i.e. either a small “precision” 
grip or a large “power” grip – to the available large or small objects in the 
environment (Ambrosini et al., 2011; Ambrosini et al., 2013; for a review, see Bach et 
al., 2014). For example, eye movements reveal that people anticipate the target of 
an ongoing reach by matching the unfolding grip shape (large or small grip) to the 
surrounding objects (Ambrosini et al., 2011; Ambrosini et al., 2013), automatic 
imitation effects are larger for actions that fit a goal object (Bach et al., 2011)  and 
larger motor evoked potential are elicited by the same kinematics if they fit an 
available goal object (Southgate, Johnson, Karoui, & Csibra, 2010).  
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Here we test, for the first time, whether people use such grip-object matching not 
only to derive the action’s goal or target (e.g., which goal object is selected), but 
whether they also use these goals, as assumed by perceptual prediction models 
(Kilner et al., 2007ab), to predict how an action is assumed to develop, even if it is 
already well underway. If this is the case, we should find that the match of an 
unfolding hand grip to one of two objects in the environment should again induce 
such perceptual biases, and they should be measureable – as in our prior work – in 
subtle distortions in perceptual judgment about these actions. Demonstrating such 
distortions is crucial to show that, during action observation, people go beyond 
simple goal inference (e.g. identifying the target of a reach) but that they use this 
information to then predict which future course the action will take, predicting the 
subtle kinematic change towards the identified goal object.  
In two experiments, we presented participants with brief videos of an actor’s hand 
starting at rest and then starting to reach towards the centre point between two 
adjacent potential target objects – one small, one large –, with the hand forming 
either a whole-hand power grip or a precision grip. The hand disappeared mid-
motion, at an equal distance away from either object, and participants were required 
to indicate the final location of the hand’s index finger on a touch screen monitor. If 
observers identify the goals of the action by matching the observed grip to the two 
objects’ affordances and then form a perceptual prediction about its future course, 
then perceptual judgments should show specific biases: the located disappearance 
points should be reported closer to the corresponding object than they actually were, 
and away from the alternative (mismatching) target object. Therefore, although the 
hand actually reached between the two objects, reaches with a precision grip should 
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be reported closer to the smaller object and reaches with a power grip should be 
perceptually biased towards the larger object. 
A crucial question is whether any such effects emerge from a general top-down 
mechanism, such that high-level attributions of others’ goals penetrate lower-level 
perceptual representations, or whether any perceptual biases emerge from 
“encapsulated” interactions in the perceptual system itself (Firestone & Scholl, 2016; 
Scholl & Gao, 2013), which has already been shown to be sensitive to such 
matching hand-object interactions (Bracci & Peelen, 2013). We assumed that the 
perceptual biases in our prior research (Hudson et al., 2016ab, 2018) emerged from 
high-level information, when people either heard the person make goal statements 
(“I’ll take that!”) or instructed them about the appropriate action (“Take it!”). However, 
in these studies, these goals were given well in advance of the action commencing, 
so that participants had ample time to “tune” lower-level processes towards the 
expected goal. To test whether such high-level information can penetrate online 
social perception – when the action’s goal only becomes apparent while the action is 
underway – we manipulated, across the two experiments, whether participants had 
to explicitly derive the action’s goals or were given no such instruction. In Experiment 
4a, we had participants say into the microphone, after each trial, which object they 
thought the hand was reaching for, therefore requiring explicit goal monitoring and 
attribution in each trial. In Experiment 4b, no such verbal responses had to be given 
but participants still reported the perceived disappearance points. These localisation 
judgments therefore measure spontaneous and implicit goal inferences and the 
resulting predictions. The difference between the experiments will reveal the extent 
to which perceptual biases emerge from a more or less encapsulated, automatic 
visual predictions system that relies on perceptually available “local” stimulus 
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features (e.g., hand pre-shape, available objects, for a review, see Scholl & Gao, 
2013), or whether these processes can be penetrated by higher-level information, 
such as the explicit attribution of goals to another. Moreover, the combination of 
explicit verbal goal judgments and implicit perceptual judgments in Experiment 4a 
will also allow us to test, across participants and across trials, the relationship 
between these measures.  
6.2.1 Method  
6.2.1.1  Participants 
Sixty-two participants took part in Experiment 4a (mean age = 20 years, SD = 3.4, 52 
females) and 63 participants took part in Experiment 4b (mean age = 21 years, SD = 
5.5, 50 females). Eleven additional participants across both experiments were 
excluded due to performance assessed against several a priori criteria (see Results). 
All were right handed and had normal/corrected-to-normal vision, and were recruited 
from Plymouth University for course credit. The study was approved by the 
University of Plymouth Ethics Committee, in accordance with the declaration of 
Helsinki. A power analysis revealed that a sample size of 62 provides .80 power to 
detect effects in the predicted direction with Cohen’s d = .31, and effects in either 
direction with Cohen’s d = .36. Our prior studies investigating similar effects with the 
same method (Hudson et al., 2017; Hudson et al., 2018; McDonough et al., 2019) 
revealed that effect sizes are consistently larger (d = .52 to d = 1.23).  
 
143 
 
6.2.1.2  Apparatus 
Presentation (NeuroBS) software was used to present the experiment via a HP 
EliteDisplay S230tm 23-inch widescreen (1920 x 1080) Touch Monitor. Verbal 
responses for Experiment 4a were detected using Presentation’s Sphinx speech 
recognition engine via a Microsoft LifeChat LX-3000 Headset.  
6.2.1.3  Stimuli  
Example stimuli can be seen in Figure 6-1A. Stimuli were derived, using photo 
manipulation, from a prior stimulus set of video stimuli from one of the authors 
(Costantini, Ambrosini, & Sinigaglia, 2012). The videos (950x540) showed an actor’s 
arm, from the side view, reaching towards a location in-between a small target (a 
strawberry) and a large target (an apple). They were derived from videos of natural 
(e.g. non-pantomimed) reaches towards one of the two objects, which were then 
photo-edited such that both objects were located at an equal distance away from the 
hand, with one closer to the foreground and lower down on the screen and one 
closer to the background and higher up on the screen (object positions 
counterbalanced across trials). The two objects were chosen because both their size 
and typical use clearly affords small “precision” grips (strawberry) and large whole-
hand “power” grips (the apple), but they have similar abstract round shapes and 
merely differ in colour, so that they represent prototypical objects.  
The actor’s hand started at rest in a neutral closed hand posture, and then began to 
reach, with the hand progressively opening to form either a whole-hand “power” grip 
or a thumb-index “precision” grip. Four reach videos were used for each hand pre-
shape condition, which together with two target layouts (small object to the front, 
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large at the back, or vice versa), created a total of 16 different videos. Each video 
was converted into 9 frames, where frame 9 showed the actor’s hand at maximal 
pre-shape, halfway between the starting position and the objects, and halfway 
between the two objects, so that only pre-shape information would predict which 
object would be reached for and not the hand position. The shadow of the hand was 
digitally removed so this information could not aid localisation.  
Response images for both experiments were created by digitally removing the 
actor’s arm and hand from the scene, so that only the target objects and the 
background remained. Presenting this frame immediately after the action sequence 
gave the impression of the hand disappearing from the scene. A second response 
image for Experiment 4a was identical to these images, with the addition of four 
question marks positioned at each corner of the screen. These served as cues for 
participants to make their verbal responses about which object they believed was the 
target. All editing was completed using Adobe CC Photoshop. 
6.2.1.4  Procedure 
An example trial sequence can be seen in Figure 6-1B. Participants completed a 
total of 192 trials, consisting of four blocks of 48 trials (each representing all 16 
different trials three times), with breaks in between. At the start of each trial, 
participants saw an instruction to “Hold the spacebar”, to which they pressed the 
spacebar with their right hand and kept it depressed until the end of the action 
sequence. This ensured that they did not track the observed action with their finger, 
and could only initiate their response once the action sequence had disappeared. 
They then saw the first (neutral) frame of the action sequence for 1000ms, followed 
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by successive frames at 80ms intervals. The final frame was randomly chosen in 
each trial as either frame 8 or frame 9, to increase variability of the hand’s final 
position. This final frame was then immediately replaced with the response image.  
Participants released the spacebar and, with their right hand, touched the screen 
where they thought the final position of the tip of the observed index finger was. For 
Experiment 4a, the touch response was immediately followed by the second 
response frame where participants were required to say into the microphone which 
target object they thought the actor was reaching towards (either “apple” or 
“strawberry”). Once the verbal response was registered, the next trial began. For 
Experiment 4b, the next trial began as soon as the touch response was registered. 
 
 
Figure 6-1. Experiments 4a and 4b. Experimental conditions and trial sequence. 
Panel A. Experimental conditions: The objects were arranged with either the small 
object (strawberry) on top and the large object (apple) on the bottom (top row), or 
with the large object on top and the small object on the bottom (bottom row). The 
actor’s hand reached with either a precision (small) grip (left column), or with a 
power (large) grip (right column). Panel B. Example of a trial sequence, showing a 
“large object on top” configuration with a small grip. 
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6.2.2  Results 
Data filtering was identical to Hudson et al. (2018) and McDonough et al. (2019). In 
both experiments, individual trials were excluded if the correct response procedure 
was not followed (e.g. lifting the spacebar before the response image as presented; 
2.8% of total trials), or if response initiation or execution times were less than 200ms 
or more than 3SDs above the sample mean (2.4%, Initiation: mean =355.5ms, 
SD=143.7; Execution: mean =646.0ms, SD=240.0). Participants were excluded if too 
few trials remained after trial exclusions (<50% trials, 5 participants), if their average 
distance between the real and selected positions was more than 3SDs away from 
the sample mean (mean =39.0 pixels, SD=17.0, 2 participants excluded), or if the 
correlation between the real and selected positions was more than 3SD below the 
median r value (X axis: median r =.762, SD = .113; Y axis: median r =.860, SD = 
.098, 2 participants excluded). Two further participants were excluded from 
Experiment 4a, one because they selected the top object as the most likely target 
object in all trials, and one for showing an abnormally large effect in the predicted 
direction (e.g. 15 times larger than the sample mean) so that we suspected a 
misunderstanding of the task (e.g. touching the likely target object instead of the 
hand disappearance point). Removal of these two participants does not affect the 
results. This left a total of 62 participants in Experiment 4a and 63 participants in  
Experiment 4b.  
Analysis was conducted on the perceptual bias, which reflects the difference 
between the hand’s real disappearance point and participants’ subjective judgments. 
It was derived by subtracting the real final coordinates of the tip of the index finger 
from the participant’s selected coordinates on each trial (see Figure 6-2). This 
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resulted in separate difference scores for the X and Y axis, where positive X and Y 
scores represented a rightward and upward displacement respectively, and negative 
X and Y scores represented a leftward and downward displacement respectively. A 
score of 0 on both axes indicated that the participant selected the real final position 
exactly.  
6.2.2.1  Y axis 
Participants’ perceptual biases on the Y axis were analysed with a 2x2x2 mixed 
ANOVA, with Grip type (power vs precision) and Object location (large target on top 
vs small target on top) as repeated measures factors and Experiment (4a: explicit 
prediction vs 4b: implicit prediction) as between-subjects factor. We predicted, first, 
that perceived disappearance points would be distorted towards the apparent target 
object of the reach, such that reaches would appear to have terminated slightly 
higher if they match a target object at the top and lower for a target object at the 
bottom. Second, if these perceptual biases are informed by – or do inform – explicit 
judgments, then these shifts should be larger, or only observed, in Experiment 4a, 
where the hands’ goals were task relevant, compared to Experiment 4b where such 
goal inferences would need to be made spontaneously, in parallel to the perceptual 
judgment task. These should be reflected in a two-way interaction of Grip type and 
Object location and a three-way interaction of Grip type, Object location, and 
Experiment.  
The analysis revealed the predicted interaction of Grip type and Object location, 
F(1,123) = 16.8, p < .001, ηp2 = .120. Even though kinematics were identical, the 
disappearance point of power grips was reported higher when the large target object 
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was placed at the top (-15.1px) than when the large target object was placed at the 
bottom (-16.0px, t(124)=2.75, p=.007, d=.25). Conversely, the disappearance point 
for precision grips was reported to be higher when the small target object was at the 
top (-1.5px) compared to when the small target object was at the bottom (-2.8px, 
t(124)=3.64, p<.001, d=.33). Note that while these deviations are small, they are 
highly reliable, reflected in a Bayes factor of BF10 of 130.5 for the interaction, and – 
especially when their smaller than lifelike size is considered – surpass similar 
deviations induced by object biases in the kinematics of real reaches (e.g., distractor 
interference/deviation ≈ 1mm, (Keulen, Adam, Fischer, Kuipers & Jolles, 2003; 
Welsh, Elliott & Weeks, 1999).  
The second question was whether the size of these perceptual displacements was 
larger when the actions’ target was task relevant in Experiment 4a compared to 
when it was task-irrelevant in Experiment 4b. However, there was no three-way 
interaction between grip type, object location and experiment (F(1,123) = .666, p = 
.416, ηp2 = .005). Moreover, the relevant interaction of grip and object location was 
present in both experiments, irrespective of whether participants explicitly reported 
the action’s goals after the perceptual judgments (Experiment 4a: F(1,61) = 9.56, p = 
.003, ηp2 = .135, Experiment 4b: F(1,62) = 7.20, p =.009, ηp2 = .104, see Figure 6-2). 
Two one-sided tests (TOST) procedure (Lakens, 2017) indicated that the observed 
effect size of the between-experiment difference (d=.16) was significantly within the 
equivalence bounds of ΔL = –.51 and ΔU =.51, t(113.89) = -1.95, p = .027, and a 
Baysian analysis provides substantial evidence for the null hypothesis, BF10 = .110 , 
There were no further main effects or interactions (all F < 1.62, all p > .205).  
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As all other effects in the ANOVA were not predicted, they should be treated as 
incidental findings, unless they pass a threshold of p < .01, corrected for multiple 
comparisons in an ANOVA (Cramer et al., 2015). Only one, a main effect of grip 
type, F(1,123) = 1130, p < .001, ηp2 = .902, surpassed this threshold, showing 
perceived disappearance points of power grips were displaced further downward 
than precision grips. This was expected since the power grip is larger and therefore 
has a lower centre of gravity, which is known to affect touch screen judgements, but 
is independent from our effects of interest (Coren & Hoenig, 1972; see also Hudson 
et al., 2017; Hudson et al., 2018). 
6.2.2.2  X axis 
Perceptual biases on the X axis were analysed with the same ANOVA model. As we 
did not have any prediction for the X axis, all effects are therefore subject to alpha 
inflation due to multiple comparisons in an ANOVA (Cramer et al., 2015) and should 
be evaluated against a Bonferroni-adjusted alpha of p < .007. Only the main effect of 
grip type, F(1,123) = 503, p < .001, ηp2 = .804, passed this adjusted threshold, with 
the perceived disappearance point of power grips more leftward than precision grips, 
which again reflects leftward centre of gravity for power grips. There were no further 
main effects or interactions (all F < 4.07, all p > .046). 
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Figure 6-2. Experiments 4a and 4b. Results. 
Panel A. Grip type x object interaction for Experiment 4a. The difference scores 
between the real final position and the selected final position is plotted for the X axis 
and Y axis. Panel B. Grip type x object interaction for Experiment 4b. Panel C. A 
raincloud plot (Allen, Poggiali, Whitaker, Marshall & Kievit, 2018) of the comparison 
across experiments of the size of the Y axis interaction in pixels, equivalent to the 
total amount by which each grip type was distorted towards the congruent object. 
Each data point represents this Y axis interaction value for each participant. Error 
bars depict 95% confidence intervals. 
6.2.2.3  Relationships between perceptual shifts and explicit goal judgments 
An important question is to what extent the perceptual displacements measured 
above are informed by people’s higher-level, explicit judgments about the observed 
actions. If perceptual predictions are shaped by high-level goal attributions or vice 
versa, then perceptual displacement and explicit judgments in Experiment 4a should 
be closely linked, both across participants and across trials within participants. 
6.2.2.3.1 Do people rely on affordance matching to make explicit goal 
judgments?  
We first established whether grip/object-matching does not only inform perceptual 
biases in action observation, but also people’s explicit judgments about the action’s 
goals. Participants were never given explicit instruction about the relevance of 
grip/object match, but they reported, after each action in Experiment 4a, whether 
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they subjectively experienced the hand to be reaching for the apple or the 
strawberry. To test whether these judgments were informed by the apparent 
grip/object-match, we separately coded which object the grip actually corresponded 
to and participants’ subjective judgments about which object they felt the hand 
reached for. To this end, a hand grip matching the bottom object was coded as 0 and 
a match to the top object was coded as 1. Verbal goal judgments were similarly 
coded as 0 and 1 for perceived goal objects at the bottom and at the top, 
respectively. We then simply, for each participant, calculated the proportion of verbal 
goal judgments that corresponded to the actual match with the goal object. A simple 
t-test against chance (50%) revealed that explicit judgments corresponded well with 
the actual hand-object match (M = 66.7%, SD = 16.7%; t =31.5, p <.001). This 
confirms that the grip-object-match did not only inform perceptual displacements 
(see main analysis), but also participants’ explicit goal object judgments.  
6.2.2.3.2 Are perceptual biases and explicit judgments related across 
participants?  
We then tested whether individual differences in participants’ tendency to rely on 
grip/object matching to make explicit judgments is related to their reliance on 
grip/object matching in perceptual judgments. We therefore correlated the proportion 
to which each participant’s verbal goal judgments matched the actual hand/object 
match with their perceptual biases towards the grip-matching goal object (i.e. the 
interaction contrast that marks the predictive perceptual shift due to matching grips 
to object affordances in the main analysis above). Surprisingly, the two types of 
judgments were almost perfectly uncorrelated, r(59) = .08, p = .518, N=62. TOST 
procedure (Lakens, 2017) indicated that the observed effect size (r=.08) was 
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significantly within the equivalence bounds of ΔL = –.36 and ΔU =.36, p = .011. A 
Bayesian analysis provided “substantial” evidence for the absence of a correlation,  
BF10 = .102. 
6.2.2.3.3 Are perceptual biases and explicit judgments related across trials?  
While there may be no overall relationships between a participants’ perceptual 
biases and explicit judgment, it is possible that such relationships are present on a 
trial-by-trial basis. If explicit and perceptual judgments depend on one another, then 
actions/trials judged explicitly to be directed towards the top object should also show 
a perceptual mis-location towards the top, and vice versa for reaches judged to be 
directed to the bottom object.  
To test this, we first tested whether the perceptual shifts in each trial reflected the 
actual target object location. We therefore correlated, for each participant separately, 
the actual target object location (coded as 0 or 1) for each trial with the size of the 
perceptual judgment displacement on the Y axis across all trials of the participant. 
Testing the resulting fisher-transformed correlation coefficients against zero with a 
simple t-test, revealed a positive mean correlation between perceptual shifts and 
target object location across participants (mean r = .03, t = 3.10, p = .003; d = .40), 
see Figure 6-3A. This trial-by-trial correlation was replicated in Experiment 4b (mean 
r = .02, t = 2.77; p = .007; d = .35), and did not differ from Experiment 4a 
(t(123)=.512, p=.609, d=.14). TOST procedure (Lakens, 2017) indicated that the 
observed effect size (d=.14) was significantly within the equivalence bounds of ΔL = 
–.51 and ΔU =.51, t(121.5) = -2.06, p = .021. As before, a Bayesian analysis of this 
effect provided substantial evidence for an absence of such a relationship, BF10 = 
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.134. Replicating the results of the main analyses with an across-trials correlational 
measure, this analysis therefore confirms that actions in which the hand grip 
matched the object on the top, compared to a grip match to the bottom object, 
induced larger shifts upwards.  
Next, we performed an identical across-trials correlation analysis for the relationship 
between the actual target object location and verbal goal judgment. This again 
revealed a positive correlation between verbal goal judgments and grip information 
(mean r = .44, t = 7.20, p <.001; d = .91), see Figure 6-3B. Across trials, reaches 
whose grip matched the top object were therefore more likely to be judged to be 
reaching to the top object, and vice versa for reaches whose grip matches the 
bottom object.  
Finally, the crucial question was whether explicit verbal goal judgments about an 
action and the perceptual shifts showed a positive relationship. Strikingly, as in the 
across-participants analysis, there was no correlation between perceptual 
displacements and the explicit verbal goal judgments across trials (mean r = .01, t = 
.694, p = .500, d = .09), see Figure 6-3C. TOST procedure (Lakens, 2017) indicated 
that the observed effect size (d=.09) was significantly within the equivalence bounds 
of ΔL = –.36 and ΔU =.36, t(61) = -2.15, p = .018, and a Bayesian analysis provided 
strong evidence for the absence of a relationship, BF10 = .088. Thus, while the 
actual target location informed perceptual judgments and verbal goal judgments, the 
two types of judgments were not related to each other. 
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Figure 6-3. Experiments 4a and 4b. Correlational results. 
Figure 3. Each participant’s across-trial correlation coefficient (r) for the correlation 
between perceptual judgments and the target object location (top object or bottom 
object, based on the grip-object match, Panel A), the correlation between verbal goal 
judgments and the target object location (Panel B), and the correlation between 
perceptual judgments and verbal goal judgments (Panel C). 
6.2.3 Discussion 
Prior work has shown that people integrate object and action kinematic information 
to derive the likely goal of observed actions, even while the action is still ongoing 
(Ambrosini et al., 2011; Bach et al., 2011; Decroix & Kalénine, 2018; Eshuis, 
Coventry, & Vulchanova, 2009; for a review, see Bach et al., 2014). Here, we tested 
the hypothesis of predictive processing models (Bach & Schenke, 2017; Hudson, 
Nicholson, Ellis, et al., 2016; Hudson, Nicholson, Simpson, et al., 2016), that such 
goal inferences are immediately translated into perceptual predictions about the 
actions future path towards the inferred goal, and bias perceptual judgments towards 
these expected trajectories.       
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The data from two experiments supported this proposal. In each trial, participants 
observed the initial stages of a reach towards two potential target objects that 
differed in size, with either a whole-hand power grip or a precision grip, and were 
asked to perceptually report the hand’s last seen position after its sudden offset. The 
results revealed consistent biases in perceptual judgments towards action 
expectations derived from the compatibility between the emerging grip type and 
object size. While reaches with a power grip were reported to be closer to large 
objects, reaches with a precision grip were perceived to be closer to small objects, 
even when actions with the same kinematics were observed and only the location of 
the relevant target object changed. These perceptual mis-locations were present 
both when participants were explicitly asked to identify the goal objects in a 
secondary task (Experiment 4a) and when the reach targets were completely task 
irrelevant and participants were only asked to accurately report the hand’s 
disappearance point (Experiment 4b). Moreover, they were observed even though 
the actor’s hand started at rest before pre-shaping. The target object was therefore 
ambiguous before action onset and only became apparent once the action 
commenced and a specific grip type began to form.  
These perceptual displacements towards the expected kinematics support predictive 
processing models of social perception, which argue that any inferences about an 
observed action’s goal will (1) give rise to predictions about the action’s further 
kinematics, which can then (2) bias action perception towards these expectations 
(Bach & Schenke, 2017; Hudson et al., 2018; Hudson, Nicholson, Ellis, et al., 2016; 
Hudson, Nicholson, Simpson, et al., 2016; Kilner et al., 2007a, 2007b). They go 
beyond previous findings in which action expectations were explicitly induced prior to 
action onset, for example, by asking participants to instruct the (virtual) actor 
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(Hudson, Nicholson, Ellis, et al., 2016), by hearing goal statements of the actor (“I’ll 
take it!”, Hudson et al., 2017; Hudson, Nicholson, Simpson, et al., 2016), or by 
presenting a static image of the goal object with or without obstructing objects in the 
way (Hudson et al., 2018; McDonough et al., 2019). Here, no such prior information 
was available. The actions started from a neutral position and the goals only became 
apparent once it was underway, from the subtle pre-shaping of the hands for the 
affordances of the goal object (i.e. precision grip when directed towards the small 
object, power grip when directed towards the large object).  
Our results therefore show, first, that predictions are not just made before action 
onset, but are dynamically adjusted “on-line” as more information becomes available 
from the unfolding kinematics and are then integrated with the action’s perceptual 
representation. Second, they reveal that matching of actions to the affordances of 
potential goal objects in the environment plays a major role in this process, as 
previously hypothesized (see Bach et al., 2014 for a theoretical proposal and 
review). Third, they go beyond prior work that has shown that people use such 
affordance matching to identify the target of another’s action, guiding eye 
movements towards it in an anticipatory manner (Ambrosini et al., 2011; Ambrosini 
et al., 2013; Bach et al., 2011). Instead, they reveal that these predictions do not just 
represent the likely goal object, but represent concrete expectations about the next 
step of a hand’s path through the scene, which interact with the perceptual 
representation of the kinematics that were actually observed.  
A surprising finding was that this matching of actions to goal objects and the 
resulting perceptual biases appeared to be highly automatic and independent from 
explicit judgments. We had hypothesized that if perceptual mislocations and explicit 
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judgments inform each other, then those trials that were explicitly judged to be 
directed towards the top object should also show upwards mis-locations, and vice 
versa for judgments towards bottom objects. However, converging findings from 
three independent tests argue against this interpretation. First, in Experiment 4a, the 
action’s goal was highly task relevant because participants indicated verbally, after 
each action, which object they believed was the target. No such response was 
required in Experiment 4b, such that any perceptual bias therefore indexes only 
spontaneous, implicit goal inferences and prediction. Nevertheless, the perceptual 
bias towards the grip-matching object was evident – with virtually identical effect 
sizes – in both experiments. Second, in Experiment 4a, correlational analyses across 
participants showed that the perceptual biases were independent of whether 
participants’ verbal goal judgments revealed a reliance on grip information or not. 
Thus, the perceptual bias towards the matching goal object was of similar size 
irrespective of whether participants made use of grip-object matching when they 
explicitly judged the action’s goals. Third and finally, correlational analyses across 
trials that directly relate perceptual displacements in a given to trial to verbal goal 
judgments in the same trial (Experiment 4a) confirmed this lack of a top-down 
influence. Even though the actual goal object predicted both the direction of the 
perceptual bias and which object was explicitly reported as a target, the perceptual 
biases and verbal goal judgments remained uncorrelated across trials. In other 
words, while the mechanisms for action prediction and the goal identification both 
rely on grip-object matching, the two mechanisms do not strongly inform each other: 
explicit goal judgments do not induce perceptual biases, nor do perceptual biases 
induce explicit goal judgments. While it had been difficult to draw conclusions from 
null effects, recent Bayesian and equivalence-testing (TOST) analysis techniques 
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have overcome this problem (Lakens, 2017). Indeed, all three tests described above 
provide substantial to strong evidence for the absence of a link between explicit 
judgments and perceptual biases, and the reported difference remain significantly 
within equivalence bounds.  
This apparent dissociation between explicit and implicit perceptual biases may 
appear surprising from a viewpoint of predictive coding models, according to which 
predictions and prediction errors ensure that top-level and lower-level judgments 
remain aligned (Clark, 2013; Friston & Kiebel, 2009; Hudson et al., 2017). Thus, any 
inferences on a higher level – for example, what the goal of the action is – would 
propagate downwards to lower levels and inform perceptual judgments. Conversely, 
any change in perceptual estimation – whether it is perceived to travel upwards and 
downwards – would, via prediction errors, inform resulting high-level judgments of 
action goals. This apparent conflict can be resolved, however, if one accepts recent 
proposals that predictions can also emerge locally, from top-down interactions within 
the human perceptual system for the perception of biological motion (for a review, 
see Scholl & Gao, 2013), without drawing on information external to these networks 
such as high-level explicit action goal judgments (Firestone & Scholl, 2016). Indeed, 
several lines of evidence suggest that the perceptual system itself can detect many 
aspects of intentional behaviour, without the need for higher-level evaluation, such 
as whether one actor chases another (Gao, McCarthy & Scholl, 2010), whether an 
actor pays attention to their reach or whether an actor moves certain limbs in a 
particular direction, dependent on this attention orientation (e.g. moving an arm to 
the left when the actor is attending to this target position, Jellema, Baker, Wicker, & 
Perrett, 2000). The match between hand and goal object may therefore provide 
another feature from which such lower-level teleological interpretations of observed 
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motion can be derived, and low-level perceptual regions have indeed been found to 
be sensitive to such information (e.g., STS, Gao, Scholl & McCarthy, 2012; Saxe, 
Xiao, Kovacs, Perrett & Kanwisher, 2004;  lateral occipital cortex, Bracci & Peelen, 
2013). Our new data then suggests that these regions are not only sensitive to the 
presence of these matches and the goals they signify, but that they also use them to 
predict the action’s further path and bias the perceptual representations towards it, 
independently of the goals explicitly attributed to the other person.  
Future studies now need to investigate from what kind of mechanism the perceptual 
biases emerge. Our prior studies point towards lower-level perceptual processes that 
determine participants’ conscious perceptual experience of the actions, which then 
drives their explicit judgments. First, in our original studies (Hudson et al., 2017; 
Hudson, Nicholson, Ellis, et al., 2016; Hudson, Nicholson, Simpson, et al., 2016), 
these effects were measured not with touch screen judgments, but probe judgments. 
Participants compared the hand disappearance point with probes in the same, 
forward, or prior position. Even when these probes were presented only 250 ms after 
hand disappearance, the perceptual distortions were apparent, suggesting, at the 
very least, an effect in iconic memory. Second, in our most recent work testing 
perceived changes to action kinematics in the presence of obstacles, all such effects 
were eliminated when dynamic visual noise masks were presented briefly (560 ms) 
after action offset (Hudson et al., 2018), which are known to interfere with re-entrant 
top-down projections to early visual cortex (Fahrenfort, Scholte, & Lamme, 2007; 
Lamme, Zipser, & Spekreijse, 2002). Together, therefore, these findings support a 
low-level locus of the effects that either reflects the top-down sharpening of the 
uncertainty during motion perception (i.e. motion blurring, Hammett, 1997), or the 
filling-in of the expected path after the unexpected sudden offset (Ekman et al., 
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2017). Neuroimaging studies would be useful to disentangle to what extent the 
perceptual changes we have measured here reflect changes to early perceptual 
systems, similar to that seen in various visual illusions and sometimes in motion 
illusions (e.g. apparent motions, Muckli, Kohler, Kriegeskorte, & Singer, 2005; 
predicted motion pre-play, Ekman et al., 2017). 
6.2.4 Conclusions 
The present results reveal that the perceptual experience of others’ actions is 
predictively shaped by the integration of the unfolding action kinematics with the 
affordances of available goal objects, as proposed by recent predictive models of 
social perception, (Csibra, 2008; Kilner et al., 2007ab; Bach, Nicholson & Hudson, 
2014; Schenke & Bach, 2017). These integrations likely emerge at a relatively low-
level, from processes within systems for the perception of biological motion, without 
influences from top-down evaluations of others’ goals and intentions. Future studies 
must now resolve precisely via which mechanism predictions act on perceptual 
representations, how they help guide own actions towards future states in social 
interactions, and how prior knowledge is updated and revised if it consistently fails to 
explain the perceptual input. 
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7 Chapter Seven - General Discussion 
The ability to understand the actions of others and engage in social interaction lies at 
the core of our existence. Understanding the goals, beliefs and attitudes of other 
people not only informs our expectations of their next movement, but also allows us 
to prepare our own action in response, allowing for fluid social interaction (Hamilton 
& Grafton, 2007; Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009). The aim of this thesis was to investigate 
the mechanisms that underlie this capacity. While traditional models assume a post-
action evaluation of the observed behaviour, deriving action goals through mirrored 
motor activations (di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; Gallese 
& Sinigaglia, 2010; Iacoboni, 2009; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), this thesis 
investigated more recent claims of predictive social perception. Such predictive 
models suggest instead that the goals and intentions of other’s actions can be 
inferred by drawing upon prior expectations, derived from knowledge about the world 
and other people (Bach et al., 2014; Csibra, 2008; Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007ab). 
This knowledge is translated into a prediction of the forthcoming action, providing a 
reference with which to compare the observed action as it unfolds, confirming prior 
goal assumptions or signalling the need for revision.  
Utilising the well-established Representational Momentum paradigm that reliably 
measures the predictive influences in motion perception (Freyd & Finke, 1984; 
Hubbard, 2005, 2015), this thesis provides evidence that observers actively predict 
the upcoming actions of others in such a manner. They show that action 
expectations rely on the principle of efficient action, providing a reference signal that 
guides the perception of others’ actions and bias their perceptual representation 
(Chapter Three). These reference signals are perceptually represented (Chapter 
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Four) and rely on cues to intention (Chapter Five). The results further demonstrate 
that action predictions do not only rely on knowledge and contextual information that 
is available prior to action onset, but that they are also dynamically updated during 
ongoing action observation (Chapter Six). Together, the findings support a predictive 
processing account of social perception, akin to those that underlie perception in 
general, and reveal how we so effortlessly navigate the social world (Bach et al., 
2014; Csibra, 2008; Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007ab).  
7.1 Summary of results 
Initial experiments, presented in Chapter Three, tested whether human observers 
interpret the actions of others under the principle of efficient action, predicting them 
to take the most energy-efficient path to achieve their goals (Csibra & Gergely, 2013; 
Dennett, 1987; Gergely & Csibra, 2003). Using a Representational Momentum 
paradigm (Freyd & Finke, 1984; Hubbard, 2005, 2015), they investigated whether 
these predictions are represented in a perceptual format, providing a reference 
image for the observed action that distorts its perceptual representation.  
Participants observed videos of an actor reaching towards a target object. The actor 
either reached efficiently (straight towards a target object or arched over an obstacle) 
or inefficiently (straight towards the obstacle or arched over an empty space). The 
hand disappeared mid-way through the action and participants indicating the last 
seen position of the actor’s index finger using a touch screen. Across three 
experiments, perceptual judgements were consistently biased towards the expected 
efficient trajectory. Straight reaches towards an obstacle were judged to be higher 
than efficient straight reaches, in line with the expectation that the actor would have 
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reached over the obstacle, even though the straight reaches in both conditions were 
identical. Conversely, arched reaches were reported lower when they reached over 
an empty space than when they reached efficiently over an obstacle.  
These biases were evident when participants passively viewed the actions 
(Experiment 1a) but increased when participants explicitly acknowledged the context 
(by stating the presence or absence of obstacles, Experiment 1b), and increased 
further when they explicitly predicted the most efficient action path (Experiment 1c). 
These results revealed that human observers, indeed, make predictions about the 
efficiency of others upcoming actions, and these predictions specifically concern the 
expected kinematics that a rational actor, who is aware of all environmental 
constraints, would take. The resulting biases towards the expected kinematics 
highlight the perceptual nature of these predictions and their use as a reference 
against which the observed action is compared. Moreover, these predictions were 
derived spontaneously, and the increase in perceptual biases when predictions were 
made explicit, prior to action onset, confirms that action efficiency understanding is 
not only derived from the kinematic components of the observed action, but also 
from predictions informed by prior knowledge and context.  
The experiments in Chapter Four tested whether the biases reported in Experiments 
1a-c do indeed reflect changes to the perceptual representation of the action, or 
whether these effects could be explained by later changes in working memory or the 
motor components required to make touch-screen judgements (Firestone & Scholl, 
2015; Ianì, Mazzoni, & Bucciarelli, 2018). To test this, Experiment 1b was replicated 
and touch-screen responses were replaced by probe stimuli that appeared directly 
after action offset (with 250 ms. interval, Experiment 2a) either in the predicted 
direction (e.g. upwards for inefficient straight reaches) or in the unpredicted direction, 
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as well as forwards and backwards. Results replicated the main findings, showing 
that probe stimuli in the predicted direction were consistently misjudged to be in the 
same position as last seen image of the hand, compared to probes in the 
unpredicted direction. These findings therefore provide evidence against a working 
memory or motor-based explanation as prediction effects were apparent immediately 
after action offset, when working memory does not yet have access to visual 
representations, and were captured using probe judgements that do not rely on 
visuospatial motor maps (Kerzel, 2005).  
The results from Experiment 2b further confirm that predictions of action efficiency 
act on early perceptual representation. They tested whether these prediction effects 
can be disrupted by a dynamic visual noise mask that reliably disrupt such low-level 
perceptual processes (Breitmeyer & Öğmen, 2006; Fahrenfort, Scholte, & Lamme, 
2007). Experiment 1b was again replicated and a short (dynamic checkerboard) 
mask was inserted into half of the trials, over the last seen position of the hand, 
directly after action offset. Touch responses in non-masked trials were consistently 
biased towards efficient action expectations, replicating the original findings, while 
these perceptual biases were disrupted in masked trials, dramatically reducing the 
size of the effect. This confirms that the perceptual mask successfully disrupted the 
predictive processing of action stimuli, confirming the low-level perceptual nature of 
action predictions. 
The experiments in Chapter Five investigated how such predictions of action 
efficiency emerge and upon what information they rely. Specifically, Experiment 3a, 
3b and 3c revealed a reliance upon cues to intentionality. Experiment 3a provided 
evidence of the robustness of these prediction effects by, first, replicating the original 
experiment (Experiment 1b) and replicating the resulting perceptual biases. The 
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magnitude of the perceptual biases were reduced when intentionality cues were 
removed, first by replacing the actor’s hand with a non-agentive ball that moved 
along the same biological trajectory as the hand (Experiment 3b), and reduced even 
further by removing this biological motion profile so that the ball now moved along a 
straight path with a constant speed (Experiment 3c). These findings confirm that 
predictions of action efficiency do indeed depend on the intentionality of the actor, 
cued by agency and biological motion, and therefore on the extent to which 
behaviour is deemed rational and intentional. Action predictions are therefore 
informed by prior information from knowledge (of agency and efficient action) and 
context (obstacles present). 
The experiments so far investigated predictions of action efficiency whereby all 
information required to make a prediction were available prior to action onset (i.e. 
presence of obstacles, agency of stimuli). Experiments in Chapter Six confirmed that 
action predictions can be generated on-line, once the action has begun, even when 
goal cues are not available prior to action onset. Participants saw videos of an actor 
reaching towards two adjacent objects (a small object and a large object) forming 
either a small precision grip or a large power grip. The hand disappeared as it 
approached the objects and participants judged the disappearance point on a touch-
screen. The results showed that large grips were perceived closer to large objects 
and small grips were perceived to be closer to small objects, even when the same 
actions were observed and only the placement of the objects were changed. 
Surprisingly, the size of these prediction effects did not change when explicit goal 
judgements were made after each action in Experiment 4a and no relationship was 
found between perceptual shifts and explicit goal judgements across participants or 
across trials. These findings reveal that on-line adjustments of predicted actions can 
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be made based on affordance-matching information revealed during the ongoing 
action, which biases the perceptual representation of observed actions. These 
distortions appear to emerge from low-level evaluations of the action kinematics, 
independent of explicit goal identification.  
7.2 Implications for prior research and theorizing 
7.1.1 Prediction in social perception 
A dominant view of social perception explained action understanding as a purely 
bottom-up process whereby the goals and intentions of others were realised by 
directly matching observed behaviours to own motor experience, without feedback or 
inference (Gazzola & Keysers, 2008; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti & 
Sinigaglia, 2010). Despite the seemingly compelling evidence in support of this view, 
from the discovery of mirror neurons in the monkey brain and apparent homologous 
systems in humans (Di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 
1996; Gazzola & Keysers, 2008; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Umilta et al., 2001), 
more recent research has highlighted the involvement of top-down processing in 
action observation (e.g., Bach, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2011; Liepelt et al., 2008). These 
findings are consistent with predictive processing models that view perception in 
general as an iterative process of hypothesis testing and revision (Bach et al., 2014; 
Csibra, 2008; Kilner et al., 2007ab). Prior knowledge and contextual information is 
used to make inferences about what is being perceived, which is translated into the 
sensory information that would be received if these inferences are correct, which can 
then be compared against – or integrated with – the actual input. In this way, 
expectations can act as a reference signal that biases perceptual representations of 
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the input towards expectations. In non-social vision, such predictive models explain, 
for example, how surrounding illumination is cancelled out in colour perception (Bloj, 
Kersten, & Hurlbert, 1999), how expectations influence the perception of bi-stable 
figures (Hohwy, Roepstorff, & Friston, 2008), and how illusory motion arises from the 
perceptual “filling in” of apparent motion stimuli (Muckli, Kohler, Kriegeskorte, & 
Singer, 2005). Social perception might be supported by similar predictive 
mechanisms (Bach et al., 2014; Csibra, 2008; Kilner et al., 2007ab).  
Initial studies have used a Representational Momentum paradigm (Freyd & Finke, 
1984; Hubbard, 2005, 2015), originally designed to investigate top-down predictive 
influences on non-social motion perception, to test whether similar predictive effects 
emerge using social stimuli (Hudson, Bach, & Nicholson, 2018; Hudson & Jellema, 
2011; Hudson, Liu, & Jellema, 2009; Hudson, Nicholson, Ellis, & Bach, 2016; 
Hudson, Nicholson, Simpson, Ellis, & Bach, 2016). Hudson and colleagues (2016) 
presented participants with short video clips of an actor reaching towards or 
withdrawing away from an object. Before the onset of the action, participants 
instructed the actor by saying either “Take it!” or “Leave it!”. Participants 
overestimated the last seen position of the hand in the direction of motion, and this 
forward bias was larger when the direction of the action followed the instruction. 
Thus, reaches towards an object appeared more exaggerated after instructing them 
to “Take it!” than to “Leave it!”, and vice versa for observed withdrawals. This 
Representational Momentum effect was replicated when the actor stated their 
intention instead, by saying “I’ll take it!” or “I’ll leave it” before the onset of the action 
(Hudson et al., 2016), and it was modulated by the likelihood that the actor would do 
as he says (25% or 75% of the time, Hudson et al, 2018). These findings therefore 
reveal that high-level information about the goals and intentions of other’s actions is 
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used to generate predictions of their upcoming behaviour and that these predictions 
create distortions to the perceptual representation of the action, in line the predictive 
processing theories (Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010).  
The experiments in this thesis built on this prior research. They were designed to 
reveal how these predictions of others’ upcoming behaviour are generated, on what 
cues they rely, and how these predictions alter the perceptual representation of 
others’ action. The following sections will discuss, step by step, the implications of 
each stage in the action prediction process. 
7.2.1.1  Expectations of efficiency 
One question addressed by the current work is the prior knowledge that is required 
to form expectations about others’ behaviour. Prior work has revealed a reliance 
upon social cues such as gaze direction (Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007; Hudson, 
Liu, & Jellema, 2009), facial expression (Hudson & Jellema, 2011b; Yoshikawa & 
Sato, 2008), and statements of intent (Hudson et al., 2018; Hudson, Nicholson, Ellis, 
et al., 2016; Hudson, Nicholson, Simpson, et al., 2016). Here, experiments explored 
a more general social predictor that has been argued to form the basis of all goal-
directed action expectations performed by rational agents: the principle of efficient 
action (Csibra & Gergely, 2013; Dennett, 1987; Gergely & Csibra, 2003).  
Prior research has shown that humans, from a very young age, interpret the actions 
of others as purposeful and goal-directed (Csibra & Gergely, 2013; Dennett, 1987; 
Gergely & Csibra, 2003). An essential feature of this “intentional stance” is the 
realization that humans act rationally, taking the most efficient route possible towards 
their goals, minimising energy expenditure. Assumptions of efficient action have 
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been measured in children, as revealed by increased looking times when observed 
actions violate these assumptions (Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Southgate, Johnson, & 
Csibra, 2008). In many of these studies, however, action efficiency is measured as a 
post-hoc evaluation of behaviour that has already been observed. The experiments 
in this thesis, in contrast, were the first to demonstrate that the principle of efficient 
action plays a major role in the formation of action predictions, forging a perceptual 
reference action that a rational actor would take to achieve their goal given the 
environmental constraints (Chapters Three-Five). As such, they do not only establish 
the principle of action efficiency as a major contributor to goal inference, but also 
identify the features that motivate predictions of efficiency, both those that are 
available prior to the action, such as the presence or absence of obstructing objects 
(Chapter Three) and the agency of the stimuli (Chapter Five), as well as those only 
revealed during the action, such as its motion profile or the hand’s match to target 
objects (Chapter Six). The principle of action efficiency may therefore act as a 
general perceptual reference for observed intentional behaviour, structuring action 
perception in the same way that surrounding illumination structures colour perception 
(Bloj et al., 1999) and the influence of gravity on motion perception (Hubbard, 1995, 
1997), reinforcing the idea that social perception and perception in general may 
develop from similar neural underpinnings or, at the very least, processing principles.  
7.2.1.2  Predictions of action kinematics 
Previous studies that utilized a Representational Momentum paradigm to reveal the 
top-down predictions made during action observation measured perceptual biases 
towards expectations, such that rotating heads were perceived to have rotated even 
further when eye-gaze looked towards the same direction (Hudson & Jellema, 2011; 
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Hudson et al., 2009), and hands were perceived to have reached even closer to goal 
objects when the actor said “I’ll take it!” compared to “I’ll leave it!” (Hudson et al., 
2018; Hudson, Nicholson, Ellis, et al., 2016; Hudson, Nicholson, Simpson, et al., 
2016).  
The experiments in this thesis go beyond this prior work to demonstrate that action 
predictions do not merely reflect abstract goal attribution, creating biases in the 
general direction of inferred action goals that could be attributed to shifts in attention 
or anticipatory eye shifts towards these expected goals (Ambrosini, Costantini, & 
Sinigaglia, 2011). Instead, they show that action predictions reflect the specific 
kinematics that are required to achieve these goals. The experiments in Chapters 
Three, Four and Five reveal shifts in perceptual judgements not towards the ultimate 
goal of the action (the target object) but towards the expected path that the actor 
should take to reach these objects, governed by the principle of efficient action. 
Actions that reached inefficiently straight towards an obstacle were perceptually 
lifted, in line with the expectation of efficiency that the actor would have reached over 
the obstacle, and reaches that inefficiently arched over an empty space were 
perceptually lowered, in line with the expectation that a rational actor would have 
reached straight towards the target. Moreover, making these specific trajectory 
expectations explicit, as demonstrated in Experiments 1b and 1c, increased 
perceptual biases. These findings therefore demonstrate that, in line with predictive 
accounts of perception (Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010), action predictions do not just 
lead to a bias towards inferred goals. Instead, they provide a perceptual reference 
trajectory, detailing the specific expected kinematics at each stage of the action, from 
which the observed action can be compared or integrated, biasing its perceptual 
representation.   
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7.2.1.3  Perceptual predictions 
Predictive models of non-social perception hypothesise that expectation, derived 
from prior knowledge and context, may induce changes to even low-level perception 
(Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010). A famous example is the “dress illusion” whereby 
inferences about the source of light and surrounding environmental context had a 
drastic impact on the perceived colour of a dress, so that some people saw it as 
black and blue while others perceived it as white and gold (Chetverikov & Ivanchei, 
2016). Such effects on low-level perception have also been evidenced in the social 
domain. Apparent motion studies revealed illusory perceptions of motion between 
two images of a hand that were alternately flashed in two different locations 
(Chatterjee, Freyd, & Shiffrar, 1996; Shiffrar & Freyd, 1990,1993). The perceived 
motion did not just reflect lasting after-images on the retina, moved around by 
shifting eye-movements (Kerzel, 2000), but instead revealed specific expectations 
about the action kinematics during these gaps, such that the illusory hand 
movements seem to curve around obstructing objects, revealing the perceptual 
“filling-in” of the missing information during these intervals (Muckli et al., 2005; Yantis 
& Nakama, 1998). In the non-social domain, such a filling-in has been confirmed with 
neuroimaging techniques that reveal corresponding activity in primary visual cortex 
(Ekman, Kok, & de Lange, 2017; Kok, Brouwer, van Gerven, & de Lange, 2013).  
The current thesis adds to prior work by adapting the Representational Momentum 
paradigm (Hubbard, 2005; Shiffrar & Freyd, 1993), which reliably captures low-level 
predictive influences on motion perception, with social stimuli (Hudson, Bach, & 
Nicholson, 2018; Hudson & Jellema, 2011; Hudson, Liu, & Jellema, 2009; Hudson, 
Nicholson, Ellis, & Bach, 2016; Hudson, Nicholson, Simpson, Ellis, & Bach, 2016). 
 
184 
 
The current findings do not only extend this work by revealing specific kinematic 
expectations (see above) but confirm that they act on low-level representations of 
observed actions, revealing their perceptual nature. Experiment 2a was designed to 
rule out explanations of these predictive effects from later changes to the action’s 
representation in working memory or motor-related processes during the touch-
screen responses. Touch-screen responses were therefore replaced by probe stimuli 
(a small red dot) that appeared directly after action offset (with 250 ms. interval), 
either in the predicted direction (e.g. upwards for inefficient straight reaches) or in the 
unpredicted direction. Probe stimuli in the predicted direction were consistently 
misjudged to be in the same position as the last seen image of the hand, compared 
to probes in the unpredicted direction, replicating the predictive effects from 
experiments in Chapter Three. These findings therefore provide evidence against a 
working memory or motor-based explanation as prediction effects were apparent 
immediately after action offset, when working memory does not yet have access to 
visual representations, and were captured using probe judgements that do not rely 
on visuospatial motor maps (Kerzel, 2005).  
More direct evidence for changes to perception are revealed in Experiment 2b. This 
study goes one step further than prior work by employing a novel paradigm to verify 
that these predictive effects do indeed rely on low-level perceptual changes. 
Experiment 2b utilised a dynamic visual noise mask that reliably disrupts low-level 
processing and the integration of top-down information on perception (Breitmeyer & 
Öğmen, 2006; Fahrenfort et al., 2007). The reduction in the perceptual biases 
confirmed that predictions are perceptually represented and bias the perceptual 
representation of observed actions.   
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The experiments in this theses therefore provide evidence that the perceptual 
representation of action predictions can be similarly explained as other perceptual 
biases outside social perception. They can therefore either reflect perceptual “filling 
in” of predicted action kinematics directly after the sudden action offset (Muckli et al., 
2005; Yantis & Nakama, 1998) or changes to ongoing perception, reflecting the 
perceptual sharpening of expected actions (Hammett, 1997; Kok, Jehee, & 
de Lange, 2012; Yon, Gilbert, Lange, & Press, 2018). Nevertheless, either 
explanation reflects direct changes to low-level perceptual representations of action 
towards expected action, providing further support to a predictive account of social 
perception that corresponds with those underlying non-social perception (Clark, 
2013; Friston, 2010). 
7.2.1.4  Online action prediction 
The current work has revealed that the principle of efficient action is part of the prior 
knowledge that is required to form assumptions about the goals and intentions of 
others’ behaviour, driving expectations of their forthcoming actions. This adds to 
prior work that has revealed a reliance upon social cues such as gaze direction 
(Hudson et al., 2009), facial expression (Hudson & Jellema, 2011b; Yoshikawa & 
Sato, 2008), and statements of intent (Hudson et al., 2018; Hudson, Nicholson, Ellis, 
et al., 2016; Hudson, Nicholson, Simpson, et al., 2016) to generate action 
expectations. In the experiments in Chapters Three, Four and Five, prior knowledge 
and contextual information was available from the outset, enabling the formation of 
specific predictions of upcoming actions before they were initiated. For example, 
visual access to the target object, the presence or absence of an obstacle, and the 
agency of the target (hand or ball) was available before the action started, allowing 
 
186 
 
for the formation of goal assumptions and action predictions well in advance. 
However, these highly informative contexts do not generalise to the real world where 
ambiguity and changeability dominate. Often, visual access can be restricted or 
obscured by overlapping features, by changes in viewpoint orientation or by 
competition for attention, for example, all of which can change over time (Yuille & 
Kersten, 2006). The dynamic social world therefore requires an active social 
prediction system that can be updated online, as more information is revealed. 
Indeed, the findings from Chapter Five already provide some evidence of a real-time 
updating of prediction as kinematic information is revealed. In these experiments, the 
same visual information is available prior to action onset in the Biological and Non-
biological ball conditions (i.e. the stationary ball, the target object, and the presence 
or absence of an obstructing object). Therefore, differences found in predictive 
effects are likely to be influenced during the ongoing action as more information 
about from the motion profile is revealed.  
The subsequent experiments in this thesis (Chapter 6) directly tested the updating of 
action predictions when goal information is unavailable prior to action onset and is 
only revealed dynamically during ongoing action observation. These experiments 
capitalized on the idea that the affordances of available objects in a scene provide 
key information about likely goals after the action has already begun (Bach et al., 
2014). Specifically, this information can be revealed by the unfolding match between 
an actor’s hand posture and nearby objects such that a small precision grip predicts 
a reach to a small object and a large power grip to a large object.  
Consistent with an online use of such affordance information, the experiments in 
Chapter Six indeed revealed perceptual biases towards matching target objects. 
They therefore confirm that such affordance matching information contributes to the 
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formation of goal assumptions and predictions about how the action will continue. 
The actor’s hand started at rest in every trial, therefore assumptions about which 
object was the target object was only revealed once the action had initiated and the 
hand began to form a specific grip type. This therefore provides evidence for an 
online updating of action prediction during the ongoing action, as grip information is 
revealed and goal assumptions can be made. The findings go beyond prior work by 
demonstrating that the goals of others’ actions are inferred during the ongoing 
action, when prior goal information is unavailable, updating action predictions online. 
They therefore reveal how we so effortlessly navigate the dynamic social world, 
relying not only on prior knowledge and context, but also on the integration of new 
information as it is received.  
7.2.1.5  Level of representation 
The current work has demonstrated that the perceptual representation of observed 
actions is influenced by the goals that the actor is assumed to hold and how these 
goals are expected to be achieved. The experiments in Chapter Three show how 
high-level reasoning about action efficiency guides low-level processing of others’ 
behaviour and the more these efficiency expectations are made explicit, the more 
they influence action perception. The experiments in Chapter Five and Six reveal 
that goal assumptions do not only rely on such high-level information that is available 
prior to action onset, but also on differences in the low-level kinematic features of the 
action revealed during the ongoing action observation, such as biological motion 
profiles (Chapter Five) and grip formation (Chapter Six). These findings support prior 
work from Representational Momentum studies that show that predictions rely on 
low-level motion features of the stimulus as well as prior knowledge and context 
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(Hudson, Bach, & Nicholson, 2018; Hudson & Jellema, 2011; Hudson, Liu, & 
Jellema, 2009; Hudson, Nicholson, Ellis, & Bach, 2016; Hudson, Nicholson, 
Simpson, Ellis, & Bach, 2016). More broadly, they are consistent with predictive 
processing models that assume that the perceptual experience of the world emerges 
from reciprocal interactions between all levels of the cortical hierarchy (Clark, 2013; 
Csibra, 2008; Friston, 2010; Kilner et al., 2007ab). High-level knowledge cascades 
down each level of the hierarchy generating a perceptual reference image for 
sensory input comparisons. This high-level knowledge is constantly updated by new 
low-level information received by the senses that is transported back up the 
hierarchy and provides input for the generation of new hypotheses. These models 
therefore assume that representations on all levels of the hierarchy remain aligned.  
Surprisingly, the findings from Chapter Six do not support this alignment of low-level 
and high-level information. When participants were asked to explicitly judge the goal 
of the observed action (small strawberry or large apple), although these judgements 
relied on the same grip-match information as perceptual judgements, they did not 
correlate on a subject level or on a trial level (Experiment 4a). Those subjects who 
were more likely to explicitly identify the matched target were not those who showed 
the largest perceptual biases towards these objects, and the same lack of 
relationship was revealed on the individual trial level. Moreover, although participants 
were aware that these goal judgements were required, therefore influencing more 
explicit processing of the action as it unfolded, this awareness had no effect on the 
resulting perceptual biases, as revealed by a lack of difference between predictive 
effects in Experiment 4a compared to Experiment 4b.  
A predictive processing account would of course assume a strong relationship 
between high-level and low-level information, given the connectivity and reciprocity 
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between each level of the processing hierarchy (Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010). Instead, 
the results of Chapter Six suggest that, although each level may receive the same 
input, this information could be processed locally, within the perceptual system for 
biological motion, for example, as well as globally, across all levels (Firestone & 
Scholl, 2015; Scholl & Gao, 2013). As a result, the information probed at the 
perceptual level may contain dissimilarities to that probed at higher levels. Indeed, it 
has recently been argued that visual illusions show exactly such a distinction, in 
which high-level knowledge (“I know both lines are of equal length”) and perceptual 
experience (“One line seems longer.”) diverge (van Buren & Scholl, 2018). 
Indeed, there is now recent evidence that points towards a low-level perceptual 
evaluation of action intention within the perceptual system, independent of higher-
level influence, such as whether one actor chases another (Gao, McCarthy, & Scholl, 
2010), whether an actor pays attention to their reach or whether an actor moves 
certain limbs in a particular direction, dependent on this attention orientation (e.g. 
moving an arm to the left when the actor is attending to this target position, Jellema, 
Baker, Wicker, & Perrett, 2000). The results from Chapter Six therefore do not only 
support such low-level goal attribution, but also suggest that this information is 
directly translated into a prediction of future action, creating biases to the perceptual 
representation of the observed action, independent from predictions generated from 
explicit goal inferences at higher levels.   
Such a mechanism would enhance the efficiency of generating rapid predictions of 
future action, reducing any delay that might result from feedforward and feedback 
information processing between high-level and low-level regions, for example. By 
allowing the generation of goal assumptions and associated predictions within the 
perceptual system itself, the necessary information required to inform own action 
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selection could be available more quickly, facilitating rapid responsive actions that 
could be vital for survival.  
7.1.2 Understanding the actions of others 
Understanding the actions of others is crucial for all social interactions. Through 
action observation, humans can derive the goals, attitudes and beliefs that drive the 
actions of others to gain insight into the meaning of their action, and plan a suitable 
response when required (Bach, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2011; Hamilton, 2009; Sebanz & 
Knoblich, 2009). Predictive processing theories offer a potential mechanism for how 
this is accomplished (Bach et al., 2014; Csibra, 2008; Kilner et al., 2007ab). They 
propose that observers constantly attempt to infer the goals and intentions of others, 
extracting information from prior knowledge and context to not only guess what an 
actor wants to achieve, but to also predict how this will be achieved. Hypotheses 
about an actor’s upcoming actions are then tested by comparing action expectations 
to observed actions as they unfold, such that a good enough match confirms prior 
goal assumptions and mismatches are signalled by prediction errors and require a 
revision to the hypothesis. The experiments in this thesis investigated which 
information is used to inform these action predictions and what impact these 
predictions have on social perception, to provide new avenues to understand how 
action expectations can shape our understanding of other people’s behaviour.   
The current findings provide evidence for such a top down predictive mechanism of 
action understanding, revealing the specific kinematic predictions that observers 
make when watching others’ behaviour. They show that these predictions are 
informed by assumptions of efficient action (Chapter Three), that they are 
perceptually represented (Chapter Four) and rely on cues to intention from the 
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target’s agency, speed and trajectory (Chapter Five). The results further demonstrate 
that action predictions do not only rely on prior knowledge and contextual information 
that is available prior to action onset, but are also dynamically updated during 
ongoing action observation (Chapter Six). Overall, all experiments in this 
demonstrate the influence of these action expectations on action perception, 
distorting their perceptual representation. The findings therefore move away from a 
purely bottom-up account of action perception (Gazzola & Keysers, 2008; Rizzolatti 
& Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010) to support a predictive processing 
account of social perception (Bach et al., 2014; Csibra, 2008; Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 
2007ab), akin to those that underlie perception in general (Clark, 2013; Friston, 
2010), and reveal how we so effortlessly navigate the social world. 
7.3 Remaining questions and future research 
While the findings from the current thesis have provided deeper insights into 
predictive social perception, revealing the cues that inform predictions of other 
people’s actions and their influence on perception, they have also opened up further 
questions about the underlying mechanisms. The following sections highlight these 
questions and propose directions for future research to address them.  
7.1.3 Do predictions reflect knowledge of others’ minds? 
The findings in this thesis confirm that high-level inferences about the goals and 
intentions of others are translated into perceptual predictions of their upcoming 
behaviour. In all experiments of this thesis, however, the actor was deemed rational 
and aware of all target objects and obstacles that might be present, matching the 
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awareness of the participant. In the real world, other people often possess 
knowledge and beliefs that can differ from our own, driving their actions in what 
might be an efficient manner in their reality but not in our own. It therefore remains 
unclear whether the social predictions captured reflect the observer’s own 
knowledge about the world, or the (potentially false) knowledge attributed to the 
other person. Moreover, it remains unclear is how these competing cues to intention, 
from our own reality (e.g. what obstacles we can see) and from assumptions of the 
reality of others (e.g., what obstacles we think they are aware of), come together to 
form a prediction of their upcoming action.  
Future experiments can resolve this by adapting the efficient actions paradigm used 
in this thesis. By manipulating whether the actor appears aware of the presence or 
absence of the obstacle (showing the actor in a blindfold or turned away from the 
scene, for example), could quantify to what extent perceptual biases reflect the 
knowledge of the actor or the knowledge of the participant. If social predictions 
capture the actor’s knowledge about the scene, then biases towards more efficient 
trajectories should be larger when the actor is aware of the scene (i.e. looking 
towards the objects) compared to when they are not aware (blindfolded or turned 
away). Such studies could also test whether perceptual predictions capture other’s 
false beliefs. By having the actor state their (true or false) beliefs about the scene 
prior to action onset (e.g. “There is something in the way!” vs. “The path is clear!”), or 
even changing the scene while they turn away (similar to Sally/Anne tasks, Baron-
Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985), these studies could disentangle whether perceptual 
biases follow the beliefs of the actor or the beliefs of the participant, with the largest 
shifts expected when these beliefs are aligned.  
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Such studies would then confirm whether social predictions not only reflect the 
ambiguity about the content of other’s knowledge (e.g. their general awareness of 
obstacle presence), but also more definitive assumptions about their beliefs that may 
conflict with reality. Such findings would therefore directly link social predictions to 
people’s inferences about another’s mind, as assumed by predictive processing 
models of social perception (Bach et al., 2014; Csibra, 2008; Kilner et al., 2007ab). 
7.1.4 Penetrability of perception 
The experiments in Chapters Three to Five have demonstrated how high-level 
inferences about others’ intentions can guide low-level perceptual processing of their 
actions, with more explicit top-down information exerting more influence on 
perception. These findings are consistent with predictive processing models that 
assume that one’s perceptual experience of the world emerges from reciprocal 
interactions between all levels of the cortical hierarchy (Clark, 2013; Csibra, 2008; 
Friston, 2010; Kilner et al., 2007ab). Strikingly, however, experiments in Chapter Six 
found a lack of difference between perceptual judgements when goals were explicitly 
judged and when they were not (Experiment 4a vs Experiment 4b) and a lack of 
relationship between the perceptual judgements and the explicit goal judgements 
(Experiment 4a), challenging this strong relationship between high-level and low-
level information. Instead, the dissimilarities between information probed at the 
perceptual and higher levels may reflect that the perceptual effects emerge from 
locally constrained – or encapsulated – top-down processing within the perceptual 
system itself, which cannot be penetrated by higher-level knowledge (Firestone & 
Scholl, 2015; Scholl & Gao, 2013).  
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One reason why the relationship between high-level knowledge and low-level 
perception is different in Chapter Six compared to all other experiments could be due 
to differences in experimental design. First, in Chapter Six, in contrast to all previous 
experiments, specific goal assumptions could not be made prior to action onset, only 
unspecific expectations that the actor will reach for one of the two available objects. 
Any precise high-level inferences can therefore only rely on input from low-level 
kinematic information once the action has begun. Second, explicit judgements made 
in Chapter Six were made at the end of the trial and reflect goal identification after 
the action has been observed and evaluated, rather than goal predictions made at 
the start of trial before action onset in the previous experiments. These differences 
suggest that prior knowledge can “tune” the perceptual systems towards expected 
actions or goals when it is available before action onset, but that these influences 
may not be possible when such knowledge is only revealed once the action is 
already underway.  
To test whether ongoing action perception is penetrable by high-level knowledge that 
is only available during the observation, future experiments could utilise the current 
affordance matching paradigm to manipulate how affordance matching information 
should be used to reveal action goals, as instructed before each trial. There is an 
abundance of evidence from behavioural and imaging studies that knowledge of an 
object’s affordance does not only reflect the hand configuration required to move it, 
but also the potentially different configuration required to use it (Bach, Knoblich, 
Gunter, Friederici, & Prinz, 2005; Tucker & Ellis, 1998; van Elk, van Schie, & 
Bekkering, 2014). Moreover, this knowledge is used both to guide action execution 
(Kalénine, Shapiro, Flumini, Borghi, & Buxbaum, 2014; Valyear, Chapman, Gallivan, 
Mark, & Culham, 2011) and to predict and understand the actions of others (Bach et 
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al., 2014, for a review). Future studies could therefore use the same setup as 
Chapter six, but could inform participants, before each trial, about the actor’s 
intention to either “use” or “move” the object the hand is reaching for. These objects 
would again be large or small but chosen so that they require different grips to move 
or use them. For example, a large bottle of fizzy pop requires a large grip to move, 
but a small grip to unscrew the lid. The differing instructions to “move” or “use” would 
provide high-level information about the action’s general goal, but the action’s 
specific target can only be resolved during the ongoing action, once the hand grip is 
revealed. If high-level attribution of other’s goals can indeed penetrate lower-level 
perceptual representations, while actions are already underway, then perceptual 
biases should be recorded towards the object that affords the matching grip type 
required to achieve the stated goal, not just by the general match between grip size 
and goal object.  
7.1.5 When and how is perception distorted? 
The findings from this thesis show that action predictions subtly distort the perceptual 
representation of observed actions (all chapters), and point to an early perceptual 
locus of the effects (Chapter Four). The underlying mechanisms for this predictive 
shaping of social perception are thought to be similar to general mechanisms that 
allows that sensory input to be interpreted in light of prior expectations (Bach et al., 
2014; Csibra, 2008; Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007ab). A striking observation is that 
these top-down influences can act on various stages during stimulus processing. For 
example, Muckli and colleagues (2005) recorded primary visual cortex (V1) 
activation during illusory perception in apparent motion tasks, in the precise 
retinotopic locations for the perceptual “filling-in” of the missing visual information. 
 
196 
 
Other studies have revealed changes to ongoing perception by sharpening the 
sensory input from prior expectations (Hammett, 1997; Kok et al., 2012; Yon et al., 
2018). Here, perceptual expectations reduced overall V1 activity while improving the 
precision of the perceptual representation. Perhaps most in line with the current 
study design is the finding that after training participants with dynamic stimulus sets, 
only presenting the initial stages of these motions triggers V1 activity that resembles 
the perception of the full trajectory (Ekman et al., 2017).  
In contrast to these prior studies, the perceptual distortions in the current 
experiments were measured once the action stimuli had disappeared. It is therefore 
not possible to distinguish whether they appear during ongoing action perception, 
reflecting perceptual sharpening of their representation, or after action offset, 
reflecting a perceptual “filling in” of missing information or pre-play of expected 
action.  
These two possibilities can be distinguished with the flash-lag paradigm, designed to 
probe ongoing motion perception (Kessler, Gordon, Cessford, & Lages, 2010; 
Nijhawan, 1994, 2008). Such paradigms briefly flash a static stimulus over another 
moving stimulus. The flash-lag effect marks the well-established finding that the 
flashed stimulus is perceived to be lagging behind the moving stimulus, even if it is 
objectively in the same position. It therefore demonstrates a predictive change of the 
ongoing perceptual representation of the moving target, displaced further along its 
motion trajectory than it was when the flashed stimulus appeared (Nijhawan, 1994, 
2008). If perceptual changes occur already during action observation, then flashing a 
stimulus over the actor’s hand should elicit a similar lag effect (Kessler et al., 2010). 
Specifically, for efficient action paradigms, the flashed stimulus should appear to be 
lower than it actually was when predicting the hand to lift up over an obstacle, and 
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higher than it actually was when predicting the hand to straighten down towards the 
target. Similarly, for the affordance matching paradigms, a flashed stimulus should 
appear to be lower than it actually was when the hand grip matches the top object, 
and higher when the hand grip matches the bottom object. Such results would reveal 
an online distortion to the perceptual representation of observed actions towards 
expectations that can be revealed not only during ongoing action observation, but 
also after action offset.  
Further neuroimaging studies would confirm whether biases to the perceptual 
representation of observed actions occur during the ongoing observation or in the 
period after their sudden offset. These studies could utilise modern MVPA methods 
with fMRI to reveal the patterns of activation in primary visual cortex elicited by 
predicted actions, to reveal whether action expectations do indeed sharpen their 
perceptual representation (Ekman et al., 2017; Yon et al., 2018). By training MVPA 
classifiers to decode specific reach trajectories (straight or arched) from observed 
actions, these same classifiers should then be able to more easily decode the same 
actions when they are efficient (and therefore predicted) than when they are 
inefficient (and therefore unpredicted), as signalled by the presence or absence of an 
obstacle. Moreover, the neuronal representation of an inefficient straight reach 
should therefore take on features of the predicted arched reach, and vice versa for 
inefficient arched reaches. Furthermore, the extent to which inefficient actions elicit 
activation patterns that more resemble those for an efficient reach should correlate 
with the size of their subsequent perceptual biases from touch-screen judgements. 
These findings would confirm a perceptual sharpening account of social perception, 
revealing ongoing changes to action perception towards expectations.  
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7.1.6 Do eye-movements play a role in social perception? 
The current findings reveal perceptual biases to action representations in the 
direction of expectations. In the prior literature, such predictive shifts have often been 
captured by anticipatory eye movements, whereby eye gaze is shifted towards 
potential goal objects before the actor has reached them (Ambrosini et al., 2011; 
Costantini, Ambrosini, & Sinigaglia, 2012; Eshuis, Coventry, & Vulchanova, 2009). 
As noted above, the present results go beyond these findings. In the efficient actions 
paradigm (Chapters Three, Four and Five), biases were not simply shifted towards 
the target object, but towards the predicted path that an efficient actor would take to 
reach this goal (i.e. upwards to avoid an obstacle or straight towards the goal). The 
results therefore reveal that predictions do not just reflect unspecific goal inferences, 
but the precise action kinematics that are required to achieve these goals. 
Nevertheless, since eye movements were not controlled for in these studies, it 
remains unclear what role they play, if any, in these predictive effects.  
The role of predictive eye movements has been hotly debated in the 
Representational Momentum literature, with inconsistent reports of their influence on 
perceptual biases (Hubbard, 2005, 2006; Kerzel, 2000, 2003, 2005; Kerzel, Jordan, 
& Müsseler, 2001). Kerzel (2000) recorded smooth pursuit eye movements during 
the observation of a continuously moving target and found that they continued to 
move in the direction of motion for a short period even after target offset. Given that 
a target persists on the retina for 50-60 milliseconds after its offset, and that forward 
biases in Representational Momentum disappear when the eyes were fixated, he 
therefore argued that the representational momentum effect might therefore reflect 
such ocular overshoots, instead of genuine perceptual changes (Kerzel, 2000).  
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A problem for such views is that overshoots specifically result from smooth pursuit 
eye movements, as in Kerzel’s studies. They therefore do not explain the forward 
biases elicited by apparent motion and frozen action photographs, when smooth 
pursuit is not possible (Hubbard, 2005, 2006, 2017), and which therefore mostly 
likely reflect perceptual prediction. The experiments in this thesis specifically avoided 
inducing smooth pursuit eye movements for this very reason, by only presenting 
every third frame of the action, creating non-smooth, “apparent” motion, making a 
contribution of ocular overshoot due to smooth pursuit eye movements unlikely 
(Hubbard, 2006, 2017; Kerzel, 2005). 
To fully rule out a role of eye movements, future studies could use an eye tracker to 
capture the ocular movements as perceptual judgements are being made. However, 
even if eye movements and perceptual biases closely align, this would not provide 
unequivocal evidence for a role of eye movements in generating perceptual effects. 
In particular, such findings would not be able to distinguish whether ocular behaviour 
occurs as a consequence of perceptual change, or whether predictions, instead, 
steer eye movements towards expected locations, carrying with them visual 
persistence of the final image (Kerzel, 2000, 2006). In other words, rather than being 
generated by eye movements, it is possible that perceptual representations have 
been changed to guide the eyes to predicted future positions (Krauzlis & Stone, 
1999). Indeed, such a role has been specifically proposed for representational 
momentum-like effects (Hubbard, 2006).     
To resolve such “cause or effect” questions, future studies could employ variants of 
the Representational Momentum design in which eye movements are ruled out. For 
example, eye movements and retinal afterimages are only a problem for movements 
in the horizontal plane (i.e. actions in side view), but not for movements in depth (i.e. 
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towards/away from oneself), which primarily lead to objects becoming visually larger 
or smaller (Webster, 2011). Consider a task in which participants see a static image 
of an actor holding an object out to them. The actor then either says “I’ll keep it for 
me!” or “I’ll give it to you!” to elicit expectations of forwards or backwards 
movements. The hand would then either reach out towards the participant, 
increasing in size as it nears, or withdraw away from the participant and reduce in 
size. The sudden offset of the action would be replaced with a probe image that is 
either slightly larger (as if it had moved closer), smaller (as if it was further away) or 
the same size as the last image. If goal attribution directly shapes action perception, 
then approaching actions should appear even larger when an approach was 
expected, compared to a withdrawal and withdrawing actions should appear even 
smaller when a withdrawal was expected, compared to an approach, and these 
perceptual biases would be reflected in their probe judgements. Such results would 
provide direct evidence that perceptual changes can be induced in the absence of 
eye movements (Kerzel, 2000, 2006), cannot be explained by visual persistence (the 
image changes in size), and that they therefore result from changes to the action’s 
perceptual representation. 
7.1.7 How are perceptual predictions updated? 
The findings in this thesis support predictive processing theories of social perception 
(Bach et al., 2014; Csibra, 2008; Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007ab) by revealing the 
top-down influence of expectation on action observation that distort their perceptual 
representation. These predictive processing models view perception as a process of 
hypothesis testing and revision. However, the experiments so far only tested the 
downstream effect of prior knowledge, as measured by its effects on perception. 
 
201 
 
They leave open whether large enough mismatches between predictions and 
observations, in turn, are propagated back upwards to change prior inferences of the 
action. What therefore remains to be determined is the extent to which goal 
assumptions are revised when the incoming information does not support the initial 
hypothesis, as signalled by prediction errors (e.g. when clearly seeing a straight 
reach despite an obstacle being in the way).  
In predictive processing models (e.g. Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010), perceptual 
representations emerge from a Bayesian integration of what was predicted and what 
was observed, with more weight being placed on expectations the more the input is 
ambiguous (Kok et al., 2013; Lages, Boyle, & Jenkins, 2017). The perceptual biases 
captured here therefore reflect the influence of top down predictions when observing 
short and rapid action clips, which are subject to considerable uncertainty (Kok et al., 
2013; Lages et al., 2017). Such settings are typical in the real world, where multiple 
sources of information are combined to generate expectations of others’ behaviour 
which, when observed, occur rapidly, often behind multiple occluders and in 
environments with endless opportunities for action. For example, at a busy road 
crossing, you just know that the hurrying pedestrian with their hand held out will 
press the button, perhaps multiple times, despite many cars and other pedestrians 
obscuring your view of their action. Predictions, in such models, are therefore more 
likely to be updated the more precise (less ambiguous) the input becomes, and the 
more it diverges from prior expectations (Clark, 2013; Friston & Kiebel, 2009).  
The updating of goal assumptions can be directly tested by introducing post-action 
judgements at the end of each trial, similar to the experiments in Chapter Six. In the 
context of the action efficiency experiments in this thesis, for example, participants 
would still report the hand’s last seen position (via touch or probe judgments), but 
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additionally report how confident they are about what they saw. These judgements 
could probe both the kinematics features that participants believe they saw (i.e. did 
the actor make a straight or arched reach?) as well as high-level judgements about 
inferred mental states (i.e. did the actor see the obstacle or not?). By manipulating 
the ambiguity of the input – for example, by varying how long each action is seen –  
revisions of prior expectations can be tracked as the input becomes more precise. 
One would expect that these explicit judgments follow the initial expectations 
provided by the context (e.g. an obstacle in the way) the more ambiguous the action 
input is but diverge from these expectations – and become updated – the more 
precise it is. Importantly, one could then again track the relationship between explicit 
judgments and perceptual biases. In particular, it is expected that both measures 
would be closely related across trials, such that the more an inefficient reach towards 
as obstacle is perceptually lifted over the obstacle, the less likely they are to detect 
that the reach was actually straight, for example. Such findings would point to a 
close alignment of perceptual and high-level judgments, as assumed by predictive 
processing models of social perception (Bach et al., 2014; Csibra, 2008; Kilner et al., 
2007ab). 
The results from the current experiments (Chapters Three, Four and Five) already 
point to such a process. They imply that goal assumptions are not revised, and that 
participants continue to believe that the actor is aware of the presence or absence of 
obstacles (otherwise they would not show perceptual biases). They suggest that 
perceptual biases towards expectations may act as a “perceptual confirmation bias” 
that prevents this updating, limiting the detection of a mismatch. 
Future experiments could track this interplay between perceptual evidence and prior 
expectation and reveal at what point the mismatch become too large, such that 
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perception is no longer biased, and a revision to the prediction is forced instead. To 
resolve this question, future studies can utilise the current paradigm and subtly 
manipulate the kinematics of the action, such that the observed action is gradually 
shifted away from the predicted trajectory. For example, some actions would clearly 
resemble a straight reach, whereas others vary from a  slight arch to a more extreme 
arched trajectory. It is expected that, initially, a perceptual bias would be induced, so 
that a slight arch remains undetected. As the action becomes progressively further 
from the predicted straight reach, the point at which a difference is perceived can be 
captured by gradual changes in perceptual biases and post-action judgements. 
7.4 Summary and conclusion 
Understanding the actions of others is crucial for all social interactions. Despite a 
dynamic and complicated social world, humans can derive the goals, attitudes and 
beliefs that drive the actions of others, imbuing them with meaning and 
understanding (Hamilton & Grafton, 2007; Press, Heyes, & Kilner, 2011). The current 
thesis revealed that predictions play a large part in these abilities. By integrating the 
knowledge about others (e.g. their mental states) with observations of their actions, 
expectations of their upcoming movements can be derived (Bach et al., 2014; 
Csibra, 2008; Kilner et al., 2007ab). These action predictions can then provide a 
perceptual reference image that guides observation, akin to processes in non-social 
perception (Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010; Friston & Kiebel, 2009). The current research 
showed (1) that such expectations take place during social perception, (2) that they 
shape the observation of others’ action, (3) in line with the principle of efficient 
action, (4) guided by the goals and intentions attributed to the other person. It 
therefore confirms that the perceptual representation of others’ actions is biased by 
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the intentions we assign to them and our expectations of how these intentions will be 
fulfilled. Future research must now address how multiple sources of intention 
information are integrated, how they are translated into low-level kinematic 
predictions, when and how they influence perception, and how they are updated by 
new information.  
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